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CHAPTER ONE
THE TRANSITION TO POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
1The Dimensions of the Transition
This study is premised on the proposition that the 
social fields of advanced industrial societies, considered 
as the milieux for the purposive social behaviours of 
individuals, groups and organizations, are becoming subject 
to important qualitative changes in their structure and 
dynamics, which will necessitate new forms of individual 
and organizational adaptation. The evolution of such 
environments towards a state that has been characterized 
as 'turbulent' from the point of view of purposive human 
activities, appears to represent the configuration of four 
prevalent and very persistent tendencies operating within 
the technologically advanced societies: high and accelerating
rates of technological and social change; uneveness in the 
rates of change among the constituent parts of the field; 
increasing interconnectedness and interdependence among 
these parts; and increasing overall size and complexity of 
the social field.
It is now widely believed that these changes are 
indicative of the transformation of industrial society, 
though there is less concurrence of opinion as to the form 
of society that is emerging. Of the designations that have 
been popularized, a number of them have given special 
emphasis to a limited facet of the developing societal 
structure. 'The affluent society' and 'the atomic age', 
now less fashionable than 'the service state' and 'the 
electronic age', are designations of this sort. Brzezinski's 
'technetronic era', Boulding's 'post-civilized society', 
and Toffler's 'super-industrial society' are more encompass­
ing terms, and analysis reveals a good deal of overlap 
amongst them. Here, however, the term popularised by 
Daniel Bell, 'post-industrial' society, is preferred."*" Its
1
Brzezinski [1968] , Boulding [1964] , Toffler [1970] , <
Bell [1967].
2advantage, as Trist has pointed out, lies in the implication 
of its metaphor:
that we may not assume that the present social 
order will continue indefinitely; rather must 
we prepare ourselves to assist the emergence of 
a society radically different from the industrial 
societies which have evolved in the last two 
hundred years - whether these remain substan­
tially capitalistic or have taken on either a 
mixed or a socialistic complexion. [Emery and 
Trist:1972:157]
Industrial society, now undergoing transition, may be 
characterized as a manufacturing society, dominated by the 
production systems of secondary industry, whose development 
is geared to the exploitation of natural resources and a 
system of trade considerably dependent upon international 
relations. It is a system in which most of the important 
roles are occupied by adult males, as workers, decision­
makers, and 'bread-winners', and in which families, as a 
consequence, are 'nucleated'. In such a society the state 
has three fundamental roles: to create and regulate the
conditions under which production and productivity can be 
maintained; to provide for a comprehensive education system 
that is capable of meeting the necessary manpower require­
ments ; and to provide for the casualties of industrialism - 
the poor, the sick, the aged, etc.
The concept of post-industrialism challenges the 
prevailing unreflective assumptions of the relative 
permanence and stability of these structures and their 
implications for our personal worlds. It challenges in 
particular the concepts of planning that have been developed 
and applied in industrial society, for planning has a 
special concern with trying to anticipate the shape of the 
future. If, as we believe, industrial society is undergoing 
a radical transformation, then it is certain that our 
attitudes towards, and methods of planning are going to
require revision. In fact, as will be discussed, such a 
're-think' has already begun.
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The first part of our argument is applied to 
describing the transformation that is taking place, and 
putting forward an interpretive framework. The second part 
applies this framework to planning activity and tries to 
formulate a new concept of planning that is appropriate to 
the conditions that are emerging in society.
In discussing the nature and the dimensions of 
the changes that are taking place - in particular those 
changes which have significant consequences for a social 
system's efforts to plan its future - the concept of social 
field has been adopted in preference to the concepts of 
society or social structure, although of course these terms 
are used. The field concept conforms to the 'world 
hypothesis' of contextualism, for which the 'root metaphor' 
is the historical event or act [Pepper:1942]. Contextualism's 
basic categories are contexts or complexes, which as 
explicans, are taken into consideration from whatever source 
they come and interpreted one by one, as they occur. The 
'world hypothesis' to which the field concept conforms is 
synthetic and dispersive, standing in direct contrast with 
the mechanistic world hypothesis, which is analytic and 
integrative, but differing also from the organicist and 
formistic hypotheses [Pepper's four 'world hypotheses' also 
discussed below, p.56ff].
The essential reference of the field concept is 
topological, and it leads to the interpretation of events 
and processes in terms of such genotypical properties as 
position, force, direction, velocity, mass, barrier, and 
so on - properties that are descriptive of the structure 
and dynamics of the field. The concepts of society and
4social structure that have developed in sociology and 
anthropology do not tend to lead to interpretations of this 
sort, but promote instead a mode of interpretation that is 
constrained by 'classificatory' thinking and ordered to 
entities rather than events as the basis data.
This is especially true of both mechanical and 
organic models of society, which, when taken at all literally, 
tend to exclude any means of interpreting and articulating 
the processes of mediation between the main structural 
components, the entities, and the parts of which they are 
constituted - between the social group and the psychological 
individual. The distinguished success of such models in 
understanding machines and organic life is no guarantee at 
all of their utility in understanding social systems, whose 
constituent parts are not only dynamic and animate, but are 
in themselves purposeful.
Certain widely accepted sociological concepts are 
readily assimable to the field-theoretic approach - the in­
group versus out-group distinction made by Sumner, Cooley's 
distinction between primary and secondary groups, and the 
more recent concepts of reference group and relative 
deprivation, for example. Many others are not - the 
categories of upper, middle and lower class used in stratifi­
cation studies (Marx's bourgeosie and proletariat are by 
contrast dynamic concepts), the church-sect typology, the 
distinction between formal and informal organization in 
organization theory, and so on. Where possible, field- 
theoretic terms will be used throughout in preference to 
'Aristotlean', class-theoretic terms.
Although the basic analogue for a field theory 
of social behaviour may have been mechanisitic in origin - 
the gravitational and electro-magnetic fields of physics - 
its fullest development in the behavioural sciences, in
5the work of Lewin [1935, 1936] and Brown [1936] is whole­
heartedly contextualist in character. Lewin's topological 
psychology and his concept of life-space presented the 
psychological field as a spatial construct, a region, to 
which our phenomenal descriptions of psychological behaviour 
can be ordered. The social field is a methodologically 
equivalent construct for ordering sociological and socio- 
psychological behaviour.
The social field precedes and endures beyond the 
individual life-time, coming into existence for the individual 
with socialization. The individual is a carrier of the 
field in the collectives that he becomes part of - family, 
community, formal organization, nation, and so on, but 
membership of these collectives alters the field for him 
and for the other members. The strength of an organizational 
'philosophy', of class consciousness, or of group cohesion 
is thus to an extent a measure of the degree to which the 
social field is unified for a collection of individuals, 
the extent to which a given social field is shared. The 
social field exists only in and through individuals, but on 
account of its pervasiveness and persistence - its spatio- 
temporal expanse and its historical duration - it achieves 
a phenomenological independence as the 'ground' on which 
social life is sustained, a relatively stable domain within 
which the effects of action and interaction are calculable 
to a degree that permits the maintenance of social order.
The social field is not to be thought of as simply 
a passive medium however, as a backcloth against which social 
behaviour is acted out. It is a region in which all the 
points have positional values, of direction and magnitude, 
and in which the total distribution of forces determines 
the value of positions within it. Behaviours available to 
the organism, individual, or group, are not therefore freely
6variable, but are conditioned by the properties of the field 
as a whole. The goals to which activity is directed, and 
the strength and persistence with which goals are sought, 
are not determined solely by the actor, but are jointly 
determined by the actor and the structure and energy distri­
bution of the field. Global characteristics of the relevant 
field such as its degree of stability or instability, 
homogeneity or heterogeneity, its overall size and complexity, 
and the degree of interdependence between its parts, as well 
as the more localised texture of the immediate action 
situation, have a determinative influence over the choice, 
structure, and success of behaviours.
The social field is therefore not simply a spatio- 
temporal distribution of persons and objects, but is a region 
of social and psychological forces which constrain the 
striving and avoidance behaviours of individuals and 
collectivities. Individuals and social collectives may 
therefore be implicated in fields from which they are 
geographically distant. Both love and emnity between 
persons can endure across oceans and across decades. The 
espionage agent in a foreign land, the infantry patrol behind 
the enemy lines, the commercial salesman out in his territory - 
each of these is responsive to field forces which emanate 
from the distant 'base' as well as the immediate situation 
that is confronted. The full power of forces such as these 
is most completely experienced by those who try to escape 
them - the political defector, the deserter, and the 
escaped convict.
Equally, the field may be reduced to insignificance, 
or go out of existence for actors physically present in its 
midst. Thus total institutions such as monasteries and 
mental hospitals can have the effect for their 'inmates' 
of erasing the extended social field outside the institutional
7boundaries and localising the experiential world almost 
entirely within its confines. For individuals, the experience 
of immense loneliness within a large and busy city is a 
classic example.
The field concept is radically a-historical, and 
in this respect represents a starting point quite different 
from the concept of society. Only those forces actually 
operating on the person or the group in the present are held 
capable of having effects. The social field, like the life- 
space, does however have a forward and a backward reference, 
such that events which have happened, and events which are 
yet to occur or are anticipated, may have effects in the 
present through the medium of the brain's memory function 
and through the adoption of goals and purposes. Just as 
past traumas and cherished ambitions operate as contemporaneous 
forces in the life-space of the individual, so too, past 
experiences which have been shared by many people, such as 
the World Wars and the Depression, and shared anticipations 
about the outcome, for example, of a General Election, 
enrich the quality of social fields by incorporating elements 
of the past and the future.
In general, the extension of the social field 
cannot be represented categorically, but only relationally.
It is a function of the way in which the constituent parts 
perceive their interconnectedness with other parts - their 
comprehension of their own dependency upon the behaviours 
of other parts and of the ways in which their own behaviours 
influence the behaviours of other parts. In some instances 
therefore the social field may transcend national boundaries, 
in other instances it is included within them. 'Jet-set' 
connotes at least an embryonic social field that is supra­
national, and aspects of social fields that are conditioned 
by world religions similarly extend across societal boundaries. 
The main intra-societal differentiation in modern society
tends to be between urban and.rural fields, but many other 
regional, functional and cultural differentiations exist.
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The transformation of the social field thus refers 
to changes in the structure and the dynamics of the social 
and psychological environments in which the behaviour of 
groups and individuals takes place. Just as with gravita­
tional and magnetic fields, the global properties of the 
social field - the overall distribution of forces - influences 
all activities within the field. Our main purpose in 
trying to understand the current transformation of social 
fields in highly industrialized societies is to arrive at 
an appreciation of the implication in this transformation 
particularly for planning activity.
We now return to a discussion of the four main 
dimensions of this transformation that were identified at 
the very beginning.
1. Acceleration of change
Large-scale and persistent technological change, 
with its attendant impacts on the social structure has, 
since the first unfolding of the industrial revolution, 
become ubiquitous within the western societies. The internal 
logic of machine-based production systems geared to an 
expanding free enterprise market system has entailed a heavy 
and rising investment in technological innovation as a means 
to the survival and expansion of economic enterprises in the 
face of constant competitive challenge. Change, we have 
long learned to live with. The essential novelty that we 
now have to come to terms with is the accelerating rate of 
change in a number of key areas of contemporary social 
systems. As David Loeks has put it:
There is an increasing awareness that man now 
stands well past the threshold of a universally
9urbanized, industrialized, technologically 
sophisticated world. The nature of his response 
to these circumstances is and will be dominated 
by the overweening fact of accelerated change: 
unprecedented, explosive, and for the foreseeable 
future at least, continuing. [Loeks:1967:347]
Statistics relating to per capita consumptions of 
energy, car ownership, computer speeds and capacities, 
average standards of living, productivity of labour, propor­
tions of a society in the 'learning force' - all these and 
thousands of other dimensions combine to suggest that the 
industrialised societies are not merely climbing a gradient, 
but are mounting a steep and sharply rising curve with respect 
to the material means of life.
The twentieth century marks the middle period of 
a great transition in the state of the human 
race. It may properly be called the second great 
transition in the history of mankind. The first 
transition was that from precivilized to civilized 
society which began to take place about five 
thousand years ago...(The second) may be called 
the transition from civilized to post-civilized 
s ociety.
Part of the evidence is that:
...as far as many statistical series related to 
activities of mankind are concerned, the date 
that divides human history into two equal parts 
is well within living memory. [Boulding:1964:1-2]
Individually apprehended, trends such as these do not unduly 
impress or disturb. In combination however, they are both 
reflected in, and are a determining factor behind, some of 
the massive structural shifts that are currently threatening 
to engulf our major social policy-making institutions. The 
emergence of government as the biggest capitalist of all, a 
massive employer and the main dispenser of social welfare, 
has created fundamental problems concerning the relations 
to be developed between government and industry, the political 
system and the economic, and is thrusting a new responsibility
10
upon the administrative arm of governments, commensurate 
with increasing governmental power.^
Deeply ingrained assumptions bearing upon the 
'natural' life cycle of family dependency, education, 
marriage and employment, and eventual retirement are having 
to be modified as mass secondary education and the advent of 
'continuing' education shift the balance of numbers between 
the labour force and the learning force in favour of the 
latter; as the service sector takes over from manufacturing 
as the predominant employer of labour, and the balance of 
work to leisure time alters; as 'non-linearity' of educational 
and career lines becomes possible with the expansion and 
diversification of education and the general attainment of 
higher levels of basic education, and with the greater ease 
of geographical and occupational mobility.
Finally, and perhaps most dramatically, the 
accelerating pace and scale of urbanization, crystallized 
in the unprecedented growth of the world's cities, epitomises 
in material form the dominance of man over nature in which 
all technology plays a part. Here, as in many other areas, 
the obsolescence of concepts is testimony to the pace of 
change. 'Town and country planning' may have been a brash 
and imaginative designation in its day, but as a conceptual 
tool for approaching the contemporary tumult of London or 
Chicago it would seem a little quaint. 'City' has had to 
be supplanted by 'connurbation' and subsequently by 'megalopolis' 
in order that we may conceptually encompass the new dimensions 
of the urban phenomenon. More recently still the notions of 
'Ecumenopolis' and 'Urban Field' encourage a still wider
2
See Shonfield [1969] for analysis and speculation on the 
changing roles and relations of the corporation and the 
state in modern society.
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view of the urbanization of the world.
Alvin Toffler has coined the term 'future shock' 
to refer to the psychological bewilderment and disorientation 
that may affect individuals, groups and entire cultures when 
the rate of change in their environments outstrips their 
adaptive capacities:
Future shock is a time phenomenon, a product of 
the greatly accelerated rate of change in society.
It arises from the superimposition of a new 
culture on an old one. It is culture shock in 
ones own society.
The concept of future shock... suggests that there 
must be balance, not merely between the rates of 
change in different sectors, but between the 
pace of environmental change and the limited 
pace of human response. For future shock grows 
out of the increasing lag between the two.
[Toffler:1970:13, 5]
In associating his concept with the parallel term 'culture 
shock', he argues that the culture of the future is likely to 
be so radically different from the present, and at the same 
time will invade the present so rapidly, that the effect on 
individuals and groups will be directly analogous to that of 
a lateral shift between two existing but quite dissimilar 
cultures. His concepts and his intuitions correspond 
encouragingly with the concept of 'turbulence' which has 
been subject to a quite separate development during the last 
decade, and particularly in the identification of accelerating 
rates of change as a major contributory factor in the emergence 
of qualitatively novel social -environments.
2. Uneveness of change
The second contributory factor augments in a 
significant way the impact of accelerating change per se. 
The uneveness of change rates across the manifold segments
and dimensions of extended social fields widens the range of
12
opportunities between differently situated groups, thereby 
supporting tendencies towards social segmentation and creating
4wider possibilities for sentiments of 'relative deprivation', 
as more groups perceive themselves as disadvantaged compared 
to the standards of welfare of the more rapidly advancing 
parts of the system.
It is useful to distinguish two components of the 
effects of differential change rates among the parts of a 
complex and dynamic system. One result is the structural 
effect of differentiation per se, revealed in increasing 
heterogeneity of the system as a whole. Thus freshmen classes 
and recruit intakes at a military induction centre begin as 
relatively homogeneous groups which subsequently differentiate 
over time with respect to criteria of educational attainment 
and leadership ability. The second component is the 
processual effect of 'friction', which can be expected to 
occur wherever contiguous parts of a system move at differen­
tial speeds or in different directions. Differentiation 
engenders segmentation, and creates problems of the 
co-ordination and regulation of parts; 'friction' engenders 
conflict, tension, and resistances, creating problems of 
conflict, resolution and tension reduction - social and 
organizational 'lubrication'.
The manifestations and consequences of uneven 
change rates among the parts of societies have become the 
daily fare of the mass media, though they naturally lean in 
favour of reporting the conflicts and the abrasiveness which 
issue from differential change, and are inclined to leave the 
'mapping' of social segmentation to the statistical bureaus 
and the academic world.
The reality of a widening generation gap has become 
more and more conspicuous since the Second World War, to the 
extent that a generational 'bi-culturalism' can be discerned
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in the advanced societies. Dominant societal issues in the 
United States such as integration and civil rights, the draft, 
and the role of the universities, have reverberated through­
out the western world and have become the catalysts of a broad 
age polarization. It is the moral issues of individual and 
social values in the contemporary world where the cleavage 
is most directly experienced. The phenomenon castigated as 
'permissiveness' by older people is embraced as 'self- 
actualization' by the young. The life experiences, values 
and expectations of the young and the old are geared to 
different futures. The dimensions of the divide as well as 
some of its consequences are being recorded for posterity 
by the judiciary, for in the transcripts of trials hearing 
charges against anti-war protesters, draft resisters, and the 
publishers of underground newspapers one finds encapsulated 
the clash of radically different, generation-based value 
systems.
Uneven change rates are discernable too between
the 'permanently disadvantaged' poor and the affluent masses,
between the whites and the negro in America, between the
developed and the developing nations. As far as their means
of existence are concerned the populations of outlying rural
districts are vulnerable to becoming 'trapped' in the same
manner as the disadvantaged, 'ghettoized' minorities in the
cities, and welfare agencies have found the problems of both
3groups difficult to meet in an effective way. The recent 
'insurrection' of French agricultural workers, and the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, which is currently attaining 
the proportions of civil war, are each symptoms of friction 
between groups which are advancing materially at different
3
Despite massive government subsidies, the economic plight 
of Australia's far outback dwellers for example is beginning 
to seem quite hopeless.
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rates - farmers and industrialists, catholics and protestants.
More has been written about the structural handicaps
of pre-industrial societies trying to accumulate sufficient
surplus resources for the investment necessary for economic
'take-off'. A few, like Mexico and Israel, seem to have got
over the 'hump' with the assistance of heavy foreign aid,
but there are dozens of other societies still struggling to
provide a basic subsistence for their expanding populations
(e.g. India), or stalled at the point where they can produce
enough to keep pace with population growth but not enough to
4be able to tool up for industrialisation (e.g. Indonesia).
The crises latent in this state of affairs are described by 
Horowitz:
Destitution, malnutrition and distressingly low- 
standards of living are aggravated by sociological 
and psychological conditions. The 'demonstration 
effect' of modern civilization and of standards 
of living superior to those of the overwhelming 
majority of the people in underdeveloped countries 
is conveyed to the latter by the media of mass 
communication - radio, motion pictures, etc.
The socio-political repercussions of the gap 
between the two major areas of the world, that 
is to say, between the industrialized and the 
underdeveloped areas, are thus magnified. The 
industrialized sector now faces the urgent challenge 
of either mitigating these politically explosive 
frictions and antagonisms, or of taking the 
consequences, which may be serious. A new approach 
to the interrelationship between the developed 
and the underdeveloped parts of the world has 
become inevitable. The affluent sector of the 
world cannot remain a quiet island in the midst 
of a stormy ocean, an oasis of prosperity in a 
desert of desperate poverty. [Horowitz:1966:5].
There is one dimension of the kind of societal
4
The United Nations and the OECD definitions of a 'developing 
country' are given in Moyes and Hayter [1964]. They list a 
total of 153 societies of which approximately 34 are 
'industrialized' according to OECD criteria.
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development imbalances that we have been talking about, which 
seems in a significant way to lie behind the more specific 
manifestations. It is located in the seaming paradox that 
while scientific advance, and its translation into technology, 
has created the potential for a world of plenty and put the 
natural order at our feet, nevertheless the welfare and even 
the survivial of a vast proportion of the world's population 
is as seriously threatened as at any other period of time. 
Elting Morison has put it this way:
...we may be caught in the irony that at the very 
moment when by our wit we have developed the means 
to give us considerable control over Qur resistant 
natural environment, we find we have produced in 
the means themselves an artificial environment of 
such complication that we cannot control it.
[Morison:1966:209]
At base the fault seems to be that our knowledge grows faster 
than our ability to use it; our decision-making institutions 
have been outdated by the growing complexity and unpredicta­
bility of the phenomena about which decisions have to made:
For many years our technological knowledge has 
been rapidly outpacing our decision-making 
institutions.... Until the 19th century, society 
usually showed great capacity for assimilating 
new scientific and technological information and 
putting it to rather wide use. Among the novel 
social adjustments to new knowledge were, for 
example, the limited-liability corporation, 
central planning units, the mass-denocratic state, 
independent regulatory commissions, and professional 
managers. However, the technologies and theories 
of most of the older scientific knowledge did not 
deal directly with the central institutions and 
values of society.... It is modern science that 
has made the relationship between knowledge and 
social action a radical problem....
I can see only a continuously accelerating rate 
of innovation in most branches of science. The 
knowledge these innovations will crsate will be 
able either to destroy mankind physically and 
socially or, if it used to our best advantage, 
to lift mankind to new heights of individual and
16
social existence. The problem of integrating 
knowledge and social action is therefore 
becoming both more difficult and more critical.
[Dror : 1968 : 3-5]
It is perhaps not too immodest to suggest that social science
understandings are now urgently required to redress the
balance between our technical capacities and our social,
5political and economic wisdom.
Again the United States offers the most poignant 
examples, but they are descriptive of a general characteristic 
of advanced industrial society. The nation that has awed 
the world with the technical triumphs of the Apollo moon 
missions, pioneered the revolutionary Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting-Scheduling system in government administration, 
and successfully devastated vast tracts of the Vietnamese 
landscape with its highly sophisticated armaments and 
'delivery systems', has not been able to develop the social 
and institutional controls needed to handle the problems of 
waste and pollution and restore sanity to the problems of 
movement in the city. There is no longer even a clear 
conception of 'victory' to guide the war machine. Insofar 
as the 'lag' involved here is in the maturity of our 
institutional arrangements for decision-making, policy­
making and planning, then we are in need of s.ome sort of 
organizational revolution in order to over-step the traditional 
bureaucratic thought-modes which are the legacy of early 
forms of mass production and professional civil services, 
and the influences of Taylor and Weber. If our understanding 
and control of nuclear fission can be replicated for planning 
and policy-making, then this basic component of uneveness of
5
Some imbalances of this sort, between government, technology, 
and social problems, are discussed by Sayre and Smith [1969] 
in terms of the relative degrees of political and technological 
'readiness' for particular societal innovations.
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growth will have been substantially removed.
Our use of the concept of 'lag' draws attention to 
a much earlier appreciation of the significance of uneven 
development. William Ogburn first used the concept of 
'cultural lag' in 1914, developed the idea into a theory in 
the following year, and published it in his work on 'Social 
Change' in 1922. In that book he writes:
The thesis is that the various parts of modern 
culture are not changing at the same rate, some 
parts are changing much more rapidly than others; 
and that since there is a correlation and inter­
dependence of parts, a rapid change in one part 
of our culture requires readjustments through 
changes in the various correlated parts of 
culture. [Ogburn:1950:200-201]
Commenting much later on his earlier work, he further explains 
that:
A cultural lag is independent of the nature of 
the initiating part or of the lagging part, 
provided that they are interconnected. The 
independent variable may be technological, 
economic, political, ideological, or anything 
else. [Ogburn : 1964 : 91]
The appearance of technological determinism in his earlier 
writing he subscribes to the fact that: "In our times in
the western world, technology and science are the great prime 
movers of social change. That this is so is an almost 
universal observation." [ibid:91].
We have noted above that uneveness of growth must 
be viewed as augmenting the effects of rapid change itself. 
More than 30 years after he first developed his theory Ogburn 
writes:
The application of the theory to modern times 
suggests a possible appendix to the theory 
which runs like this: The number of patents,
discoveries in applied science, and inventions 
has been increasing in something like an
18
exponential curve. Most of these are minor; but 
important ones have been coming very rapidly....
As these discoveries and inventions are adopted, 
we must adjust to them; we must adapt ourselves 
to this changing environment, but we do it with 
a certain amount of lag. So an addendum to the 
theory of cultural lags is that lags accumulate 
because of the great rapidity and volume of 
technological change. [ibid:92]
We should perhaps note that Marx's dialectical 
materialism already contained the core ideas of structural 
lag and its consequences for a social system. In fact the 
thesis occurs in Marx in its most exaggerated form. His 
radical dichotomization of 'the parts of culture' and the 
emphasis of the one fundamental connection between them, that 
of their relations to the means of production, distills the 
essential idea of the consequences of differential growth 
rates. The material advance of the bourgeoisie, and their 
exploitation of the proletariat, culminating in the working- 
class revolution, is a model of the ideas we have been 
concerned with.
3. Increasing interdependence
A third aspect of the current transformation of 
social fields is the increasing ecological interdependence 
among the parts of the field, which seems to be primarily due 
to the related processes of increasing functional special­
ization of the parts, and dramatic extensions in the scope 
and rapidity of inter-species communication. A revitalization 
of interest in human or social ecology, and the development 
towards maturity of ecological psychology reflect an awareness 
of this transformation and provide some of the essential 
concepts for its comprehension.^ At a time when the biological
6
See in particular Emery and Trist [1972] and Barker [1968, 
1969] . Also the earlier work of Hawley [1950] .
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sciences too are giving more and more attention to ecological 
problems, it may be as well to emphasise the distinctiveness 
of social ecologies.
Man as the species homo-sapiens is comprehended in 
the eco-system problems of the biologists, but the behavioural 
sciences of man need to take into account the unique role of 
cultural-symbolic phenomena in the evolution of social fields, 
which distinguishes them somewhat from plant and animal 
populations. Social ecology encompasses the organization of 
populations and their modes of adaptation to the environment, 
but has to appreciate the special significance of man's 
capacity for symbolic inter-communication and the distinctive 
ways in which such communications may be amplified, attenuated, 
or distorted, through a multitude of psychological and social 
mechanisms.
In any ecologically connected system, increases in 
interdependence have the consequence that the activity of a 
discrete part or perturbations in a remote sector are more 
likely to affect the functioning of the whole system. For 
social systems, industrialization is inevitably accompanied 
by differentiation of its structure into more and more 
specialized parts, such that the completion of any major task 
is likely to require the involvement and the co-ordination of 
greater numbers of relatively independent sub-systerns. This 
is true especially of the division of labour within production 
systems, and interconnectedness across extended social fields 
is now being most rapidly increased by the elaboration of 
service and maintenance functions, which become indispensable 
equally to the operation of households and giant corporations.
Specialization in other institutionalized domains 
has been no less profound. In science, in government and 
administration, the provision of leisure and recreation 
facilities, and so on, professional roles, occupations and
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organizational units have been multiplied. In response to 
the failure of laissez-faire economics to assist those who 
are disadvantaged in the market-place, and to the need for 
massive investment programmes in such requirements as defence, 
education, housing, urban rehabilitation, and rural recon­
struction, government has extended its influence and control 
into wider and more diverse areas, and has thereby greatly 
increased the 'organic' interconnectedness of industrialized 
societies.
Differentiation into a larger number of parts does
not of itself guarantee the amplification of communications
networks and the absorption of new parts into a wider set
of interrelations. This has been notoriously the experience
of such multi-centred institutions as metropolitan
7administrations and civil services. After a point however, 
the very survival of new units is threatened by their 
inability to establish relationships with other parts of 
their environment. Thus we tend to find that the multiplica­
tion of disciplines, products, areas of administrative 
responsibility, occupations, etc., creates an increase in 
the total interrelatedness of the system, a higher density 
of ecological networks.
Industrialization has increased the requirements 
for inter-communication between specialized parts, but has 
also produced the means for expanding communication 
capacities. While science and technology in general have 
become prime mover of an accelerating rate of change, it is 
specifically in the technologies of transport and communica­
tions that the greatest impact has been made on the
7
Mayor John Lindsay documents some gross examples of mal­
administration and agency inco-ordination in recounting his 
first term as Mayor of New York [Lindsay:1969].
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interrelatedness of system parts. The point has been amply 
made by Emery:
Telegraph, telephone, radio, radar, television, 
gramaphone, typewriter, linotype, camera, dupli­
cator, Xerox, calculator, Hollerith, computer: 
these names register a century of change that 
continues in an explosive fashion. Parallel with 
these has been a very great increase in speed and 
ease of travel, so that recorded communications 
flow in greater bulk at greater speed, and even 
the recording of communications becomes short- 
circuited as it becomes easier for managers, 
scientists and politicians, etc. to fly together 
than to correspond. [Emery:1967:224]
Improvements in mans capacity for moving himself 
and for transmitting information have the character of both 
a precondition and a symptom of higher levels of interdepen­
dency. They have made possible the emergence of national 
and multi-national associations in which the member groups 
can react to one another m  'real time', while increasing 
functional specialization and geographical diversification 
of production, distribution, and administrative systems have 
created pressures for innovations and further refinements to 
improve the speed and reliability of communications.
As indicated in discussing the concept of social 
field, the parts of such fields may be related retrospectively 
(developing from common initial conditions), contemporaneously 
(actually in interaction), and prospectively (having over­
lapping futures). The higher development of the human brain 
and central nervous system, and man's ability to communicate 
symbolically, impart to social fields a temporal dimension, 
as well as a spatial dimension, which is characterized by a 
greater or lesser connectivity of time-slices.
The scope and amplificatory power of communication 
channels that has been developed, has some interesting and 
unexpected consequences in the adoption and imitation in many
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remote sectors, of events and experiences occuring at some 
particular point. Fads and fashions can skip continents as 
a result of timely exposure in a prominent part of the mass 
media. There is some evidence for example, that the very 
public self-immolation of a Buddhist monk in Saigon, and 
the equally dramatic suicide of a Czeck student, Jan Tilach, 
during the Russian occupation of Prague, became, via the 
media, the 'starting condition' for imitative behaviours 
across the globe. The recent spate of air-craft hi-jackings 
is another instance, and there is now considerable agreement 
that campus riots in London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, and 
many other university centres towards the end of the sixties, 
had a common 'ignition' in the events at Berkeley in 1963.
The mass media promotes contagion, and makes it more probable 
that similar but isolated occurrences in remote parts of the 
world can be traced back to a single localized event.
The 'contemporary' interrelations through which the 
needs and ambitions of individuals and social systems are 
met are perhaps the most widely recognized and the best 
understood. Specialization entails that no one part can 
accomplish a complex task by itself, so that interactive 
relations with other parts are essential as a means for the 
attainment of such ends. The momentary interrelations which 
make an existing division of responsibilities work are the 
most accessible to observation and intervention, and typically 
high proportions of institutional energy and resources are 
expended in improving their efficiency and in correcting 
their relatively apparent deficiencies.
The most challenging interdependencies that are 
characteristic of social fields are those we have called 
prospective, and which tend to be latent in the existing 
state of affairs rather than manifest. The economy of all 
societal resources is such that the outcomes sought by its 
multitude of actors invariably compete with each other. This
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can often be anticipated and taken into account in the 
definition of roles and areas of responsibility, the formula­
tion of laws and regulations, and efforts to secure agreement 
over basic aims and values.
The ubiquity and rapidity of change make it more 
and more important to try and appreciate in advance the 
mutual interferences of separate courses of action. The 
uneveness of change and greater degrees of interdependence 
across the social field make it increasingly difficult to do 
so. -It can happen of course that activities directed to a 
particular end have benign consequences in another sphere 
which were not expected. The introduction of the motor car 
thus led to dramatic reductions in the incidence of diptheria 
and other diseases that scarred urban living during the 
19th century. The replacement of the horse as a source of 
motive power reduced the available breeding ground for the 
flies that carried many such diseases. On the other hand, 
the building of in-city free-ways to relieve traffic conges­
tion has had the opposite and deleterious effect of increasing 
congestion. Enhanced ecological interdependencies increases 
the probability that the consequences of present actions will 
prove to be related in quite unexpected ways.
Dürkheim's work on the 'Division of Labour in 
Society', which was first published in 1893, significantly 
predates a number of the concepts and the insights that we 
have been discussing. His thesis is that while all societies 
are characterized by some form of 'solidarity' (broadly, 
social cohesion), the progress of the division of labour is 
accompanied by a shift from mechanical to organic forms, from 
cohesion based on similarities to cohesion based on differences. 
The division of labour itself is advanced by increases in 
both 'social volume' (the sheer size of a society) and moral 
density (the degree to which 'individuals are sufficiently 
in contact to be able to act and react upon one another') .
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Three causes of increases in moral density are 
outlined: first of all, the 'progressive condensation' of
social life is a natural concomitant of the progress of 
civilization - the transition from nomadic and hunting 
societies to agricultural, and finally to industrial societies, 
results in an increasing concentration of the population; 
secondly, the formation and development of cities, resulting 
from the need of individuals 'to put themselves in very 
intimate contact with others', creates 'so many points where 
the social mass is contracted more strongly than elsewhere'; 
Finally, "there are the number and rapidity of ways of 
communication and transportation. By supressing or diminish­
ing the gaps separating social segments, they increase the 
density of society." [Dürkheim:1963:259-60]. The density of 
society and the division of labour react upon one another:
"If society, in concentrating, determines the development of 
the division of labour, the latter, in its turn, increases 
the concentration of society." [ibid:260]. The progress of 
societal differentiation is normally accompanied by new 
'organic' forms of social cohesion as the relationships among 
the specialized parts become routinized and embodied in 
contracts and other laws, customs and norms.
Of further interest to our concern is his analysis 
of a pathological form of the process - the 'anomic division 
of labour'. After drawing attention to certain phenomena 
manifesting a lack of social cohesion - industrial and 
commercial crises, labour-management conflicts, and the 
specialization of science - he argues as follows:
If the division of labour does not produce solidarity 
in all these cases, it is because the relations of 
the organs are not regulated, because they are in 
a state of anomy.... The state of anomy is impos­
sible wherever solitary organs are sufficiently in 
contact or sufficiently prolonged. In effect, 
being contiguous, they are quickly warned, in each 
circumstance, of the need which they have of one
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another, and, consequently, they have a lively 
and continuous sentiment of their mutual 
dependence.... But, on the contrary, if some 
opaque environment is interposed, then only 
stimuli of a certain intensity can be communica­
ted from one organ to another. Relations, 
being rare [or, we might add, entirely novel] 
are not repeated enough to be determined; each 
time there ensues new groping. The lines of 
passage taken by the streams of movement cannot 
deepen because the streams themselves are too 
intermittent... the case will be the same if the 
contiguity, though sufficient, is too recent or 
has not endured long enough. [ibid:368-9]
Regarding the particular case of labour-management conflicts, 
he offers the following explanation:
Machines replace men; manufacturing replaces 
hand-work. The worker is regimented, separated 
from his family throughout the day. He always 
lives apart from his employer, etc. These new 
conditions of industrial life naturally demand 
a new organization, but as these changes have 
been accomplished with extreme rapidity, the 
interests in conflict have not yet had the time 
to be equilibrated. [ibid:370]
In these two passages we find support for the conclusion that 
the degree of connectivity among the parts of the social field 
is threatened by the appearance of novelty (...'contiguity is 
too recent'...) and by the rapidity of change.
As the part processes of the organism are regulated 
by the bio-chemical exchanges of homeostasis, and organic 
ecologies are regulated by processes of phylogenetic adapta­
tion, so cultural systems play an essential part in the 
regulation of social ecologies. To the extent that the 
cultural system integrates the basic values, beliefs, norms, 
expectations, etc., it provides a constant reference, or set 
of ground rules for the regulation of newly formed inter­
dependencies. When change comes too rapidly, and is spread 
unevenly across the social field, the cultural system itself 
tends to become disintegrated, and new interrelationships
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can no longer be referred to its basic axioms, but have to 
be worked out independently.
4. Increasing size and complexity
The extensiveness of the social field, the area 
within which individuals and associations perceive themselves 
to share some common conditions of life, and within which their 
behaviours form part of the relevant environment for the 
others, is most strongly influenced by personal mobility 
(geographical and social) and the power of communications.
In making possible higher degrees of interdependence within 
the field, these factors also have the effect of extending 
its boundaries. Television via satellite, telex, faster and 
more voluminous jet aircraft; these and other refinements of 
communications are currently 'shrinking the globe', in the 
same way that the railway era had the effect of shrinking 
countries. Greater fluidity of stratification systems and 
more opportunities for travel, permit individuals to experience 
and share in a far wider sphere of life experiences than is 
possible in less mobile societies.
The popularity of McLuhan's term 'global village' 
is no doubt in part due to the accuracy of his perception. 
Commenting in a recent article on Boulding's recognition of 
a 'second great transition', Wooton writes:
Post-civilized society is a global society, and, 
just as civilized man had to adjust to one type 
of environment, post-civilized man will have to 
adjust to a new type of environment. It is 
important to understand the global dimensions of 
this post-civilized environment since we cannot 
adequately formulate policies concerning the 
process of development unless we first of all 
have a correct understanding of the historical 
period in which we live. [Wooton:1971:5]
One of the portents of this new supra-national 
environment is the rise in importance of a new form of
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enterprise:
The multi-national corporation is perhaps the 
best example of an institution operating within 
the constraints of" the present while at the 
same time developing the institutional frame­
work for the emerging global society. [ibid:6]
Perlmutter has coined the term 'global industrial estate' to 
draw attention to the pervasiveness of modern industrial 
technology and the trans-national economies of scale that 
it makes possible, while Steiner and Cannon, in their study 
on 'Multi-national corporate planning', note that
rapidly accelerating foreign activities of business 
enterprises is an impressive development of the 
past ten years, and continued growth of inter­
national business is readily predictable for the 
future. [Steiner and Cannon:1966:vii]
As a corollary, the Marxian dream of workers of the world 
uniting moves closer to some sort of fulfilment, as interna­
tional labour organizations seek ways in which to combat the 
new degrees of manoeuverability in negotiation, and flexibility 
in production, that are acquired by the international 
corporation.
Other economic and military developments contribute 
to the same tendency. The development of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles has reduced the whole world to a single 
theatre of war, whereas a few fields at the most were used 
at Agincourt. The complexities of the international currency 
system are well beyond the comprehension of the average 
mortal (including therefore the author), but there are 
occasions, such as the devaluation of sterling some years 
back, and the contemporary crisis of the American dollar, 
when the extensiveness and the seeming precariousness of 
international monetary relations is made evident, testifying 
again to the extent of our global interdependencies.
Within national boundaries, similar trends towards
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the expansion of the field relevant to particular activities 
can be identified. The farmer must recognize the city as a 
more and more important part of his world, as agriculture 
becomes 'industrialized' and its success more directly 
dependent upon the city's mass markets, finance, and export 
facilities. The indications are, that those sectors of the 
rural economy which fail, for whatever reason, to move into 
the ambit of metropolitan influences, become 'dissociated' 
segments within the wider system, requiring active interven­
tion merely for them to survive.
National and regional planning and development 
activities have been given an increasing amount of attention, 
and they typically have the effect of forging new links 
between previously segregated, or only loosely connected 
areas. River basin development schemes for example, of 
which the work of the T.V.A. is a classic instance, often 
have the side-effect of uniting the occupants of the basin 
within a larger system. Co-ordinated regional development 
and management of employment, education, transport, and the 
like, again widens the system of interdependencies and extends 
the horizons of the field for its participants. In general, 
the extensiveness of these interdependencies is most clearly 
revealed during the occurrence of labour strikes affecting 
the key distribution, maintenance, or communication systems.
For the individual and the family, no less than 
for the business enterprise, the relevant social world has 
become larger, more complex and more variegated. As 
progressively fewer of the needs of individuals are directly 
provided for by the home and the family, so their dependence 
upon other outside agents increases. The expansion of urban 
areas and of the proportions of the population living in 
them, advances 'cosmopolitanism' at the expense of 'localism'. 
As television is defined as a necessity rather than a luxury, 
it assumes a major role in extending peoples vision into
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other worlds, and becomes a dominant source of shared 
experiences.
The overall complexity of the social world increases 
for all its participants, as they become increasingly inter­
dependent. Their interrelations become less and less 
predictable under the impact of the field's rapid but uneven 
transformation.
Symptoms of Turbulence
These four dimensions of the transformation of 
industrial society are of course abstractions from the 
concrete situation, of which they are different facets, 
rather than separable components. In reality they overlap 
and support one another in their effects on social worlds.
As we have tried to suggest, the transformation has an impact 
upon all social units within the field - individual, family, 
community, formal organizations, the state, itself; environ­
ments characterized by accelerating but uneven rates of 
change, by ever-increasing size and complexity, and higher 
degrees of interdependence among the constituent parts, make 
very different demands upon individual, group, and organiza­
tional adaptive capabilities than do the more regulable 
environments of both pre-industrial and industrial society.
Emery and Trist have described environments of 
this sort as turbulent, in contrast to other simpler types 
of environment which are 'placid' or 'reactive'. Whereas 
in these less complex and less dynamic environments 
significant sources of variance for the actor originate only 
from other behaving systems, turbulence implies that the 
field itself has become dynamic, and that important sources 
of variance for the individual or the organization can emerge 
from practically any point in the field. Thus organizations 
caught up in these transformation processes are likely to be
30
subject to a radical increase in their area of 'relevant 
uncertainty':
The consequences which flow from their actions 
lead off in ways that become increasingly un­
predictable; they do not necessarily fall off 
with distance, but may at any point be amplified 
beyond all expectations; similarly, lines of 
action that are strongly pursued may find them­
selves attenuated by emergent field forces.
[Emery and Trist: 19 65 : 2 6]
The critical consequence from the point of view of 
purposive human activities in general is that the degree of 
uncertainty and unpredictability associated with all future- 
oriented activity increases. The relevant environment of 
the actor becomes so complex and so dynamic that the ramifi­
cations of any of his possible behaviours cannot be adequately 
anticipated beforehand. The acceleration and the uneveness 
of change mean that the future cannot be safely extrapolated 
from the past, and these forces, together with the increasing 
overall size and complexity of the set of interconnections 
relevant to the attainment of a particular outcome, render 
'comprehensiveness' in the analysis of choice situations, and 
in decision-making, impossible. Trist writes:
turbulence grossly increases the area of relevant 
uncertainty of for individuals and organizations 
alike. It raises far-reaching problems concern­
ing the limits of human adaptation. Forms of 
adaptation, both personal and organizational, 
developed to meet a simpler type of environment 
no longer suffice to meet the higher levels of 
complexity now coming into existence. [Trist:
1970:5]
Transition from industrial to post-industrial society 
has proceeded furthest in urban North America, but their are 
signs of stress within the industrialized societies of Europe 
that are indicative of a similar transition. Unless we can 
learn to control and guide the transformation process it 
seems likely that the social field for purposive human
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behaviours in these societies will be thrown into a state of 
turbulence„
The turbulent social field becomes prone to the 
fragmentation of the social fabric, and the breakdown of 
co-ordination and regulation among the sub-systems. It 
experiences widespread lags and breakdowns in the formation 
of the cultural and other symbolic apparatus which stabilize 
interpretations of new realities into theories and concepts, 
values and understandings, by means of which men can adjust 
to change. It is characterized by increasing vulnerability 
of the ecology of man-nature relations, and by increasing 
susceptibility to outbursts of violence and conflict between 
groups experiencing different rates and kinds of change. It 
is a domain in which the increasing size, transience, novelty, 
and unpredictability of his primary social world is more and 
more likely to result in the individual becoming alienated.
This, at least, is the pessimistic scenario - a 
projection of the impact of turbulence which assumes that 
our abilities to understand and to act appropriately within 
such highly complex and dynamic environments will not have 
been subject to radical improvements; that our institutional 
arrangements for decision-making, policy-making, and planning 
will not have caught up with our technological prowess.
This study aims to contribute in one particular 
area, that of city planning, to research currently being 
undertaken towards finding a solution to the problem of how 
man and his institutions can best adapt to the conditions 
of a turbulent environment.
Let us look at some of the symptoms of the drift 
into post-industrialism that have already been identified.
1. Future shock
The predominant of the four dimensions of
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turbulence that have been described - the one about which
there is most agreement in the literature, and the one with
the most vigorous effects upon all of the others, is the
acceleration of change, innovation and diffusion, dominated
itself by the rapid growth of science and technology during0
the last 200 years» Commentators on the phenomenon, with 
their prognostications, gloomy and utopian, are abundant. 
Toffler is one of the most recent, and one of the more 
dramatic«. His study explores:
...the roaring current of change, a current so 
powerful today that it overturns institutions, 
shifts our values and shrivels our roots.
Change is the process by which the future invades 
our lives, and it is important to look at it 
closely, not merely from the grand perspectives 
of history, but also from the vantage point of 
the living, breathing individuals who experience 
it. The acceleration of change in our time is, 
itself, an elemental force. This accelerative 
thrust has personal and psychological, as well 
as sociological consequences.... unless man 
quickly learns to control the rate of change 
in his personal affairs as well as in society 
at large, we are doomed to a massive adaptational 
breakdown. [Toffler:1970:4]
Human life is characterized as a constant flow of 
'situations', and situations can be broken down into six 
components:
...while the boundary lines between situations 
may be indistinct, every situation has a certain 
'wholeness" about it, a certain integration.
Every situation also has certain identifiable 
components. These include ’things" - a physical 
setting of natural and man-made objects. Every 
situation occurs in a "place1 - a location or 
arena within which the action occurs. Every
8
A different view can be found in Horowitz [1969], who 
questions the thesis that innovation is accelerating, and 
argues that significant discoveries are in fact decreasing.
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situation also has, by definition, a cast of 
characters - people.. Situations also involve 
a location in the organizational network of 
society and a context of ideas or information... 
situations also involve a separate dimension 
which, because it cuts across all the others, 
is frequently overlooked. This is duration - 
the span of time over which the situation 
occurs. [ibid:32]
It is instructive to note the similarities between this con­
cept of the situation, and the more systematically defined 
concept of behaviour setting that has been formulated by 
Barker and Wright in their development of a naturalistic 
psychology [1955, see also Barker:1968].
A behaviour setting is a standing behaviour 
pattern together with the context of this 
behaviour, including the part of the milieu 
to which the behaviour is attached...,
[Barker and Wright:1955:9]
They have used this concept to order the naturally occurring 
behaviours observed in an English and an American town, and 
to try to understand individual psychological acts in terms 
of the physical and social settings in which they occur.
Toffler's thesis is that the acceleration of change 
has the result that the stream of situations we experience 
in our everyday lives, become increasingly characterized by 
translence (high rates of ‘turnover, temporariness, 
impermanence), novelty (the non-routine, unpredicted, 
surprising), and diversity (situations of ’overchoice'), 
and it is the inability to adapt to these phenomena which 
gives rise to “future shock'. Relationships with the six 
components of human situations may be equally affected by 
transience, novelty and diversity: man-thing relations,
man-place relations, social relations, man's relations with 
the social organization - the 'organizational nexus', the 
context of ideas and information, and man's relations with 
time, may each become more impermanent, more unpredictable,
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and more variable:
It is precisely these relationships that, as 
acceleration occurs in society, become fore­
shortened, telescoped in time. Relationships 
that once endured for long spans of time now 
have shorter life expectancies. It is this 
abbreviation, this compression, that gives rise 
to the almost tangible feeling that we live; 
rootless and uncertain, among shifting dunes.
[ ibid: 43]
Elsewhere he writes:
We may define future shock as the distress, 
both physical and psychological, that arises 
from an overload of the human organism's 
physical adaptive systems and its decision­
making processes. Put more simply, future 
shock is the human response to overstimulation....
Caught in the turbulent flow of change, called 
upon to make significant, rapid-fire life 
decisions, [the victim of future shock] feels 
not simply intellectual bewilderment, but 
disorientation at the level of 
values. [ibid:290,322:emphasis
The new form of society latent in these developments, 
Toffler refers to as 'super-industrial society'. This he 
intends to connote: "...a complex, fast-paced society
dependent upon extremely advanced technology and a post­
materialist value system." [ibid:434]. What happens when 
the changes confront an unprepared population at too great 
a pace is revealed in America's experience:
...the United States is a nation in which tens 
of thousands of young people flee reality by 
opting for drug-induced lassitude; a nation 
in which millions of their parents retreat into 
video-induced stupor or alcoholic haze; a 
nation in which legions of elderly folk vegetate 
and die in loneliness; in which the flight from
personal
added]
9
For some evidence concerning the relation between the 
occurrence of significant life changes and the onset of 
psychiatric illness, see Rahe, McKean and Arthur [1967] 
and Brown and Birley [1968].
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family and occupational responsibility has 
become an exodus; in which masses tame their 
raging anxieties with Miltown, or Librium, or 
Equina 1, or a score of other tranquilizers 
and psychic pacifiers. Such a nation, whether 
it knows it or not, is suffering from future 
shock. [ibid:325]
Other authors have been particularly concerned with 
the strain placed upon cultural adaptations by the pace of 
scientific and technological advance. The greater the rate 
and the dimensions of innovation, the greater the problems 
of refashioning concepts and value systems to cope with the 
changes. Thus Ozbekhan makes the following judgement:
The prime reason for the failure of the rules 
and values on which our rationality rests can, 
as I and many others believe, be found in the 
massive changes and the rapid rates of change 
that most Western societies are undergoing.
The phenomena generated by change are not only 
stressful, they are not only disquieting - but 
they put to question the validity of many 
general concepts that, for a long time, have 
provided muscle to our world view. It is 
admittedly difficult to maintain a world view 
predicated on a particular definition of 
facts when we are no longer sure what a fact 
is, or, on scarcity when we, in the industrially 
advanced West, are experiencing the birth pains 
of abundance; or, on the sanctity of toil when 
the possibility of a leisure society has already 
raised questions of social organization so 
fundamental as to be frightening, and so alien 
to out traditional modes of thinking as to be 
unanswerable.... [Ozbekahn:1968:50]
Health services is one particular area in which western 
societies are currently facing a large set of quite severe 
moral and ethical problems, as a result of the revolutionary 
progress being made in the biological sciences. Results 
already achieved in spare-part surgery, contraception, and 
genetic control, pose an immense challenge to widely held 
belief systems and values.
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The population explosion, perhaps in itself the 
single most threatening example of accelerated change, poses 
a different order of ethical problem for the developed 
societies, over the question of immigration. It is of 
interest that while the Australian government has officially 
repudiated the existence of a 'White Australia' policy, a 
former Prime Minister has publicly acknowledged that the 
existing immigration practices are immoral. In the end, 
Australia's co-existence as a white European society in close 
proximity to an overcrowded Asia, may in moral terms be as 
little defensible as the policy of apartheid in South Africa.
There are signs that within science itself, the 
rapidity with which new disciplines, concepts and methods 
are being developed, is forcing changes on the traditional 
structure of subject-matters, that will encourage synthesis 
as well as specialization. Nevertheless, the problems of 
methodological esoterica and scientific jargon are still a 
huge handicap in the crossing of disciplinary boundaries.
The characteristic of turbulent society that we 
are talking about is known and experienced by millions of 
people as the 'rat race'. Further evidence of the existence 
of the phenomenon is that it begets its negation - in groups 
of people known as drop-outs and hippies, in institutions 
such as Free Universities, and in social relationships of 
contrived spontaneity - 'encounter groups', 'T-groups', and 
sensitivity training.
2. Fragmentation
The 'accelerative thrust' of science and technology 
issues in greater transience, novelty and diversity in the 
life situations of individuals, and creates pressures towards 
the constant readjustment of concepts, beliefs, attitudes and 
values, as reality is revolutionized. The history even of
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the first part of this century, shows that changes occur in 
both the material means of existence and in value systems.
The argument as to which is the cause of the other is no 
longer a very fruitful one, and it is widely accepted that 
the phenomena are mutually interactive in their effects.
There is some evidence however, that at different historical 
times, either ideations or production systems may be subject 
to the more rapid or more fundamental changes, and thus 
became the leading part of the system.
The bias in interpretations of the industrialization 
of western society is very much towards giving technology and 
the organization of production the role of prime mover. Thus 
Jantsch comments:
The decisive factor in the current development... 
is the rapid and almost independent growth of the 
'technology engineering' area per se, and its 
one-sided influence on the other engineering 
areas, primarily on the slowly developing area 
of social engineering and on the area of nature 
engineering which is frequently disregarded in 
planning. Technology engineering is affecting 
the insufficiently known area of human engineer­
ing in an unknown, but certainly important way.
The uncontrolled growth of this one element in 
our overall system, technology, is now about to 
assume the characteristics of cancerous growth, 
disturbing and repressing the healthy development 
of the other parts of the system. [Jantsch:
1969:179]
The second facet of turbulent society that we wish 
to look at is fragmentation or 'fracture*. Fragmentation 
results from the uneveness of change among different groups 
within society, and the tendency for other groups to put 
themselves outside society. Not all parts of a complex and 
dynamic system such as society are likely to be subject to 
changes at the same rates and in the same directions. 
Fracturing, in contrast to the division of labour (functional 
specialization), implies a reduction of cohesion and lower
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degrees of articulation among the segments that become 
separated. With fast and uneven rates of change, some 
segments are likely to get left behind, others are likely 
to be thrust out ahead, and it seems, others are likely to 
opt out altogether.
In relation to material advance it is the urban 
and the rural poor that get left behind, these groups often 
being co-extensive with ethnic or religious minorities. 
Referring to a segment of the society being left behind in 
this respect implies that the disadvantaged are not merely 
a statistical aggregate of unfortunate individuals, but that 
they share other characteristics which relate their situation 
to the social structure, rather than simply to their 
personality configurations. Thus for the urban poor, the 
high costs of housing (often accentuated rather than allevi­
ated by 'urban renewal' - slum redevelopment into middle- 
class accommodation), the size of families, and barriers to 
education, as well as unemployment, help to account for a 
cycle of poverty in which the attainment of 'escape velocity' 
is beyond the means of the majority. Middle-class adminis­
tered welfare schemes alleviate the symptoms - there has been 
a constant upward revision of the poverty level - but find it 
difficult to produce any preventive policy. The aged too are 
likely to become neglected by virtue of their structural 
position in changing world. With the steady contraction of 
kinship into nuclear families, 'the pensioners' become a 
structurally defined group, and one which, for want of 
political power, is likely to be left behind in the advance 
towards mass affluence.
Other groups advance materially much faster than 
the mean, and give rise to pockets of opulence, equally 
fractured from the total structure. The break is clearest 
with those persons who become sufficiently affluent for
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further income to be irrelevant, as far as the satisfaction 
of their material needs is concerned. Many top entertainers, 
sportsmen and executives fall into this category. One 
suspects that the clannishness of professional golfers and 
the top car-race drivers derives not only from their shaied 
experiences on the circuit, but also from the common life­
styles made possible by their success. Other groups may 
still depend upon a continuing income, but have incomes high 
enough to support life styles which divide them from the mass 
of people. The 'nouveaux riches', the 'jet set', the 'stock­
broker belt1 - these terms designate groups which are as 
insulated from average life experiences as the 'hill-billies', 
the 'Okies', and the urban poor.
In the cultural-valuational dimension, other 
segmentations occur. Here the van is represented by creative 
artists, 'media men', youth sub-cultures, and the like; 
groups that are closely related to the information-communica­
tion system, or for whom most significance lies in the future 
rather than the past. Other groups do not change their 
values and beliefs as fast as the world around them is 
changing, and indeed are inclined to maintain that there is 
a special virtue in the maintenance of the traditional and 
the orthodox, at a time when nothing else seems very permanent 
at all. Institutions which embody and purvey patriotism, 
religious orthodoxy and privilege (in Australia the Returned 
Soldiers League, the Churches, and the Melbourne Club), tend 
to react defensively when attacked, with the effect of 
solidifying their existing positions, and widening the gulf 
between themselves and the van. Intuitively, one suspects 
that the burning of national flags and draft cards, and the 
baring of private parts have become such popular sport largely 
on account of the certainty with which they evoke sentiments 
of moral outrage from the morally orthodox groups.
Fracturing of the social structure is likely to be
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a significant feature of turbulent society to the extent 
that rates of change in value systems and in material welfare 
are significantly different for different parts of the 
society. Conversely, we expect to find in relatively placid 
and homogeneous societies, not subject to constant change, 
that splintering and segmentation of the social structure is 
much less likely to occur.
A different order of fracturing occurs - we may 
think of it as active rather than passive - when a group 
wilfully disengages itself from the rest of society, either 
to create its own world, or to undermine and destroy the 
existing social structure. Contemporary examples suggest 
that this is more likely to be a response to the rapidity 
and the particular direction of change, than to its uneveness, 
although it could be expected that groups which are neglected 
beyond a certain tolerance level - groups that are left so 
far behind perhaps, as to make their situation quite hopeless 
will be inclined to break altogether with the system. It may 
be that the proponents of Black Power and the followers of 
Martin Luther King differ in their perceptions of how far the 
negros in America have been left behind. It is interesting 
to note that a number of the 'seceding' groups have adopted 
designations which emphasise their removal from the main­
stream. Drop out, underground press, and free university 
are in part relational concepts, drawing attention to the 
realms that they are disengaged from.
3. Ecological traps
The third facet of turbulent society has been 
described by Vickers as 'the end of free fall', and it will 
be useful to quote from him at some length:
Within six generations or so, we in Britain - 
and others elsewhere even more quickly - have 
blown ourselves out of the agricultural into
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the industrial epoch, out of a rural into an 
urban way of life, and out of a natural into 
a man-made environment..„. The explosion 
released several critical rates of change.
Populations began to multiply faster; individuals 
began to produce and consume more, to travel and 
communicate more, to expect and demand more. As 
a result, they began to depend more on each other 
and, soon, to get more and more in each others 
way; but these consequences were noticed only 
later, because the explosion began in a world 
so under-occupied and under-developed that for 
a time each change could excite itself and the 
others without breeding limitations. This is 
what I call the time of free fall. It grows 
clearer every day that the time of free fall 
is coming to an end. For the man-made environ­
ment in which the industrial epoch is closing 
us - created as it now is by the unintended 
results of what everyone does - is becoming too 
unpredictable to live in and may soon become 
too unacceptable to live with.... We shall 
have to live in a much denser political medium.
We must take account of the increasing mutual 
demands and expectations of people and societies 
who are growing more numerous, more crowded, 
more mutually dependent - but also, at present, 
more diverse and more mutually intolerant.
[Vickers:1968:52]
Modes of behaviour that were felt to be appropriate during 
the time of free fall are exemplified in the widespread 
practice in earlier days of what has been called 'exploitative' 
lumbering. Ogburn has described how the plentiful forests of 
the Appalachian, Great Lakes and Gulf regions were indiscrim- 
inantly cut and burnt, for timber and for agricultural land.
Then rather suddenly, it began to be realised in 
certain centres of thought that if the policy of 
cutting timber continued in the same rate and in 
the same manner the forests would in a short time 
be gone and very soon indeed they would be in­
adequate to supply the needs of the population.
[Ogburn:1950:250]
It is generally now well understood that the overcropping of 
natural resources of plant or animal life can lead to 
disastrous and irreversible ecological consequences - this
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understanding came about with the development of a biological 
concept of ecology. The current concern with the problems of 
pollution and conservation, and the better management of the 
environment in general, express a new level of ecological 
awareness - that in which man himself, and the man-made 
environment, become intrinsic elements of an extended eco­
system. The re-appearance of concepts of social and human 
ecology further reveal a sensitivity to a wider and wider 
system of interdependencies. Free fall must come to an end 
when the recognition is forced upon us that to continue to 
allow the activities of individuals and organizations to be 
guided by self-interest will lead us into 'traps' as conse­
quential for our urban civilization as the dust bowls of 
the Prairies, and the thickening pollution of the Great Lakes 
have been for plant and animal kingdoms.
The trap in its basic nature is the same in every 
case. Whether we focus attention on the indivi­
dual or on any larger human association up to 
the whole population of the planet„ we find that 
its relations with its environment are changing 
and that these changes threaten it in three main 
ways. Sometimes they threaten the physical 
basis of its existence, such as food supply, 
living space, or even breathable air. Often 
they threaten the institutional basis for its 
existence, by posing tasks which its institu­
tions, political, economic or social, cannot be 
adapted to do. Always they threaten what I will 
call the appreciative basis for its existence 
(the word 'cultural' would be too narrow) by 
requiring it to revise and revalue, more 
radically than time permits, its understanding 
of the world it lives in and of whatever in 
that world it lives for. [Vickers:1970:20]
This third facet of turbulent society, results 
particularly from the increased overall connectedness among 
human activities and the environment that they act upon, 
which increases the ecological density and makes it less and 
less possible for actors to adapt to the environment by 
themselves - joint strategies are demanded for successful 
adaptation.
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Trist has argued that one of the key consequences 
of post-industrialism is that welfare and development of the 
system as a whole become interdependent - a situation which 
contrasts with simpler levels of environmental complexity. 
'Welfare' (well-being; continuing to function well; mainten­
ance of the steady state) and 'development1 (progression; 
continuing to advance; attainment of higher order steady states) 
refer to the static and the dynamic aspects of a socio­
cultural system's adaptation. The relatively placid environ­
ments of pre-industrial societies are characterized by 'auto- 
regulative' welfare processes, embodied in extended kinship 
systems, while development processes require an active 
intervention, and are called into being when, for some reason, 
the maintenance of welfare through kinship breaks down. 
Development is a function of welfare. In the more complex 
and dynamic environments of industrial societies, development 
is maintained by auto-regulative processes which are embodied 
in the market system, and reflected in the replacement of 
kinship groups by enterprises as the leading part. Under 
industrial conditions, welfare increasingly requires active 
intervention, as kinship systems are no longer able to cope. 
Welfare is a function of development.
In the turbulent environments which correspond to 
post-industrial society, welfare and development become 
interdependent functions. "The meta-problems created in 
this situation pass the limit within which auto-regulative 
processes can adaptively operate with respect to either 
welfare or development, so that an active role becomes 
generally required." [Emery and Trist:1972:130]. In particu­
lar, accelerating rates of change means that development 
becomes a prerequisite for the welfare of sub-systems - 
otherwise they are left behind and rendered obsolescent, 
falling into states of 'ill-fare*. In addition, the 
increasing interdependence among sub-systems means that the
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ill-fare of relatively few sub-systems, especially if they 
occupy strategic positions, can be critical for the larger 
system. The increased interdependence of the fates of sub­
systems, expressed in terms of their development and their 
welfare leads to the point at which "adaptation now depends 
on the ecological regulation of the interdependencies in 
all their dimensions of the innumerable sub-systems which 
characterize large societies undergoing rapid but uneven 
change." [ibid:129]. Kinship systems and enterprises are 
supplanted by ecological systems as the critical unit for 
adaptation.
To the extent that the well-being and the progress 
of all the sub-systems become more and more strongly inter­
related, the demands for regulation, co-ordination, and 
institutionalization of relationships can be expected to 
increase also, but so far we have had relatively little 
success in this respect. Even where the problem can be 
fairly simply identified, responsibilities and authorities 
tend to be divided and confused,. Responses to the increas­
ingly ecological character of the man-technology-nature nexus 
lag behind the realities of increased environmental 
uncertainty and give rise to the familiar pathologies of 
administrative tardiness, organizational conflicts, retreat 
into routinization, and abdication of responsibilities.
Thus for example, there is a sense in which pollution 
unites us all. The well-being and the adaptivity of all 
parts of industrialized societies are subject to the revers­
ibility of the rates at which some of our crucial resources 
are used up or fouled up. The ecological problems of 
pollution, waste disposal, and resource management urgently 
demand a new coming to terms between industry and society, 
between the corporation and the city, between private gain 
and public good, in which the parties will engage in a joint 
search for a solution, and jointly take responsibility for
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adhering to it. Already we are witnessing some new forms of 
relationship between the political and productive systems in 
the metering of pollutants, imposition of penalties for 
excessive emission, the application of subsidies and other 
fiscal preferences for 1cleaness' of process and recycling, 
and the relocation of large users of fuel.
To the turbulent society's problems of coping with 
future shock, fracturing and friction can be added the 
difficulties of steering around the dangers of becoming 
'ecologically trapped'. If the connectedness of outcomes is 
recognized too late, or not at all; if the mutual independence 
of welfare and development is not appreciated by decision­
makers, then we can anticipate the setting off of some disas­
trous ecological processes for society as a whole, which, if 
they are reversible, will require huge applications of will 
and resource to reverse them.
4, Alienation
Alienation may be related in particular to the 
overwhelming size and complexity of the social field which 
industrial man has to confront, but it also seems to be 
related to the rapidity of change and the lags in our 
institutional and value systems that this is responsible for. 
Friedmann, for example, makes this connection quite explicitly:
We seem to be faced with rising disorders because 
of our collective inability to bring environmental 
'turbulence' under control. Societal actions lead 
to unpredicted, negative consequences on such a 
scale that they tend to deny the effectiveness 
of individual effort. One result of this is that 
more and more people become alienated from the 
society. [Friedmann:1969:316]
For a social system undergoing a transition of the kind we 
have been discussing, it is not only the sheer extensiveness 
and seeming immutability of the social realities that people
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have to meet in their lives that creates pressures towards 
the attenuation of their links with the social field, but 
also the increased instability and unpredictability of the 
field itself. Faunce makes the following cogent evaluation:
The most persistent indictment of industrial 
society is that it has resulted in the aliena­
tion of industrial man. Loneliness in the 
midst of urban agglomeration; loss of social 
anchorage in mass society; the absence of a 
predictable life trajectory in an era of unpre­
cedented social change; and the powerlessness 
of man within the complex social economic and 
political systems he has created are common 
themes in the social criticism of the industrial 
way of life. [Faunce:1968:84]
The pervasiveness of alienation in industrial 
societies results from its relationship to 
characteristics inherent in the social structure 
of these societies.... Rapid social change, 
increased structural differentiation, decreased 
structural integration, and rationalization of 
social organization have produced widespread 
feelings of powerlessness, normlessness, or 
meaninglessness; this pattern of social experience 
reduces the correspondence between the criteria 
used in maintaining self-esteem and those used 
in assigning social status, which results in 
loneliness, apathy, or overconformity. [ibid:102]
Unlike the other symptoms of turbulence that we have 
discussed, alienation is specifically an individual, or more 
correctly, a socio-psychological phenomenon, having to do 
with the web of affiliations that link the psychological 
individual to the social field. Alienation refers to the 
attenuation of the causal strands that connect the psyche to 
the social field, whereby the wholeness of man's experiences 
and activity becomes fragmented. This formulation encompasses 
the distinction that is usually made between alienation from 
the social units with which the individual is connected, and 
alienation from the self, or 'self-estrangement1.
This is so, because the self from which the
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individual becomes alienated is a social phenomenon; it is 
the 'looking-glass self', which is presented to us in inter­
action with significant others - an assimilation of other's 
perceptions of ourselves. The building up and maintenance 
of a reasonably stable and consonant self-concept is there­
fore largely a function of the individual's meaningful 
involvement in systems of social action that endures* 
sufficiently long for the individual to be able to 'locate' 
himself, and achieve a degree of commitment and identification 
with respect to the social behaviours in which he is implicated
The generation of commitment and identification of 
this sort is threatened by the gathering momentum of 
industrial society. The weakening of kinship bonds, 
increments in personal mobility, the greater specialization 
of occupations, and so on, each tend to reduce the possibil­
ities for stabilizing a positive personal identity. Again, 
Faunce writes:
Difficulty in affirming a positive image of self is 
pervasive in industrial societies. Industrial 
man frequently participates in activities in 
which he has invested little of his self and in 
which he is consequently self-estranged in the 
classic sense of this term as developed by Marx 
and Fromm. Freed from the bonds of small-group 
pre-industrial society, the individual is con­
fronted with the problem of maintaining self­
esteem in an unstable, fragmented, and poorly 
integrated social order. [ibid:132]
When the stream of situations that industrial man becomes 
involved in become more ephemeral and transient, less uniform 
and less predictable, it is harder for him to cement his 
image of self into his social context. He becomes self- 
estranged. The pervasiveness of such self-estrangement in 
advanced industrial society may help to account for the appeal 
of the concept of 'self-actualization' that has been 
popularized by Argyris, particularly in the context of 
organizational behaviour, for self-actualization represents
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the antithesis of self-estrangement - the maturing of the 
self rather than its vapourization [see Argyris:1957]
Estrangement from the social group can take the 
form of powerlessness, meaninglessness, or isolation [see 
Seeman:1959; and Blauner:1964 for discussion of the concept 
of alienation]. The pervasiveness of the sense of power­
lessness of the individual, and his inability often to 
influence, let alone control some of the important conditions 
of his existence appears to be a universal concomitant of 
industrialization. The debate concerning the implications 
of the bureaucratization of society for the maintenance of 
democratic control revolves around the question of the extent 
to which bureaucracy deprives the individual of his power to 
exert an influence over important decisions affecting his own 
and other's lives. Isolation refers to the more general 
separation of the individual from the social field that we 
have referred to earlier in talking of the field 'going out 
of existence' for him* Loneliness is perhaps the most common 
consequence of isolation.
Of meaninglessness, Faunce has this to say:
Various writers have noted the increasing 
difficulty in rapidly changing segmented societies 
in finding appropriate standards for judgement 
regarding courses of action or patterns of belief. 
Meaninglessness refers, more specifically, to the 
difficulty in making accurate predictions about 
the behaviour of others or about the outcome of 
our own actions. Situations have meaning to us 
to the extent that we are able to anticipate 
their outcome. Industrialism has increased the 
incidence of social situations that are meaningless 
in this sense. [ib.id:89]
Meaninglessness in particular is a consequence of the modes of 
production fostered by industrialism, whereby jobs and occupa­
tions have become ever more specialized, to the point that 
the individual becomes incapable of understanding the relation 
of his own part-function to the completed product, and
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disinclined to take any pride in or responsibility for that 
product» The job itself becomes meaningless when it allows 
no possibility for the worker to grow as a person and express 
himself in some creative way.
In what does the alienation of labour consist?
First, that the work is external to the worker, 
that it is not a part of his nature, that conse­
quently he does not fulfill himself in his work 
but denies himself, has a feeling of misery, not 
a well-being, does not develop freely a physical 
and mental energy, but is physically exhausted 
and mentally debased. The worker therefore 
feels himself at home only during his leisure, 
whereas at work he feels himself homeless. His 
work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour.
It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only 
a means for satisfying other needs. [Bottomore
and Rubel:1963:177-8]
*
Marx's statement from the middle of last century has a 
surprising aura of modernity.
Self-estrangement, powerlessness, isolation, and 
meaninglessness are psychological correlates of the drift into 
post-industrialism.
CHAPTER TWO
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
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Systems Theory as a Response Framework
This account of the transformation of social fields 
that is related to the advent of post-industrialism, and of 
the kinds of problems that this transformation is likely to 
create for the government (in the widest sense of control 
or management) of social systems, has been largely descriptive 
and partly speculative. In order to be able to respond 
effectively in the face of massive upheaval and dislocation 
of the social world, we need, both as social scientists and 
as centres of action within the social field, a system of 
concepts and understandings that is sensitive to the problems 
of organized, dynamic complexity, and that has sufficient 
theoretical significance to act as a guide in the selection 
of behaviours that are most likely to serve particularized 
ends and interests without threatening the stability or the 
survival of the field as a whole.
Notwithstanding the generally descriptive character 
of the preceding discussion, it has been guided by a particu­
lar conceptual framework, that of systems theory. This 
conceptual framework will now be made explicit and amplified, 
primarily through an exploration of three concepts that are 
central to a theory of behavioural systems: purposiveness
(or purposeful behaviour); the causal texture of the environ­
ment; and adaptation« The present chapter sketches an outline 
of systems theory and its development, and discusses the 
concept of a purposeful system« The two succeeding chapters 
present concepts of the environment and of adaptation.
It is now more than 20 years since von Bertalanffy 
gave a general currency to the concept of system, and 
presented the fundamental distinction between open and closed 
systems that has become basic to the systems approach to
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behavioural phenomena [ßertalnffy:1950]. There is now
available in the literature a considerable collection of
articles, anthologies, and monographs which survey the field
of systems theory, and it is not proposed to duplicate these 
10efforts here.
Some introductory remarks are needed however, in 
view of the fact that the systems concept has tended to 
become, over the last decade or so, all things to all men.
It has become fashionable to use a systems vocabulary, with 
the consequence that a wide diversity of points of view and 
methodologies can become obscured beneath a veneer of 
terminological similarities.
Most conceptions of the systems approach however, 
appreciate that its distinctive competence rests in its 
capability for handling problems of organization in a holistic 
manner - of interpreting dynamic complexes of interacting 
parts as wholes, and understanding them on this level.
Systems theory is therefore of particular relevance to the 
investigation of biological, psychological and social 
phenomena, as most of the critical problems of these areas 
are problems of organization. They are problems to do with 
the ways in which an entity can endure and maintain its
10
See Buckley [1967, 1968] , Churchman [1968a], and Emery [1969] 
for a way into the systems literature. The foundations, 
development and applications of general system theory are 
described in Bertalanffy [1968]. Hall and Fagen [1956] is 
frequently referred to for the definition of system, and the 
journal 'General Systems' in which their article appears is 
a useful general source. The relevance of system theory to 
organizations is explored in Katz and Kahn [1966], Litterer 
[1969] , and Maurer [1971] .
11
An early paper by Angyal [1939] proposing a new 'logic of 
systems' as a counterpart to the conventional 'logic of 
relations', and distinguishing between understanding and 
explanation as two corresponding ways of knowing, is still 
germane to the methodology of systems theory.
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essential form over time, while its parts are in complex and 
dynamic interaction, and constantly being regenerated. These 
'organizational' problems require the simultaneous apprehen­
sion of structure and process, for in living systems these 
two dimensions are inseparable. In outlining the quest for 
a general system theory, Bertalanffy writes:
If we survey the evolution of modern science, as 
compared to science a few decades ago, we are 
impressed by the fact that similar general view­
points and conceptions have appeared in very 
diverse fields. Problems of organization, of 
wholeness, of dynamic interaction, are urgent in 
modern physics, chemistry, physical chemistry 
and technology. In biology, problems of an 
organismic sort are everywhere encountered: it
is necessary not only to study isolated parts 
and processes, but the essential problems are 
the organizing relations that result from dynamic 
interaction and make the behaviour of parts 
different when studied in isolation or within 
the whole. The same trend is manifest in gestalt 
theory and other movements as opposed to classi­
cal psychology, as well as in modern conceptions 
of the social sciences. [Bertalanffy:1956:1]
Systems theory is a reaction to the mechanistic 
and atomistic thought-modes of the natural sciences that 
dominated all science for most of the 19th century. Systems 
theory may be thought of as a scientific revolution, in Kuhn's 
terms, that became unavoidable as it was realised that 
mechanism failed to offer the life sciences a concept of life 
that would distinguish scientifically between living and non­
living systems, and a concept of behaviour that would 
distinguish between the behaviour of men and the behaviour of 
machines. The breaks appeared on a number of fronts and soon 
began reinforcing one another.
In psychology the atomistic approach was first 
challenged by the gestaltists, Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler, 
who came to take as their starting point the evidence in 
perception of experienced wholes, and who replaced
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behaviourism with a phenomenological methodology. In biology 
the strain on such ad hoc hypotheses as the existence of 
'entelechies' and 'elans vitaux" reached breaking point also 
in the early decades of this century, and the mechanism- 
vitalism dispute was defused by the development of an organis- 
mic approach in the work of men such as Woodger, Jennings, 
Henderson, and Cannon. In social psychology the concept of 
the group mind which had dominated attempts to understand 
the interdependence of the group and the individual was 
similarly exposed as a vitalistic idea and succumbed to the 
more rational approaches of Lewin, Brown, and Mead.
The character of this revolution has been further 
elucidated by Ashby:
Science has, of course, long been interested in 
the living organism; but for 200 years it has 
tried primarily to find, within the organism, 
whatever is simple....
The same strategy - of looking for the simple 
part - has been used incessantly in physics and 
chemistry. Their triumphs have been chiefly 
those of identifying the units out of which the 
complex structures are made. The triumph has 
been in analysis, not in synthesis. Thus today 
the biochemist knows more about the amino acids 
off which egg-protein is composed than he does 
about the white of egg from which they have been 
obtained. And the physiologist knows more about 
the individual nerve cell in the brain than he 
does about the action of the great mass of them 
in integration.
Thus until recently the strategy of the sciences 
has been largely that of analysis. The units 
have been found, their properties studied, and 
then, somewhat as an after-thought, some attempt 
has been made to study them in combined action.
But this study of synthesis has often made little 
progress and does not usually occupy a prominent 
place in scientific knowledge..«.
...whereas physics and chemistry, given a system, 
promptly breaks it to pieces in order to study 
the parts, there is arising a new discipline that 
studies the system without breaking it to pieces.
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The internal interactions are left intact, and 
the system is, in the well-known words, studied 
as a whole. [Ashby:1958:1]
The’ distinction between open and closed systems was 
of very great importance in the application of systems con­
cepts to the understanding of behavioural systems [Bertalanffy: 
1950]. An open system engages in exchanges with its environ­
ment, importing from the environment certain sorts of material, 
transforming this in characteristic ways, and exporting a new 
configuration of the materials back into the environment. 
Processes such as photosynthesis, respiration, and manufactur­
ing, may thus be regarded as conversion processes of open 
systems. The ability to incorporate free energy from the 
environment means that open systems are capable of adaptive 
evolution, moving towards higher degrees of complexity and 
organization, and that they can maintain themselves in a 
time-independent steady state, avoiding increases in entropy*, 
Closed systems on the other hand are subject to the second 
law of thermo-dynamics, and they tend always to be moving 
towards an equilibrium point at which no more work can be 
done. Being unable to import energy from the environment, 
they are not capable of differentiation and growth - once 
the initial state of the system is determined, all subsequent 
states of the system can in principle be known also.
According to Bertalanffy:
Every living organism is essentially an open 
system. It maintains itself in a continuous 
inflow and outflow, building up and breaking 
down of components, never being, so long as it 
is alive, in a state of chemical and thermo­
dynamic equilibrium but maintained in a so- 
called steady state which is distant from the 
latter. This is the very essence of that 
fundamental phenomenon of life which is called 
metabolism, the chemical processes within living 
cells. [Bertalanffy:1956:3]
This distinction was in itself of the greatest
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significance to the understanding of organisms and behavioural 
systems, and of the ways in which they differ essentially from 
inanimate objects and machines. The assimilation of the 
concept of open system into the behavioural sciences has had 
as one consequence far more systematic attention to the 
environments of individual and social action, and the part 
that it plays in behaviour. As Emery and Trist have 
commented:
...though von Bertalanffy“s formulation enables 
exchange processes between the organism, or 
organization, and elements in its environment 
to be dealt with in a new perspective, it does 
not deal at all with those processes in the 
environment itself which are among the deter­
mining conditions of the exchanges. [Emery and 
Trist:1965:22]
A concept of the environment as a causal texture that 'co- 
produces ' the outcomes of the purposive behaviours of 
individuals and groups is discussed in the following chapter.
A further source of insight and inspiration in the 
development of a theory of behavioural systems was the 
dramatic progress made in systems engineering during and 
after the second world war. The funds available for research 
on weapons and defence systems, and the bringing together of 
the first operations research teams to work on problems of 
integrated man-machine complexes that the new weapons 
technology created, compounded interest and progress in 
understanding the systems problems of control and communica­
tion in complex organizations. The development and refine­
ment of radar-controlled gunnery, of target-seeking missiles 
such as the torpedo, and of servo-mechanisms for controlling 
the course of ships and aircraft had a valuable spin-off for 
the social sciences by providing insights for the comprehen­
sion of goal-directed and purposeful behaviours of social
sys terns.
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In particular, developments in information and 
communication theory, and in cybernetics, gave rise to a 
powerful cross-fertilization with developments in the under­
standing of purposive human behaviour, that can be traced 
back to Singer [1924] and Tolman [1932] . It now appears 
that the development of the ability to build a machine that 
could regulate its own behaviour by means of feedback signals, 
lead to an over-enthusiastic extension of cybernetics 
principles to problems of social life, that continues still.
An important corrective, drawing attention to the limitations 
of the applicability of cybernetics to purposive behaviour 
was published by Churchman and Ackoff [1950], and the 
subsequent collaboration of Ackoff and Emery [1972] has gone 
an important step beyond this in identifying the properties 
of purposeful systems and showing in what ways they differ 
from goal-seeking systems.
This much at least can be said in general about 
the background and the temperament of systems thinking. In 
order to appreciate some of the variation that is possible 
within this general frame we may usefully turn to Pepper's 
analysis of 'world hypotheses' [Pepper:1942].
Pepper identifies four 'relatively adequate' world 
hypotheses: formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organ-
icism. The means he uses in isolating these four is the 
'root metaphor theory', which he says: "is simply a
recognition of the fact that there are schools of philosophy, 
and an attempt to get at the roots of these schools" [ibid:328]
12
Some of the more stimulating work in this area came from 
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow. See Rosenblueth, Wiener 
and Bigelow [1943] , Rosenblueth and Wiener [1950] , and 
Wiener [1948].
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The four world hypotheses amount to competing interpretations 
of the universe, each of which has its own conception of what 
the basic units are, and its own mode of interpreting them. 
They are "hypotheses of unrestricted scope, which exclude 
no evidence as irrelevant on the grounds of being outside 
the field under discussion." [ibid:326]. Insofar as they 
each claim to encompass all phenomena in the universe, and 
none of them has the power to conclusively adjudicate over 
the adequacy of the others, it is open for different thinkers 
to adopt the hypothesis that they think or feel to be most 
appropriate to the problems that they have to confront. If 
Pepper's claim is correct, that each of these four is a 
relatively adequate world hypothesis, then in particular 
instances an investigator's choice of a particular strategem 
may, without serious damage, be guided as much by his personal 
characteristics as by any objective criterion demonstrating 
its advantages over others. There is some evidence that 
systems thinkers, while each adhering to the basic conception 
of the system (a set of objects and the relations between 
them) have connected the basic systems vocabulary to a number 
of different world hypotheses.
The four hypotheses are outlined by Pepper as
follows:
Formism is often called 'realism' or 'Platonic 
idealism'. It is associated with Plato, Aristotle, 
the scholastics, neoscholastics, neorealists, 
modern Cambridge realists. Mechanism is often 
called 'naturalism' or 'materialism' and, by some, 
'realism'. It is associated with Democritus,
Lucretius, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, Reichenbach. Contextualism is 
commonly called 'pragmatism'. It is associated 
with Peirce, James, Bergson, Dewey, Mead. There 
may be a trace of it in the Greek, Protagoras.
Organicism is commonly called 'absolute (or 
objective) idealism'. It is associated with 
Schelling, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce.
[ibid:141-2]
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The root metaphor of formism is similarity, the experience 
of identity and sameness in the world around us; of mechanism 
it is the machine, such as a watch or a dynamo; contextualism's 
root metaphor is the historic event or act; and organicism's 
is the organism and integration. It has to be appreciated of 
course that world hypotheses are not always made explicit, 
even by philosophers, and that eclecticism is perhaps more 
common than the consistent exploration of a single hypothesis.
The hypotheses are arranged in four different pair 
relationships. Formism and mechanism are analytic, and 
contextualism and organicism are synthetic, "Not that the 
analytical theories do not recognize and interpret synthesis, 
and the synthetic theories analysis; but the basic facts or 
danda of the analytic theories are mainly in the nature of 
elements or factors, so that synthesis becomes a derivative 
and not a basic fact, while the basic facts or danda of the 
synthetic theories are complexes or contexts, so that analysis 
becomes derivative." [ibid:142].
In the second polarity, formism and contextualism 
are linked as dispersive theories, mechanism and organicism 
as integrative. For the dispersive theories the universe is 
a rather choatic scattering of facts, lacking any overriding 
determination or order. Facts are therefore taken one at a 
time as they arise, understood in the contexts in which they 
occur, and left. For the integrative theories on the other 
hand the cosmos is highly systematic and facts occur in a 
determinative order, so that if enough could be known they 
could be described and perhaps predicted down to the 
minutest detail. The dispersive theories are more extensive 
in scope than the integrative theories, but are lacking in 
precision. More information about its 'facts' increases the 
determinateness of a dispersive theory by spreading its 
structural corroboration into a wider context (Structural 
corroboration is contrasted with multiplicative corroboration;
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the former consists in 'the convergence of qualitatively 
different items of evidence in support of a single item', 
e.g., 'circumstantial evidence'; multiplicative corrobora­
tion is achieved in the repetition of an 'identical' item 
of evidence in many different instances.). The integrative 
theories on the other hand, straining to put all facts in 
a determinative order, are more precise, but suffer from 
inadequacy of scope. They are more likely to be threatened 
by the appearance of new information than are the dispersive 
theories. putting the two pairs together reveals that 
analysis is treated dispersively by formism and integratively 
by mechanism, while synthesis is treated integratively by 
organicism and dispersively by contextualism.
This present work responds to the contextualist 
root metaphor, the historic event, or act:
...But it is not an act conceived of as alone 
or cut off that we mean; it is an act in and 
with its setting, an act in its context.
[ibid:232]
The contextualist's world is a world of incidents, events 
and acts that can be described least ambiguously by the 
use of verbs alone - running, loving, exploring, working, 
suffering, and so on. its fundamental categories are change 
and novelty - an explicit denial of inherent orderliness in 
the universe.
...disorder is a categorical feature of contex­
tualism, and so radically so that it must not 
even exclude order.... change in this radical sense
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ANALYTIC SYNTHETIC
INTEGRATIVE 
DISPERSIVE
(adapted from pepper, p.146)
Mechanism Organicism
Formism Contextualism
ANALYTIC: basic facts are elements or factors
SYNTHETIC: basic facts are contexts or complexes
INTEGRATIVE: facts occur in a determinative order,
and if enough is known they are in 
principle predictable. characterized 
by inadequacy of scope.
DISPERSIVE: facts taken one by one and interpreted
as they come. The cosmos is unsyste­
matic. characterized by inadequacy 
of precision.
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is denied by all other world theories. If such 
radical change is not a feature of the world, 
if there are unchangeable structures in nature 
like the forms of formism and the space-time 
structure of mechanism, then contextualism is 
false. [ibid:234]
The degree of uniformity and structure that never­
theless persists is apprehended in the concepts of quality 
and texture, whose sub-categories provide the framework for 
the interpretation of actual events and acts. The quality 
of an event is constituted of its spread (its 'so-called 
specious present'), its change, and its degrees of fusion; 
and texture can be decomposed into its strands, its contexts, 
and its references. The quality of a melody for example, is 
in its experiential wholeness or gestalt - 'its total meaning 
its texture refers to the notes and the tonic relations with 
which it is constructed. In general: "...the quality of a 
given event is its intuited wholeness or total character; the 
texture is the details and the relation which make up that 
character or quality." [ibid:238].
For the contextualist the investigation of a 
context or complex is not usually undertaken for its own 
sake, but is end-oriented, or pragmatic. Correspondingly 
it appeals to an operational theory of truth - "truth in 
terms of action, of actual events having references which 
lead to satisfactions in other actual events." [ibid:268].
For the contextualist moreover, analysis is never finished, 
but spreads out into ever more inclusive contexts, so that 
the point at which investigation begins and ends is finally 
a rather arbitrary manner. For systems theory, the complete 
acceptance of the idea that phenomena in the world may be 
ordered to a hierarchical array of systems and sub-systems - 
each system included in a larger system of which it is a 
part, and itself being constituted of parts which are systems 
in themselves - means precisely that interpretation can
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proceed outwards into ever more inclusive contexts, and inwards 
into an ever finer textures.
This cursory account of Pepper's ideas is unfortun­
ately no more than an introduction, and an appreciation of 
the world hypotheses of formism, mechanism and organicism in 
particular will require an examination of the original work.
The contextualist hypothesis, to which the systems thinking 
of this study is oriented, is to be further outlined in the 
investigation of the development in psychology of a contex- 
tualistic concept of the environment and its role in behaviour. 
Pepper himself has shown the way in which the categories of 
contextualism may be fruitful in the study of behaviour in 
his critical review of Tolman's study of 'Purposive behaviour 
in animals and men' [Pepper:1934].
With regard to other varieties of systems thinking, 
it is apparent that the machine metaphor of mechanism has a 
dominant place in the interpretive schemes of many who 
identify themselves with systems engineering, systems manage­
ment, and systems analysis. Whenever the workings of complex 
men-machine systems are investigated from a methodological 
viewpoint that takes no account of the unique properties of 
a man, but is interested in him as a physical force, or 
calculator, or communicator, the investigation may usually 
be traced back to the categories of mechanism. The mechan­
istic root metaphor may well be the most appropriate for 
analyzing inanimate systems in the nature world, but its 
application to the social world invariably strains the 
interpretation of purposive human activity. Thus for example, 
essays on 'The mechanics of bureaucracy' [Reiger:1966], and 
on the 'Cybernetics analysis of change in complex social 
organizations' [Cadwallader:1959], and the theory of 'systemic 
planning' laboriously constructed by Catanese and Steiss 
[1970] spell out some parallels between mechanical and social 
systems, but fail to enrich our understanding of man and his
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socio-cultural world. Many attempts to apply systems analysis 
to management problems suffer from similar shortcomings 
[Optner : 1968] .
The confusion that has sometimes arisen between 
systems theory and structural-functionalism (or simply 
functionalism) in sociology is clarified if it is appreciated 
that functionalism is a kind of systems theory# that has been 
rather heavily dependent upon the organicist hypothesis. The 
equilibrium model in functionalism# developed in the work of 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown# reflects a synthetic bias# 
because its datum is a set of interrelated parts# and an 
integrative disposition# in its insistence on the harmony or 
balance of these parts. Thus a great deal that is understood 
as systems thinking in sociology relates back to the organic­
ist root metaphor# including of course the more specific 
organicism of Spencer# Ward, and others. As Pepper's analysis 
suggests, the strains that have been experienced in the con­
sistent application of organic models of society# have to do 
mainly with the inadequacy of their scope# and particularly 
their capacity to incorporate notions of conflict# change and 
novelty. There has thus been a tension towards incorporating 
elements of other world hypotheses# and in particular contex- 
tualism# that will help to overcome such limitations. The 
incorporation of concepts of dysfunction [Merton:1949]# and 
of reciprocity and autonomy in functional theory [Gouldner: 
1959] # may have rendered it more flexible# but Nagel's 
excellent critique [1956] has not yet been satisfactorily 
answered# and Dahrendorf's more polemical evaluation of 
structural-functionalism [1958] has won many minds.
Finally# the influence of formism is also to be 
found in certain types.of systems thinking. In Pepper's view# 
formism is the weakest of the four hypotheses# and its full 
expression within a particular theoretical framework is 
therefore not to be expected. Its strength lies in the feeling
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of certainty that adheres to its root metaphor, the intuition 
of similarity, and its expression in particular disciplines 
is typically made manifest in class-theoretic concepts and 
ideas. Our feeling is that the program of General Systems 
Theory that was launched by Bertalanffy and Rappaport in 
1956 can be related to this formistic hypothesis.
Bertalanffy commented at that time, that in view 
of the correspondences emerging in a number of previously 
unrelated parts of science,
It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of 
systems of a more or less special kind, but of 
universal principles applying to systems in 
general., In this way we come to postulate a new 
discipline, called General System Theory. Its 
subject matter is the formulation and derivation 
of those principles which are valid for 'systems' 
in general.
A first consequence of the existence of general 
system properties is the appearance of structural 
similarities or isomorphies in different fields.
There are correspondences in the principles which 
govern the behaviour of entities that are in­
trinsically, widely different....
In fact, similar concepts, models and laws have 
often appeared in widely different fields..».
It seems, therefore, that a general theory of 
systems would be a useful tool providing, on 
the one hand, models that can be used in and 
transferred to, different fields, and safeguard­
ing, on the other hand, from vague analogies 
which often have marred the progress in these 
fields. [Bertalanffy:1956:1-2]
Boulding at the same time advocated an approach to the organ­
ization of general systems theory that would proceed by 
arranging the empirical fields in a hierarchy of complexity 
of organization, and try to develop a level of abstraction 
appropriate to each. He identified eight such levels: 
Frameworks, clockworks, thermostat, cell, plant, animal, 
human, and social [Boulding:1956]. Although this classifi- 
catory scheme of systems, and others like it, have been taken
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up in the systems literature, they have not shown great
promise of stimulating new developments, but are limited in
13their utility to a clarificatory role.
Systems Theory and the Concept of Purpose
The development of a non-mechanistic systems theory that is 
able to take account of such unique properties of humans and 
their behaviour as will and personality has for a long while 
been baulked by the problem of differentiating objectively 
between goal-seeking behaviour, of which machines as well 
as men are capable, and purposeful behaviour, which represents 
the distinctive capability of human and social systems; of 
demonstrating the uniqueness of human behaviour as well as 
its similarities with cybernetic machines. The work by 
Ackoff and Emery, 'On purposeful systems' [1972] puts forward 
a solution to these difficult problems, and it is the basis 
of this discussion of the concept of purpose.
They adopt the following definition of system:
a set of interrelated parts each of which is 
related directly or indirectly to every other 
element and no subset of which is unrelated to 
any other subset. [Ackoff and Emery:1972:2-13* ]
Given the interdependence and interpenetration between systems 
which are 'open', and their environments, it follows that an 
adequate understanding of living systems, all of which are 
open, requires an appreciation not only of the internal 
characteristics of the system, but also of the characteristics 
of the environment it exists in, and of the nature of the two-
13
A general discussion of mechanical, organic, and process 
models of social systems, together with a review of general 
system theory, can be found in Buckley [1967]. For some of
the short-comings of general system theory see Hempel [1951],
* Typescript page numbers. publication forthcoming.
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way exchanges between system and environment* Following Emery 
and Trist [1965], if we use L to indicate some potentially 
lawful relation, and the suffixes 1 to refer to the system, 
and 2 to the environment, we can say that a comprehensive 
understanding of such systems requires some knowledge of each 
member of the following set:
L11; L12; L21 * L22
refers to internal system processes, L^2 and to system-
environment interdependencies and transactions, and L to the 
processes by which parts of the environment become interrela­
ted - 'the area of interdependencies that belong within the 
environment itself'.
Ackoff and Emery have defined the environment of a
system as:
a set of elements and their relevant properties, 
which elements are not part of the system but a 
change in any of which can cause or produce a 
change in the state of the system. [op cit:2-14]
Whereas, as we have pointed out, the contextualist's framework 
implies that the environment of an open system may logically 
be extended outwards to include the entire universe, the 
above definition restricts it pragmatically to those parts 
of the environment which make a difference to the state of 
the system.
The relationship of producer-product which occurs 
in this definition is distinguished from the relationship 
of cause-effect, in the following way. An object A in a 
particular environment is said to be the producer of another 
object B at a later time, if A is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for the occurrence of B; in other words there are 
other necessary and insufficient conditions which must occur 
in conjunction with A in order for B to be produced. The 
relationship between an acorn and an oak tree exemplifies
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the producer-product relation; the acorn is certainly neces­
sary for the occurrence of an oak, but is not by itself 
sufficient, other conditions of soil and climate for example, 
also being necessary.
The relationship of cause and effect on the other 
hand, occurs when a set of circumstances at a particular point 
of time is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the 
occurrence of another set of circumstances.
Producer-product is thus a special case of cause- 
effect, It applies when we consider the relation­
ship between parts of time-slices [a time-slice 
is a 'bounded volume of space at a moment of 
time...that part of the natural world in which 
an investigator is interested'] rather than time- 
slices as a whole. [ibid:2-22]
Thus when the time-slice that is the object of investigation 
is constituted of a system and its environment (and this is 
the way of looking at behavioural phenomena that is charac­
teristic of the systems approach), then we can expect to find 
that a number of the 'products' (or 'outcomes') that we are 
interested in understanding are jointly produced by the system 
and its environment - there being at least one element or 
relationship in each that is necessary but insufficient for 
the outcome or product in question.
The term 'co-producer' is used to refer to "two or 
more objects, properties, and/or environments which are 
producers of the same product", and the observation added 
that "since no producer is ever sufficient for its product, 
every producer has at least one co-producer." [ibid:
We shall see later that the relationship of producer-product 
is basic to the concept of adaptation - the adaptability of 
a behaving system is a function of its ability to select and 
use certain parts of its environment as co-producers of its 
outcomes.
It is clear that the class of open systems includes
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a very wide range of phenomena. Plants, meters, servo­
mechanisms, target-seeking missiles, organisms, individuals, 
groups, organizations - all of these are open systems. It 
is clear also that there are some important differences in 
the characteristics and capabilities of these different 
systems. Open systems may be differentiated along two dimen­
sions: the range of actions of which they are capable, and
the range of outcomes that they can produce.
A thermostat attached to the heating system of a 
house for example, is capable of only three actions - doing 
nothing, turning the furnace off, and turning the furnace 
on; and so long as it is in action is capable of producing 
only one outcome - the maintenance of the air temperature 
within a given range. A human being by comparison is capable 
of an infinite variety of different actions, and of producing 
an equally wide range of different outcomes. The critical 
differences lie in whether or not the system is capable of 
chopsing the actions that it will take, and the outcomes that 
it will produce.
Three classes of system can be distinguished.
Firstly there is a group of functional systems, which are 
not capable of choice at all, but which merely act and react, 
in certain pre-structured ways. Both their actions and their 
outcomes are pre-determined, by their internal properties and 
by the environment. The second group, of goal-seeking systems, 
are those which are capable of choosing their actions, but 
whose outcomes are determined by the environment. Finally, 
there is a class of purposeful systems - those which are 
capable of choice with regard both to their actions, and to 
the outcomes that they produce. The fourth possible class, 
of systems that are capable of choosing their outcomes, but 
whose actions are determined, is meaningless. Systems whose 
actions in a particular state of the environment are determined 
clearly cannot exercise choice over the outcomes produced by
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those actions.
outcomes choice of
predetermined outcomes
actions functional
predetermined systems
choice of goal-seeking purposeful
actions systems systems
Typology of Systems - Ackoff and Emery
Functional systems: In any one state of its environment, a
functional system has only one action (set of actions) and 
can produce only one outcome (set of outcomes). Thus the 
changes registered by barometers and thermometers for example, 
invariably correspond to states of the environment by which 
they are determined. Other functional systems are more 
complex, and are able to display structurally different actions 
in structurally different environments, though never structur­
ally different actions in the same environment. Servo­
mechanisms and state-maintaining systems in general are of 
this type - they react differently to different states of 
the environment, but always so as to produce a predetermined 
set of outcomes - to perform the same function. A third class 
of functional systems is capable in addition of performing 
different functions in some different environments - an air- 
conditioning system that maintains a desired temperature and 
humidity is an example. There is finally a rather marginal 
group of functional systems - those which have only one action 
for all states of the environment, but which, as a result of 
changes in the state of the environment, can produce some
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different outcomes. Ackoff and Emery give the example of 
waste emitters, such as a factory chimney, which under certain 
environmental conditions but not others, produce pollution of 
the lower atmosphere.
functions of outcomes
one function in 
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one function in any 
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one structure in 
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FUNCTIONAL
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Classes oJ 
from Acko:
F Functional systems 
Ff and Emery p.2-35
Goal-seeking systems: The basic distinction between functional
and goal-seeking systems is that goal-seeking systems are able 
to select structurally different actions for doing the same 
thing in one environment. They are systems
that can respond in structurally different ways 
to one or more structurally different (internal 
or external) events and all their responses have 
the function of producing a particular outcome, 
which is its goal...a goal-seeking individual 
or system is responsive, not reactive, because 
it has a choice of responses.... Such an 
individual or system may accomplish the same 
thing in different ways. [ibid:2-39]
A chess-playing computer, a radar-controlled gun, and an
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electronic maze-solving rat are examples of goal-seeking 
systems. It must be noted that when such systems have memory, 
then they are capable of learning and improving their effici­
ency in goal-attainment over time. There is a class of multi- 
goal-seeking systems, which seek different goals in different 
environments, but which still do not determine the goal to 
be pursued. Most plants have the properties of multi-goal­
seeking systems. Goal-seeking systems choose the means by 
which to pursue their goals, but the goals to be pursued are 
determined by the environment and not by the system itself.
The computer and the rat have to be programmed by an agent 
from the environment.
Purposeful systems: The basic distinguishing characteristic
in this case is that purposeful systems can choose their goals, 
as well as the means by which they attempt to attain them. A 
purposeful system is "one which can produce (1) the same 
functional type of outcome in different ways in the same 
structural environment, and (2) can produce functionally 
different outcomes in the same and different structural 
environments.... Thus a purposeful system is one that can 
change its goals under constant environmental conditions; it 
selects goals as well as the means by which to pursue them.
It thus displays will. Human beings are the most familiar 
examples of such systems" [ibid:2-40] .
Hence purposeful systems are in an important way 
environmentally independent - neither their courses of action 
nor the purposes that they pursue are determined by the 
properties of the environment that they are in. If for example, 
a mature human being were substituted for the thermostat: of 
our earlier example, and given control over the supply of warm 
air to a building, his possible range of actions, and the 
range of outcomes that he could potentially produce would be 
far greater than for the thermostat - a reactive functional
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system - and would be quite independent of any environmental 
state. If it were too hot he could make the building hotter, 
if it were too cold he could make it colder. If he became 
bored he might simply quit performing his function. To be 
purposive is more than simply to react or to respond.
Animals and men have memories, and their ability 
to engage in choice of actions and outcomes under constant 
and varying environmental conditions means that they are capable 
of learning - specifically they can improve their knowledge of 
the relative efficiency of differing courses of action, and 
they can alter the relative values of the outcomes that they 
can produce. In other words, through experience they can 
find better ways of doing things, and they can change the 
ranking of the goals that they seek. Given the additional 
capacity of communication, they can also systematically improve 
their knowledge of the courses of action that are available 
to them in particular environmental contexts. Such improve­
ments can be made without communication, but they would then 
be dependent upon trial-and-error behaviour. The effective­
ness of inter-species communication is naturally a decisive 
factor in determining the amount and effectiveness of learning 
that can take place.
It is evident that the capacities of purposive 
systems are not only much greater than, but also that they 
include the capacities which are characteristic of functional 
and goal-seeking systems. This is so simply by virtue of the 
fact that the choices open to purposive systems include the 
choice to deliberately suppress their freedom in selecting 
actions and outcomes - at least this is true of humans. There 
are in addition abundant instances in which the potential 
complexity of human behaviour is downgraded to purely functional 
or goal-seeking activity, though this may more often be due to 
coercion than to voluntary choice. Part of the legacy of the 
industrial revolution - the 'rationalization' of production -
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has been the deliberate downgrading of the tasks to be 
performed by human beings, so that as Marx observed, they 
become 'mere adjuncts of a machine1.
This is but one example of a widespread phenomenon - 
the use by certain systems of other systems as instruments 
for the production of certain outcomes. An instrument is 
defined as "an object which co-produces the outcome of an 
individual's or system's action, which co-production is 
itself produced by the individual or system." [ibid:2-41]. 
Hammers and spanners, washing machines and refrigerators, 
calculating machines and computers are some examples of 
devices that are used by individuals as instruments. It can 
be said in general that the class of functional systems, and 
the different types included within that class, have signifi­
cance almost exclusively as instruments that have been created 
by men to extend their inherent capacities. They do not occur 
naturally in the processes of biological evolution, but are 
artifacts.
An important general observation with regard to 
the use of instruments is that any device that is used as 
an instrument by an individual or system is always at a lower 
system level than that of the system or individual that uses 
it. It is this fact perhaps that allows us to stay calm in 
the face of the prophecy that computers or robots are going 
to take over the world. Conversely, when one individual or 
group wants to use another individual or group as an instrument, 
this can only be achieved through restricting the choices of 
the 'used' individual and curtailing his purposive behaviours. 
The actual builders of the pyramids were the instruments of 
the pharoahs, and they could be used as such only so long as 
their behaviours were those of functional or goal-seeking 
systems.
It should be made clear that these concepts referring
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to different levels of systems are quite consistent with the 
concept of social collectivities as systems. Although the 
basic analogue for the purposeful system is the psychological 
individual, groups, organizations, communities, even societies, 
may be treated in terms of the same distinctions. Insofar as 
the members of any social collectivity can be said to jointly 
produce a particular outcome or outcomes, and the group as a 
whole can be said to act in certain ways that enable its 
behaviour to be distinguished from that of other groups, and 
from its own behaviours at different times, then the group 
can be said to have an individuality and can for some purposes 
be treated as a unified entity - a system. Thus for example, 
winning and losing are outcomes for a football team which are 
to an extent determined by each member's participation, and, 
as is well known to fans, different teams adopt very different 
styles of play.
A 'social individual' is defined by Ackoff and Emery 
as "any collection of psychological individuals that is itself 
treated as an individual" [ibid:13-3]. Thus social scientists 
have differentiated among social collectivities according to 
such properties and characteristics as their size, rates of 
growth and membership turnover, their degree of cohesion and 
type of leadership, their propensity to fragment or to endure, 
and so on. Families are characterized by their socio-economic 
status and the 'emotional climate' of the home, communities 
by their relative stability or instability and by the amount 
of social pathology within them, organizations by changes in 
their efficiency, their degree of centralization, and their 
style of leadership. The uniqueness of social collectivities 
can be expressed in terms of their culture , which corresponds 
to the personality of the psychological individual [ibid:13-39]
These systems concepts of behaviour may be linked 
to our concept of the social field if we now think of the 
field as a connected network of open social systems, whose
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relevant environments are to a degree over-lapping so that 
each system's environment includes some of the other systems 
in it. We can for convenience dichotomize the field into 
system and environment, corresponding to the gestaltist more 
abstract distinction between 'figure' and 'ground', in which 
case the component systems are such entities as individuals, 
groups, communities, and organizations. Some further defini­
tions from Ackoff and Emery may help to clarify this conceptual 
link:
a system whose elements are purpose­
ful individuals.
a purposeful system whose members 
are purposeful individuals and who 
are intentionally co-producers of a 
common objective.
a social group with a functional 
division of labour relative to its 
common objective(s).
a social group which provides its 
members with, or provides them with 
access to, instruments for the 
satisfaction of some of their analogous 
objectives, instruments which some of 
its members are responsible either 
for producing and maintaining or for 
providing the group with the means 
for acquiring and maintaining them, 
and which all its members are respon­
sible for using in a way which does 
not reduce the access of any others 
in the group to them.
13.9 and 13.5, Ackoff and Emery.
Conceptualizing social groups as systems does however 
raise some problems concerning the relations between such 
systems and the parts of which they are constituted, between 
the behaviour of the system regarded as an individual, and the 
behaviour of its members, taking them as individuals. It 
would seem that the individual members may either be used by 
the group for the attainment of the group's ends, or they may 
use the group as an instrument for the attainment of their
social system: 
social group:
organization: 
community;
Definitions 13.4, 13.2,
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individual ends. Although in practice there may be some 
tension towards the balancing of rewards and contributions - 
the needs of the individual that are satisfied, and the amount 
of his individuality that has to be surrendered - there is a 
meaningful polarity in the possible relations between the 
individual and the group. Ackoff has formalized this polarity 
in the following way:
Furthermore there are two types of organization....
One type, the homogeneous organization, consists 
of members whose relevant function is to serve 
their organization's objective. A business cor­
poration is such an organization. The other type 
the heterogeneous organization, consists of 
members whose objectives it is the function of 
the organization to serve. A community is such 
an organization. [Ackoff:1970b;24]
The significance of this in planning for different types of 
system is to be discussed later on.
We have shown therefore that the concept of purpos­
iveness refers to a characteristic of an open system that is 
defined in terms of the relationship between the system and 
its environment. A system is purposive in a particular 
environment if it can choose its goals and the means for 
achieving them. In what follows we will be mainly concerned 
with the purposive behaviours of individuals, groups, and 
organizations, and with the specific question of how they 
can adapt successfully as the environments for action become 
increasingly dynamic and unpredictable.
Before turning our attention to the concept of the 
causal texture of the environment, we should note that Ackoff 
and Emery identify a fourth class of systems, which they call 
ideal-seeking systems. An ideal is an objective that cannot 
be obtained in any time period, but which can be approached 
without limit. A perfectly frictionless machine, error-free 
observations, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
perfect competition - these are examples of ideals. "Only
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those purposeful systems can be ideal-seeking that can choose
between objectives: that are able to maintain progress toward
an ideal by choosing another objective when one is achieved
or the effort to achieve it has failed, and that consistently
sacrifice objectives for the sake of ideals...a purposeful
system or individual is ideal-seeking if, on the attainment
of any of its objectives, it chooses another objective which
more closely approximates its ideal." [op cit:14-9]. we will
return to the discussion of ideal-seeking systems in consider-
14ing ways of adapting successfully to turbulent environments.
14
An earlier discussion of the nature of ideals can be found 
in Churchman and Ackoff [1949].
CHAPTER THREE
ENVIRONMENT AS A DETERMINANT OF A SYSTEM' BEHAVIOUR
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The Environment in Behaviour
It is a fundamental fact of experience that the 
environments of open systems do make a difference to their 
ability to maintain themselves (to survive), and to the 
efficiency with which they perform their functions. For 
example, many machines only operate effectively within a 
given temperature range, the efficiency of ships at sea as 
means of transport is impaired by gales, and the efficiency 
of a windmill is directly dependent upon the availability 
of wind. On the level of purposeful systems, we know that 
the success of a rat in solving a maze and finding food is 
a function of the complexity of the maze, and that the 
attainment of desired educational outcomes depends to some 
extent upon the maintenance of a classroom environment that 
is conducive to.learning. We may not always know or be sure 
about which kind of environment is most supportive for the 
attainment of particular purposes, as is evidenced for 
example in the debate over the desirability of a therapeutic 
versus a punitive milieu for correction institutions and 
prisons. Such debates however confirm the importance of the 
environmental dimensions in purposive behaviour.
At the organizational level economists have made
some distinctions among the kinds of environments that are
relevant for the operations of business firms. The models
of perfect, imperfect, oligopolic, and monopolic market
situations are a characterization of limited (thongh perhaps
the most important) parts of 'business' environments. Clark
[1965] and Rosengren [1964] have discussed the changing
environments of the education system and the mental hospital
in the United States to help account for goal-redefinition
15in these systems. At the level of international affairs
The recent publication by Maurer [1971], already cited, 
collects together a number of articles concerned with 
organizational environments.
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a good deal has been written about the distinctive way in 
which the 'cold war' conditioned the relationships between 
nations, and on the grand view, diplomacy is the attempt of 
nations to formulate and maintain a state of affairs of the 
global environment that is supportive for the purposes of 
all nations (this objective has the quality of an 'ideal') .
It is important to recognize that in so far as 
machines as well as men are producers (i.e., a machine by 
itself, such as a pump or a motor car, is a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition in a particular environment for 
raising water or for getting from one point to another), we 
need knowledge of their environments in order to be able to 
understand their behaviour. The behaviours that we are 
principally interested in are the purposive behaviours of men 
and their organized groupings, and it is therefore the 
characteristics of psychological and social environments 
that are to be specifically considered. Subsequent discussion 
may be made easier by the presentation of an extended example 
of the kinds of significance that attach to the environments 
of purposive systems - in this case an organization.
An infantry platoon in a war zone has the task of 
capturing a particular enemy position, and this objective 
is to be achieved within a given time period, and with the 
minimum possible number of casualties. Assuming that we know- 
all that can be considered relevant about the 'internal' 
characteristics of the platoon itself - its organization and 
its capabilities in terms of fire-power, inter-communication, 
and the like - we could not make any worthwhile forecast of 
the probable effectiveness of the operation, or of the chances 
of the platoon being wiped out, without a great deal of addi­
tional information about the nature of the battlefield - the 
characteristics of the platoon's environment. In assessing 
the viability of such an operation a commander would want 
information concerning the distribution and the strengths of
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the enemy, the nature of the terrain (the distribution of 
'dead ground'; its traversability) the distribution of support 
facilities (food, medical aid, ammunition supplies), and 
atmospheric conditions (the weather, distribution of hours 
of darkness and daylight)0
Except where such properties of the environment are 
determinable by the purposive behaviour of the platoon (as 
may be the case for example with the distribution of support 
facilities when these are at the disposal of a more inclusive 
system of which the platoon is a part), they are sui generis, 
having an independent existence and independent effects vis 
a vis the organization. They belong to the and
classes of relationship. In order for the platoon to carry 
out its task, some coming to terms between it and the environ­
ment is clearly necessary. This mediation occurs through 
observation, and through the platoon acting in, and on, the 
environment in such a way as to change the state of system- 
environment relations.
The faculty of perception allows the accumulation
of information. Unsystematized viewing of the landscape by
the rank and file members, together with the more deliberative
acts of environmental scanning which constitute reconnaissance,
have the effect of incorporating into the organization some
elementary 'mapping' of the relevant threats and supports,
obstacles and aids. The environment thus transposed into
information and communicated amongst the members, becomes
'intelligence', an internal characteristic of the platoon,
and we can talk about its quality, quantity and distribution
16and the influence these have on performance and survival.
16
See Aguilar [1967] for an analysis of the ways in which 
business firms scan, and obtain information about their 
environments.
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This type of mediation corresponds to relations -
perception is dependent upon causal strands originating within 
the environment. The most significant outcome for purposeful 
systems of this type of mediation is learning - the process 
by which the environment becomes known in such a way as to 
make possible increases in the efficiency of purposive 
behaviour.
The other type of mediation we have referred to 
corresponds to relations. In order to achieve its purpose
the platoon will most obviously have to move, thereby changing 
its position relative to the enemy and all the other environ­
mental relevancies. There are in addition a number of ways 
in which the platoon can act to change its environment in 
order to make it an easier environment in which to operate.
In battlefield situations illumination may be manipulated 
through the imposition of a blackout, and through the use of 
flares and smokescreens; roads and bridges can be constructed, 
and those of the enemy destroyed; the field may be fragmented 
by the erection of barbed wire or the construction of ditches. 
Military theorists have employed the terms tactics, strategy, 
and operations, to refer to the various configurations of 
behaviours that are available to a military unit, differen­
tiated principally in terms of the scope and the duration of 
particular sequences of action.
We might note here too that because the effective­
ness of the enemy's activities is known to be a function of 
his knowledge of the same environment, some amount of energy 
and resources may be expended in making the environment 
appear different to what it really is. The use of camouflage, 
decoys, and booby traps, the destruction of existing signs 
and the erection of false ones - the manipulation of the 
environment so as to plant misleading cues for the adversary 
may be a significant factor in the effectiveness of the 
mission.
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The general proposition emerging from this and the 
earlier examples is that the environments of purposeful 
systems have a significant determining influence over the 
kinds of objectives that can be pursued, and the means 
(courses of action) by which they can be pursued. On the 
face of it, this is a somewhat naive proposition, for anyone 
who is conscious of engaging in purposive behaviour, in 
pursuit either of his own ends or those of an organization 
of which he is a member, will become aware of certain ways 
in which the environment he is acting in limits, channels, 
or supports the pursuit of certain ends and the adoption of 
particular courses of action. An individual striving to 
become a politician, or to represent his country in some field 
of sport; a rural family battling to stay on the land in the 
face of a rural recession, or an organization trying to 
maximize its share of the market; a welfare department trying 
to abolish poverty, or a planning authority trying to redevelop 
a central business district: in all of these cases the system
has, if it is to succeed, to come to terms with an environment 
in which the distribution of rewards and frustrations is 
complex and often unpredictable, in which the means available 
change their character and their position over time, and in 
which other systems are often working towards competing ends.
It is surprising therefore, that until relatively 
recently, social scientists have devoted very little attention 
to environments as objects worthy of study in their own right. 
In 1954 Chein could write:
Perhaps one of the outstanding weaknesses of 
contemporary psychological theory is the relative 
neglect of the environment by many of the most 
influential theoretical viewpoints. Stimulus- 
response psychology, for instance, tends to 
assimilate the entire environment, insofar as it 
is relevant to behaviour, into the term stimulus8 
and perhaps also, as in the case of reinforcement 
theory, ’goal objects'; for the most part, many 
environmental features tend simply to be taken
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for granted.».. If, as I believe, a proper 
appreciation of the role of environmental factors 
is important to rat psychologyf it is ever so 
much more so in a humanistic psychology.„.. Not 
only are human environments more complex, but 
the behaviours with which the rat psychologists 
are most concerned take place in the controlled 
environments of the laboratory, whereas the 
behaviours of greatest concern to the humanistic 
psychologist take place in freely variable (from 
the point of view of the psychologist) environ­
ments. With the greater complexity of human 
environments they have perhaps more of a role to 
play, and with their free variability they have, 
so to speak, a more active role. [Chein:1954:115]
In a similar vein, but more recently, Barker writes:
Scientific psychology knows nothing, and can know- 
nothing, about the real-life settings in which 
people live in ghettos and suburbs, in large and 
small schools, in regions of poverty and affluence.
One might think that in the course of its neces­
sary concern with stimuli, psychology would have 
become informed about the human environment. But 
this is not the case» Psychology has necessarily 
attended to those elements of the environment 
that are useful in probing its focal phenomena, 
namely, the behaviour-relevant circuitry within 
the skins of its subjects, within psychology's 
black box. Psychology knows much about the 
physical properties and dimensions of the environ­
mental probes it uses - of distal objects of 
perception, for example, and of energy changes 
at receptor surfaces» But the problem is that, 
in the course of its investigations, it has excised 
these environmental elements from the contexts in 
which they normally occur; mealtimes, offices, 
airplanes, arithmetic classes, streets and side­
walks. In view of psychology's concern with such 
dismantled fragments of the environment, it is 
not suprising that general conceptions of the 
environment occupy a minor place in the science....
The most common notion, which can hardly be 
called a theory, is that the non-behavioural, 
ecological environment of man is an unstructured, 
probabilistic, and largely passive arena within 
which man behaves according to the programming 
he carries about inside him. [Barker:1969:31-2]
The situation is curiously similar in the case of the study
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of organizations. Evan comments:
Social science research on organizations has been 
concerned principally with intraorganizational 
phenomena...with relatively few exceptions social 
scientists engaged in organizational research 
have not taken the organization in its environ­
ment as a unit of observation and analysis.„.the 
relative neglect of inter-organization relations 
is all the more surprising in view of the fact 
that all formal organizations are embedded in 
an environment of other organizations as well as 
in a complex of norms, values and collectivities 
in the society at large. [Evan:1966:175]
In support of this judgement, Dill has written:
Administrative science needs propositions about 
the ways in which environmental factors constrain 
the structure of organizations and the behaviour 
of organizational participants«. [Dill: 1958 :409]
Blau makes the point quite categorically:
The complaint often heard that we know virtually 
nothing about the impact of the social setting 
on organizations is quite justified. [Blau:1964]
Organization theory has for a long time been constrained in 
its development by the use of closed system models, which 
predispose the researcher to look for explanations and under­
standings of what the organization is and what it does solely 
in terms of its internal characteristics. The tendency to 
investigate the organization as though it were an entity more 
or less closed to the environing social and technical milieu 
has simplified the problems of research a good deal, and has 
facilitated the accumulation of a considerable amount of 
information concerning the internal structures and processes 
of organizations. Studies of supervision techniques, incentive 
schemes, communications.and control, for example, have reached 
quite a high level of sophistication and we have a small but 
growing collection of generalizable propositions concerning 
the relations amongst them. It is evident however, that even 
if our understanding of these internal dimensions and our
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ability to measure them were vastly more advanced than it is 
now, we still need to know a good deal more before we can 
fully understand even such gross phenomena as organizational 
survival or demise, growth or recession. A crucial part of 
what we need to know concerns the character of the environment 
within which the functions of the organization have to be 
performed.
There seems generally to be a good deal of consensus 
on the judgement that one of the most significant weaknesses 
of contemporary organization theory, as in psychology, is its 
failure to develop the means whereby systematic account can 
be taken of the interdependencies between an organization or 
organism and its environment. While it has been usual to pay 
lip-service to the importance of 'taking the environment into 
account1, it typically happens that the environment remains 
an amorphous, residual category, having no definition other 
than that it is 'non-organization'.17 Schein may be under­
stating the case in saying: "The relationships between
organizations and their environments are complex, and as yet 
not well conceptualized" [Schein:1965:89].
This neglect of the environment in two areas of 
intellectual enquiry whose paramount concern is with the 
comprehension of purposive behaviour - humanistic psychology 
and organization theory - is perhaps not so surprising when 
we consider that an adequate understanding of the part played 
by the environment in purposeful activity has been dependent 
upon the conjunction of two very important intellectual 
developments which have come to fruition in this century, but
17
There are a number of exceptions to this in recent organiza­
tional literature, as well as those in psychology which are 
about to be discussed. The pioneering study by Selznick 
[1949], and the important works by Katz and Kahn [1966] and 
Thompson [1967] are good examples.
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the implications of which have not yet been fully assimilated 
into empirical social science.
The first of these was the reconciliation of mechan­
ism and vitalism (or teleology) that made it possible to show 
that the purposeful behaviour of living individuals, which is 
characterized by a certain freedom of choice, is compatible 
with a mechanical interpretation of the world. To a consider­
able extent this appears to have been the accomplishment of 
Edgar A. Singer. His analysis of the inadequacies of the 
solution to the mechanism-vitalism dilemma proposed by Kant, 
supported by his own proposal of a 'naturalistic' conception 
of purposive behaviour made possible by the identification and 
elaboration of the producer-product relationship, broke new 
ground in providing a respectable teleology. In his own 
j udgement:
For the naturalist, it is possible to accomplish 
what all history has shown to be desirable, but 
almost all past history has taken to be impossible: 
to see nature as an unbroken, determinate mechanism, 
the host and embodiment of a bio-centric world, 
populated by a vast variety of functional [not to 
say, purposeful] beings, enjoying various degrees 
of indetermination [not to say, freedom].
[Singer:1946:97]
It was Singer's work which provided the basis for subsequent 
elaboration by Churchman, Ackoff, Emery, and others of a 
consistent theoretical approach to the understanding of pur­
poseful systems. A quarter of a century after Singer's 
fundamental clarification of the concept of purposiveness, 
the naive incorporation of determinative concepts into explana­
tions of purposeful behaviour from the field of cybernetics 
continues on quite a massive scale, testifying to the durabi­
lity of out-dated thought-modes.
The second development we have already referred to. 
The elaboration of a pragmatist, or contextualist interpre­
tive scheme, distinguished by its synthetic and dispersive
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mode of interpretation. While the development of a natural­
istic concept of purpose may have been the more important 
condition, it seems unlikely that an appreciation of the 
environmental domain which is conceptually systematic, and 
at the same time theoretically relevant to the understanding 
of adaptive behaviour, could have emerged from the interpre­
tive scheme of any of the other root metaphors - formism, 
mechanism, or organicism. The two analytical types - formism 
and mechanism - simply do not encourage any investigation of 
the contexts in which their units of study occur. The analysis 
of wholes entails reducing them to their constituent elements, 
whose properties and relations are then investigated. 
Comprehension of the whole is the product of the mental 
process of 'reconstructing' the whole.
Contextualism on the other hand, encourages the 
open system perspective, and searches for an understanding 
of wholes which takes account of their contexts.
A part, then, can never be described in isolation.
A whole composed of isolable parts is an illusion.
Element analysis in the sense of breaking a thing 
down to isolated elements, is consequently impos­
sible. What then do we do, when we think we 
analyze a whole?.... What we actually do is to 
trace the strands of the given texture into some 
other texture or set of textures which have proved 
to be convenient instruments of control. [Pepper:
1934:112]
Thus the musical scale provides the 'instrument of control' 
for analyzing a melody. Organicism, like mechanism, has an 
integrative bias that directs attention to the appearances of 
integration in the universe, which, in exaggerated forms, is 
regarded almost as a time-independent phenomena. Contextualism 
on the other hand, takes cogniscence of the duration and spread 
of events, acts and processes as a basic rather than a 
secondary factor - it is dispersive.
Contextualism is accordingly sometimes said to 
have a horizontal cosmology in contrast to other 
views, which have a vertical cosmology. There
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is no top nor bottom to the contextualist's 
world. In formism or organicism or mechanism 
one has only to analyze in certain specified 
ways and one is bound, so it is believed, 
ultimately to get to the bottom of things or to 
the top of things. Contextualism justifies no 
such faith. [ibid:251]
For these reasons, contextualism seems to be the most appropri­
ate world hypothesis to employ in conjunction with a natural­
istic teleology, when the task is to understand sequences of 
purposive behaviour in environments which are usually complex 
and dynamic.
The Causal Texture of the Environment
A major exception to the general neglect of the
environment dimension on the part of behavioural scientists,
is a line of theoretical development in psychology that has
its origins in the 'gestalt' psychology that arose in Germany
during the first decades of this century. The concepts of
gestalt psychology that were developed by Wertheimer, Kohler
and Koff'ka are clearly contextualist in nature, being a direct
reaction against the 'atomistic' psychology of the previous 
18century. The development of a conceptual scheme for 
treating the 'ecological' (environmental) phases of behaviour 
as a quasi-independent realm can be traced from the early 
gestalists, through the 'molar' behaviourism of Tolman and 
Brunswick, and the work of Lewin and others at the Psychological 
Institute of Berlin, to the contemporary development of 
'ecological psychology' by Barker and the incorporation of 
the essential parts of this earlier theorizing into systems 
thinking by Emery and Trist.
In explicating the concept of environment to be
*18 _
See in particular Kohler [1929] and Koffka [1935].
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used in this study it will be helpful to consider briefly 
some of the more important contributions to this line of 
theoretic development. It will also help us to see the way 
in which contextualist thinking and a naturalistic teleology 
have combined to provide the orientation and the concepts 
that are essential to an appreciation of the environment as 
a 'causal texture'.
Heider’s seminal paper 'Thing and Medium', although 
only recently brought to light, was originally published in 
1926, and constitutes an important milestone in the investiga­
tion of the extra-personal dimensions of psychological events 
[Heider:1959} „ Whereas previous psychology had been preoccu­
pied with processes going on at the receptor surfaces of 
organisms, as far as the problems of perception and stimuli 
were concerned, Heider drew a distinction between the physical 
characteristics of the objects of perception, and the charac­
teristic processes that mediate between them and the perceiving 
organism - between 'things' and 'media8. He thus widened the 
traditional unit of perception by extending it out into the 
environment and drawing attention to the fact that distal 
objects at the origin of the perceptual unit (such as a stone) 
have quite different physical properties from the medium that 
intervenes between these objects and the proximal stimuli on 
the receptor surface (a pattern of light rays reflected from 
a stone). Media have the necessary and important quality 
that their parts are independent - it is this quality that 
allows them to 'transmit' the characteristics of things. The 
quality of a medium is thus dependent on the number of its 
parts and their 'docility' - the relative ease with which they 
can be externally constrained by things. The complexity of 
the textures that can pass through the medium is a function 
of its variability and the resistance it offers. Differential 
qualities of media are represented in the differences for 
example between coarse and fine grain photography, and between
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languages with relatively larger or smaller vocabularies. 
Writing an introduction to this paper for its recent republi­
cation, Heider says:
...it deals with the process that starts at the 
perceived object [the distal stimulus] and which 
ends with the stimuli impinging on the sense 
organs [the proximal stimuli]. This process 
lies entirely in the environment and goes on 
whether or not there is an organism affected by 
the proximal stimuli. It belongs to what 
Brunswick has called the ecological phase of the 
causal sequence. It precedes the phase which 
occurs within the organism and which so far has 
been the focus of attention in most studies of 
perception. Since perception is adapted to the 
environment, it is obvious that we must be 
familiar with the environmental structures to 
which it is adapted if we are to get a compre­
hensive understanding of it. [Heider:1959:ix].
Klein's 'note to the reader' in the same volume points out 
that:
A unique feature of Heider's approach is his 
attempt to fathom environmental structure not 
from the response side - from the inside outward, 
as it were, as is common in psychological theories - 
but from the outside inward, that is, by specify­
ing the architectural rules of the extrapersonal 
world of physical object and event units. [ibid: 
vii]
Although there is little evidence that the insights of 'Thing 
and Medium' were widely recognized at that time, Heider's work 
did have an influence on such people as Koffka, Lewin, 
Brunswick, and Barker, all of who have referred to his work 
in formulating their own important contributions. His dis­
crimination of environments into things and media and the 
recognition of significant processes which occur in the envir­
onmental sector quite independently of the organism are of
fundamental importance to the comprehension of interactions
19between purposeful systems and their environments.
19The fullest expression of Heider's thinking is found in his 
'Psychology of interpersonal relations' [1958].
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Tolman was not one of those who took up Heider's 
work, but his development of a 'purposive behaviourism' was 
perhaps the first major theoretical work to bring together 
gestalt psychology and the problems of purposive behaviour 
[Tolman: 1932] . Behaviour, for Tolman, is a molar phenomenon., 
standing in contrast to the molecular behaviourism of Watson., 
Behaviour acts are not reducible to the underlying molecular 
facts of physiology and physics, but have 'certain emergent 
properties of their own'. In his analysis the two identify­
ing properties of behaviour are its initiating causes (which 
can be either environmental stimuli or initiating physiological 
states), and the behaviour determinants. As Pepper has shown 
[Pepper:1934], the two most significant of the behaviour 
determinants are the state of purpose of the organism, and 
the cognitive immanent determinants. The state of purpose is 
an innate or acquired urge for the attainment of, or escape 
from, some sort of environmental object or physiological 
state, while the cognitive determinants of a behaviour act 
encompass the character of the goal object, (meaning either 
that which is to be sought or that which is to be avoided), 
its 'location' relative to actual and possible means-objects, 
and the character of the means-objects themselves. These three 
cognitive determinants fuse into a sign-gestalt, which in turn 
fuses with the purposive behaviour determinant in the carrying 
through of a behaviour act.
Tolman's book is widely regarded as a landmark in 
theoretical psychology. Perhaps its most significant contri­
bution from our point of view is the elaboration of a molar 
(or gestalt) conception of the behaviour act as a causal 
sequence which both begins and ends in the environment, being 
mediated through the acting organism.
[Our system] conceives mental processes as func­
tional variables intervening between stimuli, 
initiating physiological states, and the general 
heredity and past training of the organism, on
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the one hand, and final resulting responses, on 
the other. [Tolman:op cit:414]
His characterization of the environment itself, in terms of 
goal-objects and means, their properties and the relations 
between them, is suggestive but relatively rudimentary.
Tolman's subsequent collaboration with Brunswick 
had the benefits both of Pepper's insightful analysis of the 
conceptual framework of 'Purposive Behaviour in Animals and 
Men', and of Brunswick's familiarity with Heider's work.
Their joint article, 'The organism and the causal texture of 
the environment', [Tolman and Brunswick:1935] deals more 
explicitly with the composition of the environment as such, 
and the implications in environmental variance for adaptive 
behaviours.
Their initial proposition is that psychology is 
primarily concerned with the methods of response of the organism 
to two characteristic features of the environment. Firstly, 
because the environment is a causal texture, in which events 
are regularly dependent upon one another, organisms come to 
accept some events as 'local representatives' of other events.
In distance perception for example, a particular manifold of 
light rays is accepted as a local representative of the distant 
object. Secondly, these causal couplings between distal and 
proximal stimuli are to a degree equivocal - local representa­
tives are not connected one-to-one with the entities represen­
ted. Moreover, the relationship between behaviour objects 
(or means-objects) in the environment, and the goals of the 
organism, are similarly equivocal. That is to say that a 
given means-object will assist the attainment of a particular 
goal only with a certain degree of probability. Means objects 
in the environments of organisms have the characteristic, as 
Heider pointed out, that they radiate causal trains (e„g„, 
light waves) in many directions, quite independently of the 
organism, some of which may lead to its sensory surfaces.
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What is then apprehended by the organism is not the object 
itself, but a cue for the object, which is only coupled to 
the object with a certain degree of reliability» This being 
so, they argue that the psychological 'success' of the 
organism will depend firstly, on its ability to pick out the 
'good1 means objects for the attainment of particular goals, 
and secondly upon its ability to select the reliable cues 
for this 'good' means object, A hungry baby has to know what 
sorts of objects can potentially alleviate hunger* and what 
sorts of images, sounds and smells are reliable cues for such 
obj ects.
Means-objects must in reality be conceived as having 
three distinguishable aspects - their discriminanda, manipu- 
landa, and utilitanda properties- Discriminanda properties 
are those whereby the object is differentiated from other 
objects - typically such properties as shape, colour, size, 
etc. The manipulanda characteristics of an object are "the 
properties which make possible and support such and such actual 
behavioural manipulations. They are the objects grasp-ableness, 
pick-up-ableness, chew-ableness...and the like." [ibid:53]. 
Finally, the utilitanda properties of a behaviour object are 
"the ways in which the object, given the manipulanda, or the 
manipulanda and discriminanda combined, can be useful as a 
means for getting to further objects and goals." [ibid]. Thus 
for example, a piece of chocolate within the visual field of 
a baby has the manipulanda character of something chewable, 
and by virtue of this, also has the utilitanda character of 
something which will lead towards a full stomach.
Their concluding remarks point to the ways in which 
structurally different environments may make differing demands 
on the organism^ adaptive potential:
...we may say in general that in the selection 
both of the means-objects which have high prob­
abilities and of the cues which have high
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probabilities the organism responds in the form 
of hypotheses. These hypotheses it brings with 
it from innate endowment and from previous 
experience. These hypotheses tend to be 'correct' 
for normal, average environments. When, however, 
the probabilities in the particular environment 
are not those of a 'normal' or average environ­
ment, then the organism, if it is not to go 
under, must acquire new hypotheses.».. Thus the 
wholly successful organism would be one which 
brings, innately, normal averagely 'good' means- 
ends hypotheses and normal averagely 'reliable' 
perceptual hypotheses; but which can immediately 
modify these innate hypotheses to suit the special 
conditions of a special environment; which can 
note and include in its cue system and in its 
means-end system the presence of the further 
identifying features of these special environments.
[ibid:71-2]
So they give us the concept of environment as a causal texture 
in which cues, means-objects, and goals are causally interre­
lated in ways which can be quite independent of the organism.
An organism's adjustment to its environment is a function of 
the accuracy of the hypotheses it formulates about the pattern 
of causal couplings, and its degree of flexibility in formu­
lating new hypotheses and discarding old ones as the causal 
texture of the environment changes.
One of the main weaknesses from our point of view 
of the concept of environment as thus far developed is that 
it was treated in practice as a specialized, truncated part 
of the total situation, however much the full richness and 
complexity of real life environments was acknowledged in dis­
cussion. The work of Lewin and his followers has been very 
much concerned with the problems of systematizing an under­
standing of the relevance of the 'whole situation' to human 
behaviour [Lewin:1935, 1936]. Much of Lewin's thinking 
developed directly out of the work of Wertheimer, Kohler, and 
Koffka, and he was for some time also an associate of Heider:s, 
who together with his wife, was responsible for the translation 
of "Principles of Topological Psychology" into English. He
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also makes use of Tolman's work.
For Lewin, behaviour is a function of the individu­
al's psychological life space, and the life space is constitu­
ted of the person and his psychological environment, the world 
as it is to him. The person and the environment are topologi­
cally distinguished, representing different regions of the 
life space. The life space has both structural and dynamic 
properties. The basic structural concepts are region and 
boundary, and from these, more complex concepts to describe 
such structural properties as degree of differentiation, 
centrality, path and distance, are derived. The dynamic 
concepts refer to the tendency of the life space to change, 
or to resist change, and among the most important of them are 
the concepts of tension, force, field of forces, power, and 
equilibrium. Although the life space refers to the total 
situation at a particular point of time, and Lewin's concept 
of causality is that of a contemporaneous relation, the 'time 
perspective' enters into the life space in the form of over­
lapping temporal gestalts - relevant pasts and futures are 
'present1 in so far as such phenomena as memory and expectation 
actually influence behaviour. In Lewin's work we approach 
much closer to the idea of a freely variable environment in 
which the behaving individual has constantly to seek out those 
movements and locations, manipulations and responses from a 
complex and dynamic array of possibilities.
Deutsch writes:
The emphasis on the interrelatedness of the person 
and the environment was one of Lewin's major con­
tributions to psychological theorizing. Until 
recently, much of psychology has been dominated 
by what he has termed an 'Aristotlean' mode of 
thinking. In such thinking psychological events 
are determined by the characteristics of the indi­
vidual-instincts, heredity, intelligence, needs, 
habits, etc., - relatively independently of the 
situation. Since Lewin, it has become increasingly
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evident that it is meaningless to speak of 
behaviour without reference to both the person 
and his environment, [Deutsch:1968:417]
In the context of the line of theoretic development being 
considered here, it is his elucidation of the 'spatial' dimen­
sions of behaviour, bound up in the concepts of life space, 
'field', and region, that adds most significantly to our 
developing concept of the environment.
We have already noted Chein's criticism of the 
neglect of the environment in theoretical psychology. His 
discussion of 'the environment as a determinant of behaviour' 
which those remarks preface, helps considerably to redress 
this weakness, and is of the highest value as a systematic 
attempt to bring together in a comprehensive theoretic model 
many of the component features of environments that had been 
discussed in the work of Tolman, Lewin, Koffka, and others 
[Chein:1954]. We have also referred to his concept of the 
geo-behavioural environment, which is a modification of the 
distinction drawn by Koffka between the 'geographic' and 
'behavioural' environments. Whereas the behavioural environ­
ment refers to the individual's subjective interpretation of 
the world, the geo-behavioural environment is the geographic 
environment (the total objective physical and social environ­
ment) looked at from a point of view that is concerned with 
understanding behaviour, thus allowing for the inclusion of 
elements that are not part of the individual's subjectively 
interpreted world, but which do nevertheless have an observable 
impact on his behaviour. The 'major features' of the geo- 
behavioural environment which he discusses in turn are stimuli, 
goal objects and noxiants, supports and constraints, and 
directors.
He defines a stimulus as 'whatever is capable of 
initiating a change in the stream of activity...a release or 
trigger mechanism'. Stimuli initiate responses, but they do
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not determine a specific response, because any specific res­
ponse is also a function of other environmental features.
An advertisement for a brand of chocolate may lead to the 
consumption of some of that chocolate, but to say that this 
response is determined by the stimulus overlooks the role of 
other environmental features - the availability of the choco­
late, possession of the money to purchase it with, etc. - 
which are also necessary conditions for that particular 
response. (We should note here the direct connection between 
his concept of stimulus and the producer-product relation 
discussed above.) That a stimulus is something which can set 
off a response does not, he asserts, preclude the possibility 
that the same object or situation may also function in the 
role of goal object or noxiant, support, constraint or 
director. However he goes on to make the following important 
observation:
It is the sometimes concurrence of these various 
roles in the same object that has lead to what I 
believe is the common practice of overburdening 
the stimulus concept with the function of deter­
mining, as distinguished from initiating, responses.
The important point is that these various roles are 
always distinguishable and are often carried by 
distinct objects or situations. [ibid:118]
Given the role of stimuli in initiating responses, 
the overall stimulus properties of an environment have some 
important psychological consequences. Either a dearth or an 
over-abundance of stimuli may create quite severe problems of 
adjustment.
A relatively stimulus less environment, for instance, 
is, I believe, an important factor in neurasthenia: 
the individual is thrown upon his self-stimulating 
resources which may prove insufficient for the 
initiation of activity. Conversely, an over- 
stimulating environment often generates profound 
problems of self-management; one of the things we 
must learn, for instance, is not to respond to 
distracting stimuli. [ibid:118]
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It is of interest to note that Toffler makes exactly the same 
observation, and that he obviously sees 'future shock' as the 
counter-part of neurasthenia,
“Goal objects3 are objects or situations which can 
serve as need satisfiers, and 'noxiants' are objects or situ­
ations which can produce pain or unpleasantness. Chein 
suggests that many psychologists have taken the existence of 
goal objects for granted, and that they have as a consequence 
'shown little interest in examining various environments, as 
such, from the point of view of what they have to offer by 
way of goal objects and/or noxiants" [ibid:120]. Environments 
clearly do have important differences in the abundance or 
scarcity of goal objects and noxiants, and in the relative 
abundance of these in relation to certain needs as compared 
to others.
1 Supports' are 'those features of the environment 
which make particular behaviours feasible', and 'constraints' 
are 1 those features of the environment which preclude particular 
behaviours, make their occurrences less likely, or limit their 
variability'. The manipulanda and the discriminanda properties 
of objects are situations as they were defined by Tolman and 
Brunswick are interpreted by Chein as environmental properties 
which set limits on what can and what cannot be achieved - as 
supports and constraints. He treats 'cues' as a sub-class 
of discriminanda - namely those discriminanda which exist not 
in and of themselves 'but in systematic relationships to other 
discriminanda, means-end paths, etc.“. The colour green, of 
an apple, is a discriminandum, but insofar as colour is also 
correlated with taste and digestibility, colour is also a cue. 
Consistent with his definition of the geo-behavioural 
environment, Chein’s cues are objective features of the 
environment, and environments may therefore differ in the 
number and variety of the cues that they present. On this 
view, inappropriate or maladaptive behaviour may sometimes
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be the result of the absence of sufficient cues, or the 
existence of misleading or false cues, and it is not auto­
matically ascribable to human incapacity or ignorance. The 
distribution and nature of cues in an environment sets limits 
upon what may be learned in that environment. Behaviour is 
further supported or constrained according to the availability 
or non-availability of 'means-end paths'. This refers to 'the 
steps one must take or things one must do in order to attain 
particular goals or to avoid particular noxiants'. Means-end 
paths vary with respect to the characteristics of distance, 
quickness, freedom from barriers, and viscosity - they define 
the conditions for the attainment of goals.
'Directors' are 'those features of the environment 
which tend to induce specific directions of behaviour'. Most 
importantly the particular spatio-temporal patterning of 
stimuli, goals and noxiants, supports and constraints, has 
the effect of 'channelling' behaviour in certain directions.
For example, the absence of means-end paths to particular 
goals may direct behaviour towards other goals; being confronted 
with a new, unexpected goal object at a particular time may 
divert behaviour in new directions; a means to an end may 
become an end in itself due to the particular structure of 
the environment. In addition the prevailing social values or 
norms of a particular culture, or attaching to a particular 
behaviour setting, may act as directors.
Finally, Chein draws attention to some of the global 
features of the environment, many of which have already been 
referred to here. Thus some environments are more 'difficult' 
than others, some more secure. Environments are more or less 
organized or disorganized, more or less stable or unstable.
From another point of view, the availability of goal objects, 
unavoidability of noxiants, and the existing pattern of 
supports, constraints and directors, determine the number of 
degrees of freedom available to the individual in the geo-
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behavioural environment.
Emery and Trist's article on 'The causal texture 
of organizational environments' [Emery and Trist:1965] appears 
to have been the first attempt towards some classification of 
environments which recognizes that, like systems themselves, 
environments may differ systematically in their degree of 
complexity. This paper has been discussed and extended by 
Terreberry [1968] and McWhinney [1968], and the schema presen­
ted in it has been amplified by the authors in subsequent 
publications [Emery:1967; and Emery and Trist:1972],
The article presents four ideal type environments 
which are differentiated by qualitative disimilarities in 
their causal texturing. It is premised on the view that the 
system behaviours in which they are interested (in this case 
the behaviours of organizations) can generally be represented 
as moving toward, or straining away from, certain ends, objects 
or situations, which can therefore be considered as either 
helps or hindrances to the systems survival and the performance 
of its functions.
Such a concept of the behavioural environment is 
found in a number of the writers that have been considered. 
Tolman for instance, in the Glossary to his book, defines 
'purpose' as "a demand to get to or from a given type of goal 
object. Such a purpose is testified to objectively by the 
fact that behaviour tends to persist to or from and to show 
docility relative to getting to or from specific types of goal 
object or goal situation". A 'demand' is "an innate or 
acquired urge to get to or from some given instance or type 
of environmental presence or physiological quiescence or 
disturbance" [Tolman:1932]. Angyal, in discussing the example 
of an animal hunting food has written:
...one may say that the animal is driving to obtain 
food. Viewing the same occurrence with the object 
as the point of reference, one may say that the
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animal is attracted by the sight of food- The 
whole biosphere, viewed from the object pole 
as a point of reference, appears as a system 
of attractive and repulsive environmental 
forces acting upon the organism..., One fre­
quently describes environmental objects and 
situations as attractive, repulsive, pleasing, 
challenging, seductive, trying, provoking, 
threatening, conducive to one or another type 
of activity. [Angyal:1941:148]
He has noted too that Lewin's psychology is based on a similar 
concept of the role of environmental influences on behaviour. 
Lewin refers to ‘negative and positive valences', "field 
forces', and the "demand qualities' of environmental situations.
Environments are thus considered to be constituted 
°f goals and noxiants, and environments may be differentiated 
according to the distribution of goals and noxiants (random - 
clustered), their kinetic properties (placid - dynamic), and 
whether or not a given array of these “environmental relevancies' 
is shared by more than one system.
I Placid-random environment
The simplest of the four types is that in which 
goals and noxiants are "relatively unchanging in themselves 
and randomly distributed". Such environments are placid, not 
in the literal sense that they are tranquil or calm, but in 
the sense that they are, from the point of view of the system's 
activities, relatively docile, not offering active challenges 
or resistances. They are placid relative to other more com­
plexly joined environments which have dynamic properties.
They are random in the sense that goals and noxiants do not 
occur in the environment in any meaningful or systematic 
patterns from the system's point of view. It seems to be 
most useful to think of the 'pure' case of a placid-random 
environment not only as a construct, but also as a theoretical 
limiting case, or an extreme type, analogous for example, to
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the concepts of perfect competition8 or 'absolute zero'.
Such constructs can be used as a theoretical 'bench mark' 
when we are able to develop a 'comparative" or 'ordering 
concept3. In this case a comparative concept for specifying 
degrees of randomness might be a valuable development when 
the concept of 'causal texture of the environment1 is used 
in any particular investigation.
The type I environment corresponds to the idea of 
a flat surface over which an organism can move, which is bare 
apart from a number of widely scattered heaps of food [Simon: 
1957:137], It corresponds also to the relevant environment 
of the 'flea-market' salesman. He is confronted by a market 
situation which is almost totally unstructured, so that the 
same sales approach is appropriate for all comers, and one 
'mark' (customer) is as good as any other. Attempts to 
deliberately structure environments at this level for human 
beings have occurred in such settings as England's old-fashioned 
mad-houses, and in concentration camps. The environments of 
some relatively simple organisms such as an amoeba or a human 
foetus seem to be of the placid-random type,
A further characteristic of the type I environment, 
is that in environments of such relative simplicity it is 
essentially only the properties of the system itself that are 
critical to the effectiveness with which its function is 
performed. Of the set of system-environment relations:
L12' L21# L22 ■***■ :*'s t*ie LH  relati-ons' the internal character­
istics of the system, that are chiefly determinative of the 
effectiveness of behaviours in such environments. In the 
case of Simon's 'organism on a flat surface' for example, 
given the random availability of heaps of food, the survival 
of the organism is very much a function of such properties as 
its range of vision, its storage capacity, and its motility. 
Knowledge of internal properties alone can be predictive of
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system viability in the placid-random environment.
II Placid-clustered environment
The second level of causal texturing differs from 
the random environment in that goals and noxiants are now 
clustered - they occur in patterned ways and with particular 
degrees of probability that are potentially 'knowable' by the 
system. When the environmental objects, events or situations 
which are potentially 'need satisfiersV, and those which have 
detrimental or obnoxious consequences become regularly inter­
dependent in time or space, significant variations are created 
in the 'supportiveness' of different parts of the environment - 
it becomes more heterogeneous than the random environment. 
Clustering is the most important identifying characteristic - 
the goals and noxiants are still relatively unchanging in 
themselves.
The conception of the environment put forward by 
Tolman and Brunswick corresponds to the type II environment.
When environmental parts are joined in regular and predictable 
ways, some parts can come to act as cues or 'local representa­
tives' for other parts, or can have the character of means- 
objects for behaviour acts - the environment is a causal 
texture in which cues, means-objects, and goal-objects are 
systematically interrelated. If the random environment is 
exemplified in Petticoat Lane, the clustered environment 
corresponds more to the market situation of a country town 
general store. In this case it pays to differentiate among 
customers on such dimensions as regulars-passers by, debtors- 
creditors, big spenders and small spenders. Similarly, if the 
relevant environment for a person searching for shells on the 
sea-shore is a random environment, the relevant environment 
for prospectors searching for oil or minerals is typically 
clustered - the occurrence of mineral resources is known to 
be correlated with certain topographical and geo-physical features
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The factories spawned by the industrial revolution 
are the best example of environments of this type that have 
been deliberately engineered for human beings,, Significant 
variety in the work environment stemmed mainly from fluctuations 
in the physical demands of production processes and the variable 
desirability of available tasks. The environments of plants 
that are subject to the cycle of the seasons# and of human 
infants# also seem to be environments of this type.
In order to appreciate the relevance of clustering 
one typically needs to have knowledge not only concerning the 
internal processes and properties of the system, (L re -^at:*-ons) 
but also concerning the capacity of the system to choose and 
to implement alternative courses of action in response to 
environmental variations (I^ relations) . The essential 
requirements for survival in clustered environments are to be 
found in the internal system processes, and in the paths of 
influence or causal trains that originate within the system 
and extend out into the environment«,
III The disturbed-reactive environment
The type II environment represents a transformation 
of the random environment whereby goals and noxiants become 
clustered. The disturbed-reactive environment is character­
ized by a second qualitative change - it is a clustered 
environment in which there is more than one system of the 
same kind. The essential characteristic of the type III 
environment is the presence of more than one system performing 
the same function, and for which therefore the same elements 
of the environment have relevance as goals and noxiants. This 
means that from the point of view of these systems the environ­
ment can no longer be considered placid - it has active 
elements, and it is more appropriate to think of this and the 
succeeding type as dynamic environments,
10 5
An example of the type III environment is the state 
of affairs that exists when two or more timber-milling organ­
izations are exploiting the same forest for timber, or when 
two or more fleets are fishing the same off-shore waters.
The presence of a ‘competitor' makes an important difference 
in an environment that is otherwise only clustered. The 
disturbed-reactive environment corresponds to the typical 
milieu for mature human behaviour, and is described in the 
economists theory of oligopolic markets« It is exemplified 
also in most forms of contests and games, in which competitors 
must act within certain defined boundary conditions so as to 
manipulate a variety of objects or situations with the aim of 
maintaining precedence over the other(s)»
The greater complexity of reactive environments is
reflected in the fact that system viability now becomes
dependent upon a third class of relations in addition to the
two that are critical in the clustered environment (L,n and11
L-_). In an environment characterized by the existence of 12
independent causal agents, knowledge of the  ^ relationships - 
causal paths or pressures originating within the environment 
which impact upon the system - become essential to comprehen­
sion of the system's activity.
IV The turbulent environment
We have already discussed at some length the 
phenomena that are characteristic of extended social fields 
that are in a state of turbulence, and have given some atten­
tion to the concept of turbulence. In the conceptual series 
elaborated by Emery and Trist, turbulent environments are, 
like type III environments, dynamic (and clustered), but unlike 
the reactive environment, they are characterized by dynamic 
processes occurring in the field itself, and not simply in the 
actions of other systems. The turbulent environment represents
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a transformation of the third level of causal texturing - it 
is a disturbed reactive environment from which dynamic field 
processes have emerged as an unintended result of the inter­
actions of the constituent systems* (There are cases in which 
the field [or the ’ground5] itself becomes dynamic not as a 
consequence of the interactions of the relevant systems, but 
due to entirely heteronomous forces* A fishing fleet caught 
in a gale, or a village struck by a hurricane would be examples 
of this. These phenomena are not our concern,,) A useful 
analogy in understanding how turbulence arises is the effect 
of a company of soldiers marching over a suspension bridge.
They may set up a resonance that leads to the bridge's ‘self- 
destruction1 [Emery and Trist:1965:26].
We have already used some examples of turbulence 
relating to ecological processes. If the Type II environ­
ment corresponds to the relevant environment of a single 
milling enterprise exploiting a forest for timber, and Type 
III corresponds to the new state of affairs created by other 
milling enterprises beginning operations in the same locality, 
the turbulent environment corresponds to the situation that 
can arise if the competing systems over-exploit the available 
timber, encouraging soil wash and erosion and making regenera­
tion difficult if not impossible. We are increasingly alerted 
to the possibility that the continuous transformation of 
energy and the accompanying release of wastes into the atmos­
phere and into water systems may result in accumulations of 
noxious substances up to a 'critical mass' point, at which 
irreversible processes begin to take place in eco-system 
balances. Other instances of the Hegelian thesis that quantity 
can become quality are found in the work of Calhoun and others 
on the effects of population density on animal behaviour.
Again there are critical points at which qualitatively new 
processes begin to operate which cannot be accounted for in 
the same terms as the processes characteristic of inter-
107
actions of individual systems.
In the case of social fields there is a good deal 
to suggest that the dynamics of mob and riot situations 
correspond to a state of turbulence. The mutual excitation 
of emotionally charged individuals can lead to their joint 
engagement in activities that they would "normally* never 
contemplate as individuals, Emery and Trist argue that turbu­
lence arises in organizational environments as a result of 
increasing reliance on research and development, the deepening 
interdependence between the economic and other facets of 
society, radical increases in the volume and speed of communi­
cations, and the sheer growth of organizations and linked sets 
of organizations to the point that they are so large that 
"their actions are both persistent and strong enough to induce 
autochthonous processes in the environment" [ibid:26]„
In turbulent environments L.^, and ^21 re^a_
tions are still of importance, but now 1 ^ 2  relations, the 
area of interdependencies that lies within the environment 
itself, become of critical significance to the survival of 
the system and its ability to perform its function, As the 
examples that we have given illustrate, when turbulence arises 
the system's zone of free movement is largely dictated by 
processes which are entirely heteronomous with regard to the 
interactions between it and other systems occupying the field.
V The vortical environment
Since these four levels of environment were first 
described in the literature, the possibility of a further 
level has been recognized, in which the environment takes on 
some of the properties of a vortex or whirlpool. Such environ- 
ments must be thought of as entirely dynamic, and having the 
capacity to swallow up or engross anything that approaches
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them.
Natural events such as the whirlpool and the cyclone 
provide the model for such environments. In the environments 
of individuals it may be that some mob situations have the 
same characteristics when the atmosphere attains a pitch of 
frenzy and compulsion that erases the individual's will and 
engrosses him 'involuntarily' in the mob behaviour. It has 
also been suggested that some of the rituals and ceremonies 
associated with conversion and indoctrination, and with certain 
rites de passage in primitive society, have a similar effect 
on the individual subject, especially when the emotional 
intensity of the situation is enhanced by the use of pulsating 
music and chanting, and intoxicants. In this respect such 
phenomena as 'Beatlemania', Bible Belt conversions in the 
American south, and many primitive ceremonials may have a 
certain amount in common.
Emery has suggested that vortical processes may be 
set up within social fields, as in masses of fluid, where the 
parts of field are moving at quite different velocities.
Just as in rivers, eddies are set up at the interstices of 
bodies of water moving at different rates, so the frictions 
engendered by segmentation of the social field and their 
differential rates of change may induce the forces operating 
in the field to assume a vortical dynamic. It is of interest 
to speculate whether for example, the outbreaks of racial 
violence at Sharpeville, Watts County, and Notting Hill 
coincide at all with locations and points of time in the 
social field where the differences between blacks and whites
20
Some of the properties of a vortical environment are des­
cribed in Edgar Alan Poe's short story, 'A descent into the 
maelstrom', in which the narrator describes how he survived 
in the moskoe-strom, an intense tidal whirlpool off the 
Norwegian coast.
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were perceived to be greatest [Emery:1971:663j„
In the vortical environment, L ^  relations alone 
have any significance, for the fate of any object or individ­
ual implicated in such a field of forces is entirely determined 
by the character of the environment.
With regard to these five types of environment it 
should be emphasized that they are ideal types, and that the 
real environments in which empirical social science is inter­
ested are invariably "mixtures' of them. The different facets 
of business activity for example - purchasing, inventory 
control, production, maintenance, sales, research and develop­
ment, and so on, characteristically face environments of 
differing complexities, such that different demands are made 
on different sections of the organization. It is nevertheless 
usually possible to characterize the overall environment of 
the organization with respect to its dominant function. An 
individual's psychological environment at work may be stable 
and simple, while at home or in a love affair it is highly 
turbulent.
We can say in general that individuals and social 
systems engaged in purposive activity have to devote a good 
deal of time, energy and other resources to acquiring infor­
mation about the structure and dynamics of their environments, 
and frequently also to manipulating and controlling the amount 
of environmental variance they have to confront. As we have 
suggested, for mature humans the normal amount of complexity 
experienced in their life space appears to correspond to the 
Type III level. Individuals in a simpler environment are 
likely to introduce more complexity if they are able, and to 
exploit existing variances to the full. Alexander 
Solzhenitsin's novel !A day in the life of Ivan Denisovitch1 
is an insightful though agonizing account of the efforts of 
an occupation camp internee to make the most of an incredibly
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monotonous# routine existence. In the more complex environ­
ments on the other hand# the typical response is to try to 
reduce the complexity of the environment to the familiar# 
disturbed-reactive level.
A particular advantage in identifying a number of 
types of environment is that it suggests a related set of 
distinctions which refer to the problems in purposeful behaviour 
of understanding and learning about the relevant environment# 
and finding ways in which it can be manipulated. These are 
problems of system adaptation. The next chapter discusses 
the concept of adaptation# the different strategies of adapta­
tion that are appropriate to the five types of environment# 
and a number of characteristic maladaptations to turbulent 
environments.
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See Abel [1951] for a sociological analysis of the concen­
tration camp.
CHAPTER FOUR
ADAPTATION OF SYSTEMS TO THEIR ENVIRONMENTS
Ill
A Concept, of Adaptation
The concepts of system and environment have been 
discussed afsome length. Open systems, we have shown, are 
in more or less constant commerce with their environments, 
with which they must establish appropriate relations in order 
to be able to survive and to go on performing their function.
In the establishment of appropriate relations between the 
system and the environment, both the complexity of the envir­
onment and of the system itself are determinative factors.
The greater the complexity of the system, in terms of the 
number of its parts and the range of activities they are 
capable of performing, the more chance it has in any situation 
of finding a response that is appropriate. The more uncertain 
and variable the environment, the greater the difficulty for 
any system to consistently behave in an appropriate manner. 
These are problems of adaptation.
One of the difficulties in trying to understand the 
processes whereby psychological individuals and social systems 
become, or fail to become, adapted to the environments in 
which they exist, is that while the concept of adaptation has 
been well developed in the biological sciences, there has 
been no such development in the social sciences.
Biology has long been concerned with such apparently 
purpose-like processes as regulation, co-ordination, integra­
tion and adaptation, as they are observed in both plant and 
animal life. Since Darwin's pioneering work we have come to 
understand a good deal about phylogenetic adaptations - those 
changes in the form and functions of an organism that accompany 
the evolution of its species as a whole, resulting from 
natural selection and genetic mutations. The neck of the 
giraffe, the streamlining of fish, and the colouration of 
moths and butterflies that enables them to blend with their 
habitats are examples of phylogenetic adaptation.
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A different class of adaptations accompanies the 
development of the single organism, both in its embryonic 
and maturation processes# including its ability to learn 
those response which are appropriate to particular environ­
mental demands» The maturation of the human body# represented 
in sexual development and increases in strength and size, and 
the acclimatization of plants and animals to local variations 
in climate are examples of ontogenetic adaptation»
Many organisms are capable in addition of exhibiting 
end-serving behaviours, in response to the continuous flux of 
environmental events, ranging from the most highly sophistica­
ted adaptive behaviours of men (which include symbolic response 
such as speech and facial expression) # through the manipula­
tion of means-objects such as sticks and push-buttons by 
monkeys and pigeons, to the simple approach-avoid tactics 
available to the lowest forms of animal life» Instinctive 
behaviours and reflex actions constitute a further category 
of adaptations.
Men have found it of interest and value to enquire 
further and further into these processes in the organic world 
whereby the interdependencies of species are established and 
regulated, and individual organisms accommodate themselves 
to the vagaries of their environments, and yet they have not 
wanted to see themselves as integrally involved in them.
Man's unique capacity of rational thought and his subsequent 
creation of technology are typically presumed to have libera­
ted him from this organic ecology, to the point where it can 
be imagined that our problem is not to adapt to the world, 
but to adapt the world to our requirements. Technology greatly 
exaggerates this presumed discontinuity between man and the 
rest of nature» It is difficult for us to feel closely 
implicated in the ecosystem when we live in high-rise down­
town apartments, or greatly dependent on organic food chains 
when our meals come tinned and synthetic from the supermarket.
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As McHarg has pointed out, this human arrogance is 
compounded by the pervasiveness of the philosophy of Genesis, 
which expounds the view that 'man is exclusively divine', 
that 'man is given dominion over all the earth', and that man 
ought to “multiply and subdue the earth'»
The implications of this are very clear - there is 
one moral arena; that is, that the acts of man-to­
man are scrutinized by God, the Archangels, the 
Church, the Priests and the Court, and if you covet 
your neighbour's wife, or any wife covets her 
neighbour's husband or if you commit adultery, or 
theft or murder, then God, the Archangels, the 
Church, the Priests and the Courts are looking for 
you, and if they catch you they will rap your 
knuckles or do something much worse. But if you 
want to kill off every whale, every ponderosa 
pine, every sequoia, if you want to make every 
river septic, every harbour septic, if you want 
to kill the oceans, you may do so because the acts 
of man-to-nature are not sacremental. Apparently 
God, the Archangels, the Church, the Priests and 
the Courts dont give a damn, and so you may destroy 
all nature without any fear of retribution.
[McHarg;1971:641]
While it is of course true that man has achieved a
far greater independence from his environment than any other
organism, it is nevertheless an ecological madness to premise
our activities on a belief in the invulnerability of the species
man, and it is fast becoming necessary for us to take a humbler
view of the place of man in the universe and to recognize our
complete interdependence with the rest of living and non-living
things on the surface of the earth. The end of 'free fall'
requires a radical review of the Gospel of Growth and the
exploitative, competitive, and xenophobic attitudes to the
22resource balance of the ecosystem that it nurtures. One
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Such a review is advocated in the forceful polemic by Mishan 
[1967] against the 'ideology of growth'. It is an unexpected 
book from a highly reputed economist, and of the highest 
importance in drawing attention to the alternatives to 'growth- 
mania ' .
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ingredient of a better appreciation of the symbiotic relations 
between man and his social life on the one hand, and the rest 
of the universe on the other, may be the development of a 
concept of adaptation that is appropriate to the behaviours 
of purposeful systems, and which is entirely consistent with 
biological concepts of adaptation that are relevant mainly to 
goal-directed behaviours.
An important move in this direction has been made 
in the work of Gerd Sommerhoff, and his development of the 
concept of 'directive correlation' [1950, 1969]. His starting 
point is that an adequate theoretical biology must have a 
concept of life, and a way of distinguishing between living 
and non-living systems that is consistent with a mechanistic 
interpretation of the world. In a sense therefore, his work 
parallels in biology the development of a naturalistic 
psychology.
He reviews a wide range of phenomena in nature that 
have the "teleological* or end-oriented character of adaptive 
behaviour, and purposes that the common element in all such 
examples of adaptive behaviour is the concept of 'appropriate 
response', which he regards as linking together four spatio- 
temporally distinct elements in any actual example of 
adaptation:
1. Environmental circumstances (EC) or events 
which act as stimuli and evoke the response
(R) *
2. The response itself.
3. The environmental circumstance which the 
response meets during its execution and on 
which its success depends.
4. The occurrence of a certain event or state 
of affairs - the 'goal' of the response
(G) - as an effect of the co-occurrence and 
interaction of (2) and (3).
Bearing in mind that the stimulus, the response, and the goal
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are individuated by time, the notion of an appropriate res­
ponse can be represented in the following schema:
(time)
[from sommerhoff, p.44]
The response Rt^ is appropriate insofar as it has the effect, 
in conjunction with the set of environmental circumstances 
with which its occurrence coincides, ECt , of bringing about 
the state of affairs Gt^.
Sommerhoff uses the example of an automatically 
sighted anti-aircraft gun:
1. In this case the stimulus StQ (corresponding 
to ECtQ in the above diagram) is the appear­
ance of a target within a given region.
2. The relevant part of the response is the 
line of fire adopted by the gun at time t^
(Rt]_) .
3. The relevant environmental circumstances 
coinciding with the firing of the gun are 
all those events and states of affairs 
external to the gun-aiming-and-firing system 
which have an effect on the path of the 
target and of the bullet during the time-in­
flight of the latter (position, velocity, 
direction of target; strength of wind etc.).
4. The "goal4 *9 or criterion of appropriateness
can be interpreted in two ways. Generally
the gun may be said to have been aimed
appropriately if its line of fire at the time
of firing created the greatest probability 
feasible under the circumstances of the bullet
hitting the target,. This is usually a satis­
factory criterion in view of the fact that 
simplifying assumptions typically have to be
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made about the actual path of the target.
In the more restrictive version, the gun 
is said to be aimed appropriately if and 
only if the bullet actually hits the target.
It is important to note that the significance of the time 
lapse between the environmental conditions or events which 
initiate the given response and those on which its effective­
ness is held to be contingent, is frequently not appreciated, 
due to the fact that the environmental conditions that evoke 
the response often remain constant. The example of the auto­
matic gun takes account of the fact that relevant parts of 
the environment may be subject to change during the interval 
between an action being 'triggered off' and its completion. 
This factor is equally relevant to the case of a cat pouncing 
on a mouse or a man firing a rifle at a bird in flight.
To say that a given response is appropriate does 
not only imply that it is effective, but entails in addition 
a comparison of the actual response and its corresponding 
environmental state with an extended range of alternative 
possible responses and states of the environment» To return 
to Sommerhoff's anti-aircraft gun example:
»».the statement that a given line of fire is 
'appropriate* in relation to a given course of the 
target, asserts that the given course of the tar­
get is a member of a set of possible alternative 
courses and that the given line of fire is the 
corresponding member of a correlated set of 
possible alternative lines of fire, each member 
of the latter set being effective in conjunction 
with the corresponding member of the former.
[ Sommerhof f • 19 50 :4 5]
In view of the fact that an entirely accidental res 
ponse could conceivably be appropriate under given circumstan 
ces (e.g., the accidental firing of a rifle might bring down 
a bird), the definition of adaptedness requires the further 
stipulation that it is a form of non-accidental appropriate­
ness. To say that the gun is adapted to the path of its 
target implies not only that at a given moment the gun is so
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trained as to create the highest probability of a hit being 
scored, but that also, within a given range of environmental 
variation (for example a target moving in a different 
direction, or at a different velocity), the gun would have 
adopted a different line of fire, correlated with the changed 
characteristics of the target.
Up to this point, only cases in which the changed 
initial conditions that set off the adaptive response, has 
been an environmental variable, and usually an antecedent 
value of the environmental variable with which the response 
is correlated, have been considered» However, the case of 
an animate or purely mechanical system responding to a change 
in its environment represents only a limited class of all the 
events that can justifiably be called adaptive. We shall 
call such cases passive adaptation, and distinguish them from 
three other types of adaptation.
(1) Passive
adaptation
The response and the environmental conditions with which it 
coincides are jointly caused by a changed environmental con­
dition Et^. As a result the response is directively correlated 
with the state of the environment it meets during its execu­
tion, and these two variables together produce the goal, or 
focal condition (FC)„ Passive adaptation corresponds to the 
capabilities of reactive-functional and reactive multi­
functional systems, which can select actions in response to 
environmental changes, that will maintain the performance of 
their function (e.g., a thermostat).
The four essential aspects of this model of adapted­
ness and the relations between them are generalized by
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Sommerhoff into his model of directive correlation. The 
initial conditions for directive correlation are potentially 
much wider than in acts of passive adaptation, and are given 
the general name of 'coenetic variables' (from the Greek 
coenos: beginning), The coenetic variables need not be
exclusively environmental variables# but may also be changes 
in the state of the system itself# such as the sensation of 
hunger or discomfort# the need for activity or rest# or the 
apprehension of danger, Neither therefore# in an instance 
of directive correlation# need the coenetic variable be an 
earlier value of the environmental circumstances with which 
the response is correlated,, Correspondingly# directive 
correlation is not concerned simply with responses or reactions 
to variations occurring in the environment# but incorporates 
also goal-seeking behaviours. The essential requirement 
remains that Rt and ECt^ be so related in terms of the 
objective properties of the physical system of which they are 
part# that they are both caused by# and are both responsive 
to variations in the same coenetic variable.
(Environment)
(System)
(ii) directive
correlation
Sommerhoff 's formal definition of directive corre­
lation is as follows:
Any event or state of affairs Rt^ occurring at a 
time t-^ is directively correlated to a given 
simultaneous event or state of affairs Et^ in 
respect of the subsequent occurrence of an event 
or state of affairs Gt2 if the physical system of 
which these are part is objectively so conditioned 
that there exists an event or state of affairs 
CVt^ prior to t^# and a set of possible alternative
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values of CVt^, such that
(a) under the given circumstances any varia­
tion of CVtQ within this set implies 
variations in both Rt^ and Et-^ ;
(b) any such pair of varied values of Rti,
Et-^  (as well as the pair of their actual 
values) is a pair of corresponding mem­
bers of two correlated sets of possible 
values R't-^ , R''t^, R ' ' ' t^ # - » - and E't-^ ,
E ' 1 t-j_, E ' 8 ‘ t-|_, . . . #which are such that 
under the circumstances all pairs of 
corresponding members, but no other pairs, 
cause the subsequent occurrence of Gt2 .
[ ibid: 54-5]
The model of directive correlation therefore provides 
a categorically non-teleological definition of goal-directed 
behaviour, as borne out in the fact that it applies equally 
to the actions of a purely mechanical system - a radar- 
controlled anti-aircraft gun - and the whole range of organic 
processes subsumed under the concepts of regulation, integra­
tion, co-ordination, organization and the like, which have 
been the preoccupation of biologists.
Directive correlation, in short, is the fundamen­
tal and objective system-property which in more 
or less complex forms underlies the phenomena of 
adaptation in nature and their purpose-like 
character. [ibid:56]
Directive correlation refers to a characteristic of a system 
having more than one possible course of action available to 
it, such that w.ithin certain limits, it is able to select a 
course of action following a change in one of its own or an 
environmental property, that has the effect of enabling the 
system to go on performing its function.
In presenting a consistent naturalistic model of 
adaptation that is appropriate to goal-seeking systems which 
may be either mechanical or animate in nature, Sommerhoff 
rather avoids the problems of consciousness which are particu­
larly distinctive of human behaviours.
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...directive correlation is a physical property 
which can exist in a closed physical system 
without presupposing the presence within that 
system of a rational agent and of conscious 
mental processes, i.e., of processes which are 
purposive in the literal sense of the word and 
involve rational thought, the presence of 
visualized aims, and fixed resolutions in the 
mind of a thinking agent. It is therefore seen 
that conscious mental processes constitute but 
one of several possible mechanisms in nature 
which can cause a system to have the objective 
property of directive correlation. [ibid:66-7]
He does recognize that the rational behaviour of man - 'acti­
vities involving rational thought processes and proceeding 
according to a preconceived plan, fixed resolution and con­
scious purpose in the mind of the agent' - involves a type 
of adaptive behaviour that is somewhat distinctive, and yet 
he comes to the conclusion that
oo,although rational thought is a powerful 
instrument, it is neither a generally necessary 
nor sufficient condition for the objective 
adaptation of Man's behaviour to his environ­
ment. [ibid:147]
The special significance of those adaptations which 
are the result of rational behaviour, and which therefore 
typify behaviours found in social systems has been clarified 
by Emery in the distinction between active and passive 
adaptations [Emery:1967; see also Emery and Trist:1972], and 
formally distinguished by Ackoff and Emery in their definitions 
of goal-directed and purposeful systems [1972]. The concept 
of active adpatation goes beyond directive correlation in 
embracing systems of causal relationships in which the focal 
conditions are wilfully induced changes in the state of the 
system or its environment that enhance the range of responses 
that will subsequently be adaptive. In other words active 
adaptation entails a system of directive correlations, in 
which the circumstances that constitute the focal condition 
of the first are deliberately created in order to become the
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starting condition for subsequent adaptive behaviours, Emery 
gives the example of a man lighting a fire:
„.„his wit and action sets off an environmental 
process that enables him by appropriate respon­
ses to pursue goals of warmth, cooking, of 
visual contact, of security, of distillation, 
etc. Making fires is not only an adaptive 
response to the sun going down but can be a 
starting condition.for a range of other pur­
posive activities. [Emery:1967:201]
(iii) Active
adaptation
In Sommerhoff:s model of directive correlation, the existence 
of some goals in the system's environment is taken for granted. 
It is a function of the eyes and other sense organs to identify 
and locate the need satisfiers and noxiants that come within 
the organism's sphere of influence, and to establish the causal 
connections that enable environmental variables to become the 
coenetic variables of adaptive behaviour., The model is there­
fore most appropriate to the kinds of adaptations that occur 
in goal-directed behaviour.
With active adaptation, immediate actions do not 
usually result directly in attainment of the outcome sought, 
for the outcome may be extremely distant, having existence 
only as a mental image of the actor. Immediate actions are 
geared to the creation of future conditions which will make 
further adaptive responses possible, some of which have the 
character that they lead a step closer to the attainment of 
the mentally constructed or distant focal condition. The 
distant focal condition corresponds to the system's purpose 
and the more immediate ones to the various goals that are
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causally connected in the realization of that purpose. The 
same purpose can be attained by a number of different series 
of directive correlations, as a man, for example, can arrive 
at his destination by any combination of walking, running, 
catching a bus, riding a bicycle, and so on. A concept of 
planning as a formalized method of active adaptation is 
elaborated later on.
In arguing that many of the environments in which 
the purposeful activities of individuals and organizations 
are carried out are becoming increasingly complex and uncertain, 
we noted that one of the consequences is that it becomes more 
difficult for individual systems to adapt by themselves, using 
only their own resources. It becomes increasingly necessary 
for systems commonly confronting a turbulent environment to 
act in concert in order to provide the minimum amount of 
stability needed for them to pursue their individual ends.
We envisage therefore a fourth level of adaptation - ecological 
adaptation - which refers to systems of action in which a 
number of purposeful systems sharing the same environment 
consistently correlate their behaviours to one another for 
the purpose of rendering the effects of their separate activi­
ties more predictable, and therefore more susceptible to 
control.
According to the situation this may mean coming to 
agreement on the general nature of the outcomes (focal 
conditions) to be sought, the means that may legitimately 
be employed, or the nature and range of initial conditions 
that are to be the basis for actions. The most effective way 
in which the adaptive behaviours of large numbers of purpose­
ful systems can become directively correlated amongst them­
selves appears to be through the search for and agreement 
upon shared values, including values which relate specifically 
to the maintenance of the stability of the social field.
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in terms of our model, this means that the properties and >
behaviours of other systems come to constitute the coenetic 
variables in acts of purposeful behaviour.
This step in itself does not take us far beyond the 
notion of active adaptation, which already allows for the 
possibility that the sequences of directively correlated 
responses of the actor take into account the parts being 
played by other systems in the same environment. Relating 
this conceptual series of modes of adaptation to the system 
hierarchy formulated by Ackoff and Emery suggests that the 
significant step beyond the level of active adaptation entails 
an ecologically adapted series of directive correlations which 
envisages no end point; in which the correlated systems do not 
anticipate any final condition that would constitute the 
'outcome' of their collaborative involvement. This implies 
that the behaviours of the ecologically interdependent systems 
be appropriate to the pursuit of a common ideal or ideals, 
which pervade the action environment and become salient as 
field forces when choice points arise, disposing the connected 
systems to choose those behaviours which are most conducive 
to the realization of the shared ideals.
Whatever improved kind of understanding of social 
and psychological processes of adaptation the social sciences 
eventually arrive at, it is as well to appreciate, as 
Sommerhoff points out, that:
...adaptibility is never unlimited. it may be 
very extensive, as in the higher organisms and
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especially in Man, but no living organism has 
the power to cope with all the conceivable 
challenges of its environment. on the contrary, 
the environmental changes which are possible 
in the normal routine of events are often so 
limited that, as someone has put it, few 
animals have a chance to show how foolishly 
they would act under irregular circumstances.
[Sommerhoff:op. cit:19]
Clearly both the causal complexity of the environ­
ment and the variability available to the system in its 
actions are basic parameters of the degree of adaptation that 
is possible in any particular case. The success of an organ­
ism, individual or organization in bringing about and maintain 
ing the focal conditions that are appropriate to itself is a 
function of its ability to match the range of potential 
environmental states (Et^ ) with a range of potential responses 
such that for each Et there is an Rt which would produce the 
same, jointly caused, end result.
The directive correlation model suggests some 
objective measures of the limits of adaptability in particular 
cases, or to express it positively, of degrees of adaptation. 
Adaptibility can be measured in terms of the amount of 
variation of a coenetic variable over which directive correla­
tion can be maintained, and the number of coenetic variables 
that exist for a particular system. The adaptibility of the 
automatic gun is limited by the range of target velocities 
that it can cope with, and a given range of target elevations. 
An air-conditioning system that controls for humidity as well 
as temperature is adapted to a wider range of environmental 
circumstances than the simple thermostat heating system.
The following section discusses the adaptation of 
systems in environments of differing levels of causal com­
plexity,, The concepts of adaptation developed here are 
connected with the five levels of environmental texturing 
that were outlined in the last chapter.
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Environmental complexity and Adaptation
I Adaptation to the placid-random environment
When the environmental relevancies for a particular system 
are 'randomized' - the 'goods' to be approached and the 'bads' 
to be avoided have a distribution that is unpredictable to 
the system, any behaviour is as good as any other. No beha­
viour of the system can intentionally be 'better' than any 
other, as there are no known variations in the distribution 
of goals and noxiants that can be taken advantage of.
Actions may be selected fortuitously that are conducive to 
success, but such rewards cannot be anticipated in advance.
We find it difficult to conceive of any behaviour 
that could be called adaptive taking place in a purely random 
environment. scT:imerhoff seems to be of the same opinion:
The necessity for the existence of one or more 
coenetic variables in every case of adaptation 
is also intuitively obvious. it is impossible 
for any machine or living organism to adapt a 
certain action to the environment unless it has 
information about the environment, i.e., unless 
it can be influenced by some features of the 
environment. [sommerhoff:op. cit:53]
Sommerhoff's concept of appropriateness has no relevance. The 
system cannot formulate useful hypotheses about the environ­
ment because its parts do not appear to be joined in any 
regular way.
Schützenburger's interpretation of system objectives 
in such environments is that "the optimal strategy is just the 
simple tactic of attempting to do ones best on a purely local 
basis" [Schützenburger:1954:101]. if tactics refers to 
selecting an action from ones available repertoire, and 
strategy to the formulation of a 'strategic objective' - the 
position one wants to occupy at a future time, we can say that 
the discrimination between them is not relevant to random
12 6
environments,
Further, it does not seem possible for learning to 
take place in such environments. The above quotation from 
Sommerhoff suggests that learning is related not only to the 
system having available to it the faculties of perception 
and memory, and responses that would qualify as ‘learning 
behaviour', but also, and independently, to the information 
structure of the environment. chein has made this observation 
in discussing the role of cues as a determinant of behaviour. 
Cues are properties of objects or situations 'which offer 
relevant information', in the sense that they are systemati­
cally related to other characteristics of objects or 
situations:
a 'cue' is an objective feature of the environment; 
it may or may not be utilized as such by the 
behaving individual and does not depend for its 
existence (though it may for its use) on the 
learning process or on some immediate or direct 
inference. The utilization of cues may depend 
on learning and/or upon immediate and direct 
acts of inference; but this feature of the envi­
ronment sets limits upon what may be learned or 
inferred, and it makes certain learnings or 
inferences more difficult than others. [Chein: 
op. cit:121]
Purely random environments are devoid of the cues that would 
make learning possible, and regardless of the response 
capabilities of the system, there does not appear to be any 
meaningful sense in which such environments could be learned.
All four types of systems can survive and perform 
their functions in this simplest level of environment, but all 
of them, except those which simply perform a function and do 
not pursue any goal, can go on operating in such environments 
only at the expense of forced redundancy in their capabilities. 
Goal-seeking, purposeful, and ideal-seeking systems all have 
capabilities that exceed the minimum requirements of the 
random environment. if we strictly observe the interpretation
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that no adaptation is possible at this level then only 
passive functional and passive multi-functional systems 
exist in environments at this level without redundant capacity. 
Reactive functional and reactive multi-functional systems (a 
thermostat; in aircraft's automatic pilot that controls 
heading and roll) are capable of passive adaptation, and can 
therefore operate in environments which are in some regard 
clustered. systems occupying such environments are generally 
instruments of higher order systems, and it is difficult to 
think of any systems naturally occurring at this level.
The examples that we have offered of random envir­
onments have all been the relevant environments of goal­
seeking or purposeful systems, but we should note in addition 
that the relevant environments of parts of complex organiza­
tions are frequently maintained at this simple level, and 
for the same reasons that the regimes of lunatic asylums and 
concentration camps have approximated to the random field - 
control is made a good deal easier.
II Adaptation to the placid-clustered environment
The type n  environment represents a transformation of the 
random environment whereby the goals and noxiants become 
clustered. A system in an environment in which its 'need 
satisfiers' and those objects or situations which have 
detrimental consequences are regularly interdependent in 
temporal or spatial configurations, thereby giving rise to 
variations in the supportiveness of different parts of the 
environment, cannot expect to survive in the long run by the 
use of purely 'chance' behaviours or 'doing one's best on a 
purely local basis ' . clustering offers the possibility of 
improvement upon purely chance behaviours. it is no longer 
the case, as in the random environment that pursuit of the 
nearest visible goal is as good as any other action.
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To pursue the goal object that it can see, the 
goal object with which it is immediately con­
fronted, may lead the system into parts of the 
field which are fraught with unforeseen diffi­
culties . similarly, avoiding a present, diffi­
culty may lead the system away from parts of 
the environment that are potentially rewarding.
[Emery and Trist;1972 :46]
Clustering calls for the use of strategy rather 
than just tactics. Actions selected do not need only to 
satisfy the immediate situational demands — they need to 
belong to some ordered series of actions that are calculated 
to lead towards the strategic objective. in clustered 
environments the strategic objective can be appropriately 
conceptualized in locational terms - it is defining and mov­
ing towards the optimal location in the environment. Thus 
for example, mineral prospectors with limited resources for 
surveys and drilling have literally to select the best locations 
they can on the basis of surface and strata variations. 
Similarly, a wise fisherman knows which part of a river to 
drop his line in. we see therefore that in contrast to the 
random environment, adaptation is not only possible, but is 
also necessary if a system is to survive in a clustered 
environment in the long run. useful hypotheses can be developed
about the structure of these environments, and they can assist
23the selection of appropriate actions.
It differs from the random environment also in that 
learning can take place. some courses of action will now be 
repeatedly better than others for the attainment of particular 
ends. The support for associative, reinforcement or stimulus- 
response theories of learning has come very largely from the 
use of experimental situations which correspond to the 
clustered environment, in which organisms are rewarded in
See Toda [1962] for a creative analogue to the clustered 
environment.
some way when they have made 'correct.' hypotheses about the 
connectedness of parts of their environment,
in order to adapt to a clustered environment a 
system needs to be minimally goal-seeking, in various actual 
situations it needs to be able to stick to courses of action 
that are determined more by the end that it seeks than by 
the proximal array of goals and noxiants,, This of course is 
the meaning of strategy.
We mentioned that clustering is relevant also to 
the behaviour of reactive-functional systems. The distinction 
to be made is that for this class of systems, clustering has 
the effect of determining whether or not at any given time the 
system is performing its function, whereas in the case of 
goal-seeking systems the relevance of clustering is its 
influence over the effectiveness with which the system pursues 
its goal. The relevant environment of a thermostatically con­
trolled heating system is fluctuations in’ the temperature of 
the air contiguous with its sensor, if by chance the room 
temperature corresponds to the level at which the thermostat 
has been set, the system does nothing. such a system is 
adaptive because it can react to environmental changes in ways 
that have the effect of maintaining an environmental state. 
Variability in the environment is what makes such a system 
work, but that variability cannot in any sense be exploited 
or taken advantage of by systems belonging to the functional 
class.
We propose therefore to reserve the term passive 
adaptation to refer to the capabilities of reactive functional 
and reactive multi-functional systems. These are generally 
state-maintaining systems of some kind. They simply react to 
fluctuations in an environmental condition or conditions in 
predetermined ways so as to go on producing a particular 
outcome. Goal-seeking systems on the other hand are capable 
of directively correlating their actions to variations in the
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state of the environment - they are responsive rather than 
simply reactive, in that they can choose their actions.
Ill Adaptation to the disturbed-reactive environment
The new challenge to adaptation at this level is the presence 
in the same environment of a similar system. When the envi­
ronment contains a 'competitor', adaptive behaviour needs to 
take into account the information that the competitor has of .
kthe distribution of goals and noxiants (clustering)f and what 
its probable courses of action are, as well as the distribution 
of goals and noxiants per se.
in this environment, each system does not simply 
have to take account of the other when they meet 
at random, but it has to consider that, what it 
knows about the environment can be known by 
another. That part of the environment to which 
it wishes to move is probably, for the same 
reason, the part to which the other wants to 
move. Knowing this, they will wish to improve 
their own chances by hindering the other, and 
they will know that the other will not only wish 
to do likewise but will know that they know 
this. [Emery and Trist:1972:49]
The term operation refers to the new requirement for 
adaptive behaviour. An operation is a 'planned series of 
tactical initiatives' that are calculated not only to be 
adapted to the realization of the system's goal, but also in 
the process to block or elicit certain courses of action that 
are available to the other systems. Although overall location 
in the field is still a relevant consideration for survival 
and effectiveness, the critical factor now tends to be 
"capacity <ar power to move more or less at will, i.e., to be 
able to make and meet competitive challenge" [Emery and Trist: 
1965:26] . in clustered environments, where the field as a 
whole is placid - relatively stable and predictable - most of 
the important, sources of environmental variance may be coped 
with by the appropriate use of approach-avoid tactics, by
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hiding or hoarding. when the major sources of variance are 
other systems, then some active coming-to-terms between them 
is demanded. Except when it is decided to 'fight to the 
death', strategies of bargaining, coalition, co-optation, or 
competition will tend to become prevalent.
We have seen that the clustered environment offers 
an information structure that allows systems with the requisite 
capacities (perception, memory, etc.) to learn by formulating 
and testing hypotheses concerning the regular connection of 
parts of the environment. The information structure of the 
disturbed-reactive environment is enriched by the fact that 
the cues (or coenetic variables) that can become variables in 
such hypotheses now include the behaviours of independent 
causal agents . The relevant set of causal interrelationships 
encompasses L-^ • ar*d L21 re -^ataons  ^ so that distinctions
can now be made between cases of system action and environmen­
tal response, and environmental pressure and system response. 
Given adequate levels of intelligence and memory, learning 
can now include 'theoretical' knowledge with regard to the 
possible combinations and recombinations of these interactive 
effects. The difference between the Type II and the Type m  
environments in this regard is analogous to the difference 
between doing a jigsaw puzzle and playing chess.
in environments of this degree of causal complexity 
adaptive behaviour requires that a system be able not only to 
select appropriate courses of action to enable it to move into 
and to exploit the 'richer' parts of its environment, but 
also that it be able to reconsider its goals. To be adapted 
in this type of environment therefore, a system needs to be 
at least a purposeful system, that is, a system which is 
capable of choosing both its actions and its outcomes under 
constant or varying environmental conditions.
To speak of a 'similar system' in a clustered
13z
environment means that a system (or systems) is present in 
that environment whose activity has the effect of reducing 
the effectiveness of the original system in the pursuit of 
its goal. As Thompson and McEwen have pointed out for the 
case of formal organizations, the strategies of competition 
and co-operation, absorption and parasitism that are called 
for by this state of affairs, characteristically entail some 
surrender of autonomy in goal-setting [Thompson and McEwen: 
1958]. A good example of this is the recurring international 
fishery disputes over the boundaries of territorial waters«,
So long as it meets no competition a fishing fleet operates 
in an environment that is clustered (i.e., fish are more 
likely to be found in certain locations under certain sea 
conditions than others). when other fishing fleets enter the 
same territory a need develops to divide up the relevant 
environment if effectiveness in goal attainment of the indi­
vidual fleets is to be maintained. within industry as a whole 
the development of substitutes such as plastics and synthetic 
fibres has forced problems of goal re-formulation upon 
traditional industries such as steel and wool.
IV Adaptation to the turbulent environment
Questions concerning the system characteristics and the modes 
of adaptation that are required by the causal texture of 
turbulent environments are in a sense the basic questions to 
be answered. At this stage only a sketch is presented, and 
the questions raised will be returned to and more thoroughly 
examined later on.
Because our focus is on the behaviours of social 
systems, the kind of turbulence that we are chiefly interested 
in is that which is created by the interactions of purposeful 
systems - human individuals, groups and organizations. As we 
have already commented, the emergence of dynamic processes in 
the field itself means for the constituent systems a gross
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increase in their area of relevant uncertainty - the causal 
complexity of the environment is such as to render unpredict­
able, and hence uncontrollable, the effects of system actions 
and interactions. The national awakening of consumership in 
the USA that followed Ralph Nader's attack on the motor 
industry, and the dramatic flare-up of opposition both on 
and off the campuses that followed the announcement of the 
invasion of Cambodia in 1970 are indicative of some dimensions 
of turbulence in American society.
in such environments it does not seem possible for 
individual systems to formulate courses of action that would 
have a worthwhile probability of enabling them to maintain a 
level of efficiency in the performance of their function. 
Neither tactics, strategy, nor operations can be relied upon 
in a situation in which dynamic disturbances originate not 
only from competing systems but from the ground or the medium 
in which they operate. when change and complexity of environ­
mental interconnectedness are ubiquitous there is unlikely to 
be any location in the field that remains benign more than 
transiently. The aristocrats had nowhere to hide in the 
bloody days of the French revolution. Neither is the mobili­
zation of power, and the capacity to move more or less at 
will, likely to be of much use in the long run when it is 
not a question of subordinating other systems, but of bring­
ing order to the ground upon which they interact. it seems 
unlikely for example that government decree and the threat, 
of fines represent the solution to the ecological crisis.
The dominance of heteronomous events at this level 
suggests that a population of purposeful systems can best 
come to terms with turbulence by entering into joint, collab­
orative searches for solutions, premised on the recognition 
that their most significant problems are common problems. 
Unlike the disturbed reactive environment, which requires 
some coming to terms between similar systems whose fates are
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to a degree negatively correlated, the turbulent environment 
requires some coming to terms between both similar and dis­
similar systems whose fates are to a significant degree 
positively correlated. This idea has been presaged in our 
discussion of Trist's argument that welfare and development 
become increasingly interdependent as a society moves into 
post-industrialism. we are inclined to say therefore, that 
insofar as adaptation is possible in the turbulent environ­
ment, it must be ecological adaptation, which entails the 
formulation of some shared principles to guide the responses 
of individual systems in their confrontations with the 
environment by limiting the possible range of outcomes they 
can seek and the ways in which they seek them.
It seems for example, that the present state of 
industrial 'lawlessness' in Australia is the result of a 
field of forces which is turbulent from the point of view of 
the parties centrally involved, and which therefore requires 
measures of ecological adaptation. indeterminate relations 
among the government, the arbitration commission, the employers, 
and the unions, manifested in a rash of official and unofficial 
strikes unrelated to wage-bargaining and the advocacy of 
repressive measures by employers and the government (even the 
leader of the Australian Labour party, the parliamentary 
opposition, has wanted to impose fines on dissident unionists), 
have created a situation in which none of the parties involved 
seem able to achieve their aims in the long run. For the 
parties to persist in perceiving this as a conflict situation, 
and selecting their responses accordingly, is inimical to the 
welfare of the larger system of which they are all part and 
in the end probably to the parties themselves. what seems 
to be minimally required is a search for some common ground 
with regard to beliefs about the purposes to be served by the 
production system as a whole, and some shared understandings 
of the procedures appropriate to realizing those purposes.
13 5
The point is perhaps more clearly demonstrated if 
we consider the helplessness of an individual caught up in a 
mob or riot situation who aspires to dampen or to divert the 
possibly violent or destructive direction of the energies 
engendered. or we may return to the analogy of a company of 
soldiers marching over a suspension bridge; one soldier 
breaking step is unlikely to mitigate the effect created by 
the rest of the company, but if a sufficiently large number 
of them do so, destructive resonance can be avoided.
Emery and Trist have suggested that if there is a 
mechanism for coping with turbulent environments that is 
comparable to the employment of tactics, strategy, and opera­
tions at the simpler levels, it is likely to be Lthe emergence 
of values that have overriding significance for all members 
of the field' -
So far as effective values emerge, the character 
of richly joined, turbulent fields changes in a 
most striking fashion. The relevance of large 
classes of events no longer has to be sought in 
an intricate mesh of diverging causal strands, but 
is given directly in the ethical code. By this 
transformation a field is created which is no 
longer richly joined and turbulent but simplified 
and relatively static. such a transformation will 
be regressive, or constructively adaptive, accor­
ding to how far the emerging values adequately 
represent the new environmental requirements.
[Emery and Trist:1965;28].
Values and ideals, unlike goals and purposes, cannot easily be 
written into contractual relationships and other agreements 
that can be used to bring stability to the Type ill environ­
mental, but require, above this, a level of mutual under­
standing and trust among the actors within a given field. it 
is at this level therefore that ideal-seeking, as opposed to 
purposeful behaviours, become significant in the adaptive 
potentials of behavioural systems.
Compared to the problems of identifying strategies
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of behaviour that are adaptive at this level of causal 
texturing, the task of identifying and describing a number 
of maladaptive strategies is one of relative ease. Accordingly, 
the next section is addressed to the exploration of a number 
of characteristic ways of behaving which are, in the long run 
at least, inappropriate in such environments. such an 
analysis, it is to be hoped, will be of assistance in explor­
ing further the system properties and strategies that are 
appropriate to conditions of turbulence.
Maladaptive Responses to Turbulence
We have argued that the social fields of advanced industrial 
societies are becoming increasingly turbulent as a concomitant 
of the drift into post-industrialism. We have also stated the 
view that institutional arrangements for policy-formation, 
planning, and decision-making in these technologically most 
advanced societies have tended to lag behind the radical 
increase in the complexity of the environments in which plans 
and decisions have to be made.
On the one hand the qualitative novelty of turbulence 
has commonly not been recognized for what it is, and large and 
powerful organizations have gone on behaving in a manner 
appropriate to the disturbed-reactive level of complexity.
This misperception and its pathological consequences have 
been more and more recognized and commented upon in recent 
years. in the context of societal planning for example, 
Ozbekhan has observed:
At present, our perception is still largely 
governed by the world view of 19th century 
industrialism. our problem is that the reality 
we are beginning to sense and with which we must 
deal belongs, by our own admission, to some 
other, newer order. it is the rationalizing 
principles of this newer reality that we are now- 
called upon to define. [ozbekhan;1969:52]
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On the other hand, where the 'newer order' has at 
least been recognized, we have characteristically been pre­
disposed to try and 'contain' its novel complexities by 
suppressing them, and adopting a stance of more selective 
attention. By limiting our consideration to specialized 
parts, aspects or dimensions of turbulently connected fields 
we may achieve the effect of 'down-grading' them to the more 
simple levels for the purposes of our immediate responses, 
in the advanced societies that we are talking about there are 
widely shared (if often poorly articulated) feelings that the 
real richness and complication of social decisions are actually 
avoided, while being successfully dealt with at more primitive . 
level, by such bureaucratic phenomena as routinization, 'red 
tape', impersonalization and the like. These pervasive 
disenchantments are often conveyed in the over-burdened 
concept of 'alienation'.
As we have seen, successful adaptation at any level 
of environmental complexity requires that a system be sensi­
tive to the kind of causal texturing with which it is confronted, 
and be able to select courses of action and choose behaviours 
that are appropriate to that environment. The choice of 
behaviours that would be appropriate at other levels than 
that which the system confronts is in general maladaptive, 
because they do not enable the system in the long run to go 
on performing its function without a reduction in its efficiency.
The challenges to the adaptive capabilities of 
individuals and social systems with which we have been most 
concerned, are those which derive from the over-complexity 
of their environments, and we have argued that over-complexity 
becomes a characteristic condition of social fields experien­
cing the transition to post-industrialism. Adaptation becomes 
prone to breakdown in the over-stimulating and unpredictable 
conditions of environmental turbulence. Both responses which 
try to down-grade this level of complexity by reacting only
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to limited facets or dimensions of it, and those responses 
which result from a misperception of the real level of com­
plexity, are maladaptive in the long run. we shall refer to 
the former as passive maladaptations and to the latter as 
active maladaptations.
The active ones are responses which would be 
appropriate for the simpler reactive environments but which 
do not correspond to the demands of a turbulent environment, 
in such cases some of the quantitative aspects of turbulence 
may be appreciated, evoking the accumulation and mobilization 
of greater and greater amounts of power, in an attempt to 
'restore order'. it is however, the qualitative novelty of 
the Type iv environment that has to be appreciated, particu­
larly the overriding significance of heteronomous forces.
To misperceive turbulence as simply a more complex form of 
the reactive environment encourages the persistence of Type 
III strategies of adaptation, which are likely to be maladaptive 
in the long run. The passive responses are essentially defence 
mechanisms which are calculated to downgrade the causal com­
plexity of the environmental domain with which the system is 
immediately confronted, by artificially severing it from its 
wider context. These responses are passive because they are 
set off by environmental properties which they attempt to 
conform to rather than to manipulate.
Angyal's identification of three dimensions of 
living systems - depth, progression, and breadth - has suggested 
a second way of classifying maladaptive responses. The conti­
nuing viability of the system as a whole is a function of its 
ability to achieve a satisfactory level of integration of 
each of these three dimensions. Failure to do so issues in 
a pathology of some sort.
1. The depth or vertical dimension refers to the 'system 
principle', or the basic trend of the organism. For individuals
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this basic trend is bi-poler, embracing on the one hand a 
trend towards autonomy (independence from the environment), 
and on the other a trend towards homonomy (integration with 
superindividual units such as the group, society the cosmos, 
etc.). The two poles of the vertical dimension are the depth 
and the surface.
in the vertical structure the more superficial 
factor is a part of the immediately deeper factor.
The relationship between part and whole in this 
dimension is that the part is a concretization of 
the whole in some specific form,... The person in 
his development not. only acquires more effective 
ways of expression, but may acquire also greater 
depths.... The depth is more essential and 
represents what one is, while the surface is more 
accidental and represents only what one does.
[ Angyal: 1941:2 66]
integration in this dimension therefore requires that 
surface behaviours are consistently related to the deeper roots 
of the system - the basic psychic structure in the case of 
individuals, and fundamental cultural axioms in the case of 
social systems. The selection of what is to be responded to 
out of the 'blooming, buzzing confusion' of the existential 
world needs to be guided by these root principles.
2. The dimension of progression (the means-ends dimension) 
refers to the functional 'division of labour' that is charac­
teristic of all living systems, whereby the whole differenti­
ates into parts that each contribute one or more functions to 
the outcomes of the whole. The outcomes and specific behaviours 
that are shaped by the basic trend of the organism through the 
vertical dimension, can usually only be achieved through a 
number of successive stages - a means-ends chain that is 
directed to the outcomes of the system.
The position of every single behaviour can be 
defined both with regard to the vertical dimension 
and with regard to the dimension of progression.
A given activity may be looked upon as an organiza-
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tion of means and ends, but at the same time 
this activity represents the satisfaction of 
some need which in turn is the surface manifes­
tation of deeper tendencies. [ibid:268]
integration in this dimension is expressed in the 
'economy' of the division of labour and the degree of articu­
lation that is achieved among the system parts. The trend 
towards autonomy requires both that the system differentiate 
in order to adapt to a wider range of environmental variance 
(Ashby's 'law of requisite variety'), but also that newly 
differentiated parts are reintegrated into the total structure.
3 . The breadth (or transverse) dimension refers to the lateral 
co-ordination of the various specific behaviours of the system, 
whereby they become or fail to become mutually consistent, or 
harmonious.
As we go from the depths to the surface the ten­
dencies of the organism become not only more 
specific but more numerous. The same general 
tendency may seek expression in a number of ways.
The various specific expressions of the same 
deeper tendency are not subordinated or super- 
ordinated to each other, but exist side by side....
The organization of parts into a whole along the 
transverse dimension can be called synergesis, 
or simply co-ordination. [ibid:269]
integration in this dimension has particular reference 
to the trend towards homonomy. There are some dimensions of 
the total system process - the strain towards the fullest 
realization of the system principle - which require that 
certain constellations of units, processes, actions, etc. 
achieve consonance, or act in concert, with the effect that 
they individually enter into a larger whole, or gestalt. The 
movements of the various retinal, arm and finger muscles that 
are required by my writing this (but not necessarily of the 
muscles in my feet or back) must be co-ordinated and each 
enter into the total activity of writing. Again the various
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configurations of units and part processes that need to be 
'set' and 'shifted' from time to time for the carrying through 
of certain functions have to be in conformity to the structural 
principles of the system in order for integration of the lateral 
dimension to be maintained. Thus for example the notes that 
are selected from a piano key-board have to be selected accor­
ding to some tonic principle if the resulting chord is to be 
'integrated'.
Clearly these three dimensions are closely related 
to one another - they have the character of different facets 
of an act of behaving, when behaviours are seen as gestalten. 
Angyal offers the brief example of a person leaving the house 
and reaching for his hat:
This movement is composed of a number of co-ordinated 
muscle contractions (transverse dimension). This 
activity at the same time is a phase in a means- 
end organization (dimension of progression). Fur­
thermore it is a concrete expression of some tendency 
of the organism which can be traced back to more 
and more general tendencies (vertical dimension).
[ibid:270]
A well-integrated personality achieves good integration along 
all three dimensions, and disintegration (or 'segregation') in 
one dimension is usually followed by segregation in other 
dimensions.
Angyal's concepts were developed primarily to deal 
with the individual or the personality as a unit of study, or 
more correctly, to interpret the personality-plus-environment 
system, which he calls the 'biosphere', as an organized whole. 
The biosphere is literally 'the realm or sphere of life's
The biosphere includes both the individual and 
the environment, not as interacting parts, not 
as constituents which have independent existence, 
but as aspects of a single reality which can be 
separated only by abstraction.... instead of 
studying the 'organism' and the 'environment' and 
their interaction, we propose to study life as a
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unitary whole and endeavour to describe the 
organization and dynamics of the biosphere,
[ibid »100-1]
'personality' denotes "the total organism when, as in man, the 
latter includes the social self and other factors which bind 
the individual into superindividual relationships" [ibid;200].
His concepts for interpreting the biosphere translate 
readily and in a meaningful way to the level of social systems 
and the study of group behaviour because they are systems 
terms, and his study is a thorough and consistent application 
of the systems point of view. We can conceptualize the realm 
or sphere in which social life takes place as the sociosphere, 
an organized whole which includes social systems and their 
environments, and interpret the degrees of integration within 
the sociosphere in terms of the same dimensions of depth, 
progression and breadth, (see below p.209ff)
As the individuality or uniqueness of the individual 
is expressed in his personality, so the individuality of the 
group or social system is expressed in its distinctive culture. 
Each of these concepts refers to the characteristic modes of 
organization and ways of doing things that give rise to the 
important differences among groups and among individuals. The 
individuality of the group and the course of its behaviour can 
be understood in terms of its interdependencies within the 
sociosphere, in the same way that the personality is interpreted 
as a function of biospheric relations in Angyal's work.
By bringing together the three dimensions of system 
integration and the distinction between active and passive 
responses to environmental over-complexity, we arrive at a 
conceptual scheme which suggests a number of distinctive forms 
of maladaptation.
The drift into post-industrialism that is character­
ized by rapid and accelerating, but uneven rates of change, and
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the increasing interdependency of the welfare of sub-systems, 
places a strain upon the ability of the parts of the social 
structure to achieve a sufficient degree of integration along 
the three dimensions that we have referred to, The greater 
salience of novelty, diversity and transience have the effect 
of creating an ever-widening range of conditions that have 
some how to be taken into account, thereby producing pressures 
towards a greater differentiation of the structure, uneveness 
of change creates pressures towards segmentation, while the 
extension of 'organic' interdependence increases the need for 
the co-ordination of part activities,
pathologies of integration on the depth dimension
Successful integration is manifested in conformity of surface
behaviours with the deeper roots of the system, cultural or
psychic. This has the effect that what is chosen as the basis
for action, and the courses of action that are selected, are
shaped by the basic axioms of the system, and are not chosen
capriciously or according to some principle that is unrelated
to the essential structure of the system, when the system
responds to over-complexity by a breakdown, or segregation,
along the vertical dimension, we speak of superficiality.
The active form of maladaptation is when the system responds
to over-complexity by continuing to try to take everything
24into account, and we shall call this synoptic idealism,
1, superficiality
When there is a discontinuity in this dimension, according 
to Angyal:
...tendencies in the depth of personality can­
not express themselves in concrete surface
24
This term is adopted from Braybrooke and Lindblom [1963].
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manifestations; they remain repressed. Another 
aspect of the break or impairment of continuity 
of the vertical structure is that the surface 
manifestations no longer express deeper tenden­
cies and thus become more or less empty.
[ibid:323]
The mechanisms that account for discontinuity of this sort 
on the personal level are typically some form of repression, 
that amount to the denial of one's own psyche. on the social 
level it is the denial through suppression or oppression of 
the deeper cultural bonds that tie people together.
Negation of these basic axioms leaves the way open 
for the operation of random or idiosyncratic criteria as the 
basis for actions. This may mean for example that one reacts 
only to the familiar, so that behaviour is guided by an 
exaggerated deference to custom and convention, leading to 
the personal or institutional rigidity of conservatism. 
Conformity is a slightly different reaction, resulting in 
subservience to fads and fashions which are by nature ephemeral 
and transient. Emery has suggested that trivialisation may be 
the dominant mode at the moment -
...if anything might lead to anything, then the 
motive for choice becomes pretty irrelevant and 
one chooses the familiar or the efficient.
[Emery;1971:663]
2. synoptic idealism
Deviation in the opposite direction seems to entail an effort 
somehow to take everything into account - to ignore no 
possibility, to leave no stone unturned. in this case the 
choice of the bases of action is not irrelevant or unneces­
sarily restricted, but is quite unrelaistically expanded. 
Remembering that power and the ability to move at will are 
key conditions for adaptation to disturbed reactive environ­
ments, we may say that the persistence of these lower level
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strategies in the turbulent environment represents a quest 
for the power of omniscience - to be able to rationally 
calculate upon all the values and the facts so as to arrive 
at the 'one best way' in every choice.
At the personal level, the economists conceptual 
mutation 'rational economic man' has had to be endowed with 
omniscience, and it may be that in real situations the 
craving for 'rationality' in one's behaviour corresponds to 
the pathology of synoptic idealism. Those who persistently 
emphasise analysis and objectivity at the expense of sensations 
and spontaneity as the basis for what they do are typically 
perceived as 'cold' and perhaps callous in their interpersonal 
lives. At the institutional level we are inclined to think 
that a preoccupation with rational decision-making, and 
comprehensiveness in planning and policy-formation are often 
indicative of an unrealistic struggle for omniscience.
The 'Master planning' ideology that can still be 
found in the city planning profession, the rather utopian 
expectations among administrators concerning the ultimate 
utility of integrated data systems, mathematical modelling, 
cost-benefit analysis, PPBS and the like, and the tendency 
of social scientists to search for increased understanding 
by extending the number and variety of 'variables' handled 
are examples of the quest for a level of comprehensiveness 
that we are saying is unattainable in the turbulent environ­
ment.25 The limits of men's intellectual capacities, the 
multiplicity and fludity of values, and the prohibitive 
costliness of information-gathering■are just some of the 
reasons why synoptic idealism is in practice impossible to
25
Boguslaw [1965] identifies the expanding breed of systems 
engineers as the 'new Utopians', striving to eradicate 
human fallibility by the design of complex engineering 
systems.
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sustain for complex situations. it may be that the ideal is 
maladapted even to the third level of environmental complex­
ity, for comprehensiveness is really only a feasible aim 
when the system of events, situations, etc. to be acted upon 
is well understood, and can be treated more or less as a 
closed system, what we can say is that comprehensiveness 
is successively less well adapted to the higher levels of 
environmental uncertainty and complexity.
pathologies of integration on the means-ends dimension
integration in this dimension requires the presence and the 
participation of those parts or sub-systems and their 
activities that are necessary for the system as a whole to 
carry out its functions. As we have seen, the development 
or growth of living systems involves a capacity both for 
differentiation and for the reintegration of specializing 
parts and functions into the total system process. when the 
processes of differentiation and integration of functions are 
well balanced there is an economical division of labour.
When the integrative processes lag behind differentiation, 
segmentation occurs; when differentiation is suppressed or 
ignored and system energies are over-concentrated on integra­
tion, we shall speak of authoritarianism.
3. segmentation
Segmentation refers to a breakdown along the dimension of 
progression - a breakdown in relations among the parts and 
part activities that constitute the successive phases in the 
realization of the wider system outcomes. Angyal refers to 
two aspects of dis-integration along the means-end dimension. 
On the one hand a course of action may be left unfinished: 
"...the activity is aborted before it can go to completion, 
in such a case we may speak of frustration", and on the other, 
parts or sub-systems may become segregated: "subordinate
149
goals may become independent and lose contact with the main 
goal of activity. This may result in a fragmentation and 
dis-integration -of the total function” [op. cit:324] .
The separation of parts so that they begin to pursue 
their own goals at the expense of the larger systems of which 
they are part is of special concern to the understanding of 
social phenomena. At the individual level the withdrawal 
of one's contribution from a group or communal activity, or 
placing the value of independence and the achievement of 
one's personal goals above the ends pursued by the collectivity 
result in a weakening of the group's potential energies. The 
organizational phenomena of 'goal-displacement' - the tendency 
of the differentiated parts of the organization to become 
preoccupied with the attainment of their own limited missions, 
even when this no longer serves or is threatening to the 
institutional mission - is an instance of segmentation that 
has been much discussed by organization theorists. At the 
societal level we have already referred to the dangers of 
parts of the structure being left behind by the onward rush 
of technological change and mass affluence. it is curiously 
the wealthiest and most developed societies that experience 
the greatest difficulty in integrating their poor, the 
elderly, the beats and drop-outs, and other minorities, even 
though in these societies such problems of integration are 
more and more perceived as critical.
4. Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism represents an imbalance in the oppo-site 
direction - system energies are disproportionately applied 
to integrative processes at the expense of differentiation.
The response to complexity in this case is not the withdrawal 
of part processes of their contribution to the whole activity, 
but the attempt to impose a more rigid structure on the means- 
end dimension in order to ensure that all part activities are
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directly integrated with the system goal. while the passive 
form of maladaptation on the dimension of progression is the 
interruption of means-end chains, resulting in segmentation, 
the active form is found in the further elaboration and 
closer control of the means-end paths so that they converge 
upon a single pinnacle - the imposed, uniquivocal goal of 
the system.
The active responses, we have suggested, result 
from a misperception of the environmental dynamic, and can 
never be successful in the long run. This may be the basis 
of the feeling among civilized people that the regimes of 
South Africa and Rhodesia will not be able to subjugate their 
native and coloured populations indefinitely. The fascist 
states of Hitler and Mussolini had legendary success in 
having the trains and buses running according to schedule, 
but only at the cost of a system of control and repression 
that was a self-defeating component of the fuller expression 
of the aims of the state. in this dimension it is not the 
power of omniscience that is most salient, but political 
power or the power of coercion. Although there may be some 
physiological or psychological states of the individual that 
correspond to a maladaptive subordination of all parts to 
the service of a single overriding function, authoritatarianism 
in our sense seems to be better understood as a reaction of 
social systems. in the social field, power in the sense 
simply of superordination, can also be formulated in terms 
of the various types of authority - charismatic, traditional 
and legal-rational. Appeals to bring back the birch, restore 
capital punishment, create compulsory national service, extend 
censorship, and the like, are frequently offered as solutions 
to the complexity and irregularity of social life whereby 
'law and order1 might be restored.
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pathologies of integration on the lateral dimension
integration along this dimension requires a certain degree 
of adequacy of the setting and shifting mechanisms available 
to the system as a whole whereby it is able to educe the 
co-operative participation of differing combinations of parts 
and part processes according to the particular demands placed 
upon the system or the particular end that it seeks» The 
parts of purposeful systems are systems themselves, and are 
subject to the dual trends towards autonomy and homonomy0 
To the extent that the autonomous tendencies of the parts 
prevail the system as a whole is less able to employ them 
in the service of its ends, and is weakened, Angya.1 has 
called this condition dissociation. when on the other hand 
the homonomous tendencies of the parts dominate there is a 
shift towards the complete co-ordination and co-operation 
of parts, we shall call this evangelicism,
5» Dissociation
According to Angyal dissociation "consists in a lack of 
co-ordination between the parts of the whole and manifests 
itself in a kind of dysplastic behaviour. By lack of co­
ordination is meant not only motor inco-ordination, but also 
a lack of co-ordination between the various tendencies and 
attitudes of the person," [ibid:324]. The analogue for 
social systems is the reluctance or unwillingness of indivi­
duals to identify themselves with or participate in common 
social activities, some of the implications of this have 
been discussed by Emery and Trist:
Dissociation means a reduction in the average man's 
sense of responsibility for co-ordinating and 
regulating his behaviour with respect to the 
potential co-producers of his desired ends. For 
each such fractional reduction there is a marked 
multiplier effect, special and massive social 
regulatory institutions have to be created,„.to 
carry responsibilities formerly implicit in the
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web of mutual support that constituted the 
social field» [Emery and Tristg197 j66]
As a response to turbulence in the social field it 
amounts to "feathering one's own nest' and looking after 
number one6 at. the expense of any co-operative search for 
solutions to one's own and other's problems» The domination 
of autonomous tendencies over tendencies towards homonomy 
among the constituent parts of the field increases the 
freedom of movement of the individual parts at the expense 
of the ability of more inclusive, supra-individual systems 
to mobilize energies for collective tasks»
60 Evangelic!sm
<phe active form of maladaptation in the lateral dimension 
corresponds to the domination of homonomic over autonomous 
tendencies whereby all the parts of sub-systems become united 
according to some principle, so that they can only be set and 
shifted in unison» such an arrangement has the effect of 
focussing the energies that are available for doing anything, 
and generally ensures a high level of predictability concern­
ing the behaviour of the whole system» The most important 
detrimental consequence is that it reduces the potential 
responsiveness and flexibility within the system by reducing 
the number of ways in which the parts are able to combine and 
recombine in the face of variable environmental demands»
The term evangelicism is used because it is 
evocative of such notions as ’all pulling together" and 
'entering into the brotherhood1, as responses that are 
appropriate to the solution of personal bewilderment or dis­
engagement.» Thus the religious evangelicist is inclined to 
appeal for a world brotherhood of man as a panacea for all 
existing ills, and the reforming zeal of urban progress 
Association and community Development Associations makes 
a fetish of 'community spirit"» it is intended in no way to
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disparage the noble sentiments of love and brotherhood as 
such, when however, the solution to the problem of maintain­
ing some order in a turbulent environment is sought in appeals 
to people's better instincts, all the evidence suggests that 
there is little grounds for optimism regarding the maintenance 
of order in the long run. The principles whereby the parts 
become regimented need not be moral principles, but may also 
be based on power or authority„ in the army for example, 
unison of behaviours is based on discipline, which, while 
guaranteeing the performance of tasks, does so at the expense 
of overall responsiveness - “you’re not paid to think"0 
Such cases however shade off into the authoritatarian 
responses ,
If evangelicism in the turbulent environment 
corresponds to a vestigial power strategy for bringing order 
to the field, it seems to be the power of love, or the power 
of emotional sanctions that is appealed to, in contrast to 
the power of knowledge and coercive power on the other dimen­
sions, it is the feeling that 'if only people would all be 
decent to one another, the world would be a far better place’. 
Without disputing the worth of this as an ideal, so long as 
evangelical responses lack a programme for unification they 
are ultimately maladapted to the conditions of turbulence, 
in this respect the united Nations and Billy Graham confront 
similar limitations.
To the extent that the depth, progression and 
lateral dimensions of the personality and of the social 
system necessarily cohere, it is to be expected that a 
breakdown in any of these dimensions will effect the extent 
of integration on the others, with regard to what we have 
called the passive maladaptations, Angyai says»
in cases of good integration the connections of 
a given biospheric occurrence extend over a wide 
range of systems, while in the case of segrega-
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tion the biospheric occurrence becomes a more 
or less localized affair» we make such dis­
tinctions frequently in daily life, for example, 
when we say that one person is doing something 
half-heartedly and that the other is involved 
'body and soul". Activities, the connection 
of which with other parts of the personality 
are severed, are feeble, unenergetic» » . . on 
the other hand, activities well integrated with 
the rest of the personality are more forceful, 
because they are supported, backed up, reinforced 
by many systems of the personality» [op, cit:
324-25]
With respect to the active maladaptations, the mutual penetra­
tion of authoritatarian and evangelical dispositions is a 
common phenomena» Religious systems premised on the fundamental 
equality of man and dedicated to their universal brotherhood 
have demonstrated surprising capacities for using authorita­
tarian structures and teachings in the pursuit.of their 
mission, and autocratic regimes have rarely failed to invoke 
some moral, ethical or religious principle to justify their 
tyranny. The craving for omniscience on the other hand may 
be reflected in the drive towards centralized control of 
authoritatarianism, and the elaboration of theologies and 
manifestos as the underpinnings of evange.lic.ism»
CHAPTER FIVE
A CONCEPT OF PLANNING
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The preceding chapters outline a conceptual frame­
work for the investigation of purposeful human and social 
behaviours, and the ways in which social aggregates become, 
or fail to become, adapted to the environmental conditions 
that they meet. it has been argued that the nature of the 
environmental conditions for purposeful social activity - 
the overall properties of the social field, are in many parts 
of the world becoming subject to important qualitative 
changes, and that these changes demand a new type of response. 
It has been further suggested that for new forms of response, 
or modes of adaptation, to become possible on a sufficient 
scale, some conventional ways of looking at the world will 
have to be replaced by a new appreciative system in which a
critical element will be the recognition that ecological
26units must become the basis for achieving regulation. The 
following chapters constitute an exploration of the usefulness 
of systems theory and the contextualist framework in appre­
hending the significance of these qualitative changes and 
suggesting directions in which regulation might be sought.
in rapidly changing and uncertain environments, 
planning becomes the dominant method by means of which social 
units at all levels attempt to regulate their relations with 
other parts of the field* so as to be able to go on functioning 
effectively. Loeks for example, comments on American 
experience;
Man's view of himself and the world he inhabits 
has been in the process of change since the
The concept of appreciation comes for Vickers "Appreciation 
manifests itself in the exercise through time of mutually 
related judgements of fact and value...such judgements 
disclose what can best be described as a set of readinesses 
to distinguish some aspects of the situation rather than 
others and to classify and value these in this way rather 
than in that. I will describe these readinesses as an 
appreciative system," [Vickers:1965:67; see also Vickers: 
1968] .
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beginning of time. m  recent years, however, 
the rate of this change has been accelerating 
rapidly and in ways that have profound implica­
tions for planning.
An emerging national commitment to planning and 
development is being expressed in the form of 
strengthened public institutions for its execu­
tion. At the same time the private sector is 
picking up steam in its efforts to relate its 
decisions to public policy. This is reflected 
by increasing use of the non-profit development 
corporation and the expanding effort that is 
being put into corporate planning. All of the 
above points up a rapidly enlarging consensus 
concerning the degree and kind of social inter­
vention which should be brought to bear in the 
development of the environment. Dealing with 
change is becoming a pervasive acticity and by 
ten to 15 years from now practically everyone 
will be in the act. [Loeks:1967:348, 349]
planning is therefore to be understood as a generalized way 
in which many kinds of social aggregates endeavour to become 
better adapted to the environmental circumstances with which 
they are confronted. it has generally become a distinctive 
form of activity in societies, or those parts of them in 
which Type m  environmental characteristics emerge, in which 
the actions of many independent causal agents have to be 
somehow regulated if the consequences of their combined as 
well as their separate actions are to be subordinated to some 
concept of the welfare of the larger system of which they are 
part. At the simpler levels, at which uncertainties of this 
sort are generally absent, a satisfactory level of integration 
may be obtained through reacting to disturbances after they 
have become manifest, and pursuing present actions almost 
entirely on the basis of past experiences. This explains 
why, of all the particular expressions of planning, military 
planning - the formulation of battlefield strategies has the 
most extensive history. in war, even societies at the very 
simplest levels of organization have to evolve means for 
survival in a reactive field, and one of the principle means
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is planning,
planning and the social sciences
There are a number of. reasons why it is becoming especially 
important for the social sciences to arrive at a better 
understanding of planning behaviour, the conditions that 
make it necessary, and the characteristic difficulties that 
it has to overcome. Fundamentally, the omnipresence and 
acceleration of change demand more and more that we decide 
in advance of taking action, that we deliberately survey 
alternative possible outcomes and take an active role in 
bringing about those which are considered preferable. As 
the rate and scale of change increases in industrial societies, 
so too does the need for planning. with the more leisurely 
scale of development of pre-industrial eras, the future 
generally arrived at an assimilable rate, carrying only occa­
sional threats to traditional and established beliefs and ways 
of doing things. The rapid accumulation and dissemination 
of scientific knowledge and its application in society through 
technology have steadily eroded the validity of an 'extra­
polative' view of the future (the belief that it would be 
some sort of continuation of past trends) and are rendering 
obsolete the ameliorative approach to policy-making whereby 
major efforts are mounted only to remove existing ills.
We can no longer assume the continuous development 
of existing patterns of growth and decline, and can no longer 
afford to react after events, but must struggle to anticipate 
them. The advent of post-industrialism establishes planning 
as a dominant mode of decision-making. Branch comments on 
this development:
There are indications that a general field of 
comprehensive planning is developing. Many of 
the traditional academic concentrations are now 
emphasising forward-looking analysis in response
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to the accelerating complexity of society and 
increasingly pressing and difficult problems,
As scientific method is applied to areas of 
knowledge in which it once could not be employed, 
capacity to plan becomes an important substan­
tive objective, [Branch^1966:ix]
It is of course no accident that the phenomenal growth of 
futurism, or futurology, has occurred over the last two decades. 
It expresses the growing realization that our capabilities for 
survival and the maintenance of a tolerable way of life are 
becoming determined as much by our ability to come to terms 
with events and circumstances that lie in the future as our 
capacities to redress manifest pathologies and dysfunctions.
At the same time that planning has become increasingly 
important, it has also become increasingly difficult.. The very 
same factors that make it increasingly necessary for us to 
engage in anticipation# forecasting, speculation and the like 
in order to take the future into account., have the effect of 
making the future more uncertain and more unpredictable than 
ever before. The spectre of the bomb was the overriding 
uncertainty that characterized the cold war period, and its 
counterparts now are the population explosion, natural resource 
exhaustion, racial conflict, and the other ecological traps. 
Apart from this, futurists seem to concur that one of the few 
things that we can be really certain about is the continua­
tion of rapid change. we will argue that one of the main 
difficulties here is that our understanding of planning and 
our ability to plan have lagged behind the transformations of 
the environments that we plan in# and many of the complex 
systems that we plan for.
A third reason for studying planning presents us 
with a paradox. The creation and development of technology 
gives man an instrument for bringing nature more and more 
under his control# and thus liberates him from a rate of 
'progress' that is dictated by the processes of biological
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evolution, to be prosaic, we have created the capacity to 
be able if we wish, to opt for unnatural selection and 
survival of the unfittest when technology is added as man's 
tool in the man-nature nexus» The extent of the liberation 
thus made possible is that we are now able, as Gabor has put 
it, to 'invent the future' [Gabor »1963] . The capacities of 
our existing technology, let alone that which we can safely 
expect to be developed within the next decade or so* are 
sufficient for us to be able in principle to design and 
implement a considerable range of utopias that contain and 
augment only the best, and eliminate the worst of our present 
life situations. How is it then that the future presents 
such a chaotic prospect? The paradox becomes thin when we 
take into account that the viability of an invented future 
depends upon it being premised on the existing state of affairs 
and incorporating details of the path to be taken in arriving 
there. Nevertheless, the radical increase in our capacity 
for inventing the future gives us another reason for wanting 
to better understand the process of invention.
Fourthly, the new salience of 'the quality of life' 
in conceptions of the public good, and the challenge contained 
therein to economic growth as an end in itself and the over­
riding aim of governments, coincides with a widening conception 
of the tasks of societal planning, whereas prescriptions for 
economic growth can be formulated by a relatively small 
coterie of wizards advising governments, the problems of 
improving the quality of life are less amenable to expertise, 
and the search for solutions calls for the involvement of 
larger and larger numbers of people. Past and continuing 
trends towards the urbanization of larger proportions of the 
populations in industrial nations mean that the critical 
sphere in which these 'quality of life” problems have to be 
confronted is the urban environment.
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We are already experiencing a growing concern with 
the quality of the urban environment as human habitat, and 
it seems reasonable to expect that in the coming decades 
the horizons of both public and private planning will 
increasingly extend further beyond investment policy and 
budgetary control, encompassing other social goods besides 
affluence. The nature of the alternatives has been eloquently 
expressed by Galbraith:
There is little real advantage in a handsome 
income for food, clothing, houseroom, furniture, 
alcohol and private entertainment in a city 
where one cannot move in the traffic, venture 
out safely at night, or plough through the 
accumulated trash. if the New York air con­
tinues to deteriorate, the freedom of those 
who inveigh against public outlays will be mostly 
available in the next world. [Galbraith, quoted 
in Healey:1971]
The fitness of the environment and the quality of their primary 
social worlds are for the masses of people far more immediate 
and tangible issues than balance of payments deficits and 
growth rates. To the extent therefore that they replace 
'growthmania' as the priority of national and local govern­
ments, it may be anticipated that involvement in planning 
will become a more common experience.
Finally, it might be noted that sociology, and the 
social sciences in general, have given relatively little 
attention to planning as a characteristic form of human 
activity, nor to the future as a boundary to social life and 
a domain that urgently needs to be understood. planners and 
planning organizations have been the subject of some empirical 
investigations, and a cover note to 'Future shock1 notes that 
Alvin Toffler gave what must have been one of the first 
courses on the sociology of the future at the New school for 
Social Research. Although there now appears to be more and 
more social scientists joining planning organizations, the
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claims of city planners in particular that they have been 
rather poorly served by the social sciences seem justified.
On reading the city planning literature one is struck by 
the frequency with which the works of Herbert Gans are cited.
As one of the few sociologists who have made planning their 
main professional interest, his works are constantly appealed 
to as offering the imprimatur of the sociologist. That they 
are also a valuable contribution does not hide the fact that 
there are few others to appeal to.
Of the vast amount that has been written on 'social 
change' very little seems to have been designed in any way 
to influence it. in his detailed report on 'the sociologist 
and the study of the future", winthrop states that:
professionally it appears to be permissible to 
examine social change both currently and retro­
spectively. To move on time's arrow towards 
the future however, is to be guilty of construc­
ting utopias.... The irony in current develop­
ments in studies of the future is that some of 
the natural scientists and engineers working in 
this new area are less modest and are assuming 
the role of social philosophers - a role which 
the more cautious sociologist has thus far been 
willing to abdicate. [winthrop:1968:136]
Wilbert Moore, who has himself made a considerable contribution 
to the literature of social change, devoted his 1966 presiden­
tial address to the American sociological Association to the 
topic of 9 the utility of utopias’, in which he puts forward 
some reasons for the demise of the utopian tradition in 
sociology and urges that it be brought to life again. The 
factors militating against, utopian thought in sociology and 
a more activist orientation to the future are the tendency 
to accept evolutionary models of social systems, in which 
change is a 'chance’ phenomena arising from interconnectedness; 
the adoption of a metaphysic which devalues the role of large- 
scale purposeful behaviour in society in bringing about social
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change through various types of planning; the negatavism 
towards utopian thinking induced by Marxist ideology; and 
preoccupation with a closed-system methodology for analyzing 
relations among variables» on the last point he comments:
Analysis of the relations among social phenomena 
by treating them as parts of a system does not 
intrinsically require that the system remain in 
a steady state» The analysis is usually easier, 
however, if that assumption is made» Almost all 
of our analytical methods»»»are designed to 
extract more and more information about cova­
riance« [Moore:1966:766]
Moore responds to his own question "have we any obligation as 
social scientists to start taking account not only of the 
changeful quality of social life but also of the fact that 
some portion of that change is deliberate?", with the view 
that "sociologists have some scientific stake in forecasting 
and even in implementing the future that is hopefully better 
than the present"» There have been few signs of the profession 
taking him very seriously* while it is beyond dispute that 
studies of how societies have changed form an essential part 
of our understanding of the way society is now, it seems 
important that such understandings be geared more often to 
charting a course into the future»
While it is in organizations that much of the novelty, 
innovation and change that has to be adjusted to is generated, 
and it is in organizations that some of the greatest strains 
are experienced in handling the new uncertainties that they 
foster, the “sociology of organizations 8 has maintained an 
empirical and nomothetic stance, addressing itself to the 
'facts* and sifting these for generalizations, This activity 
too has its uses, but what seems to be more urgent is for 
sociologists to engage in the burgeoning spheres of O.D., 
corporate planning, and programmes of industrial democracy, 
as catalysts of the processes of change as well as impartial 
observers of them»
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The barriers to a greater engagement, of the social
sciences in the processes of societal planning and to enquiry
into the shape of the future, seem to be located in the
guiding principle of value neutrality, and the veneration of
“data: and objectivity to which this principle is conducive.
If as many believe, the social sciences have an increasingly
important role to play in regulating the transition towards
post-industrialism, by devising strategies of change and
accommodation, and by identifying and exposing the values
that are most likely to permit the attainment of at least
some of our chosen ends, it would seem to be essential that
more room is found in their professional bodies and academic
associations for value commitment and speculation, so that
passionate beliefs and 'really crazy ideas 8 are not lost to
27the search for solutions. The best knowledge of how 
organizations and larger social systems have changed up to 
now may be of limited value in coping with the type and scale 
of change that is to come, and it may become more necessary 
from time to time to abandon the methodological rigidities of 
value freedom and sticking to the facts if social science is 
to be of assistance in preparing us for the future.
The Future as the planner's Environment
The principal difference between planning and other forms of 
adaptive social behaviour is that planning is specifically 
oriented to coping with uncertainties and opportunities 
affecting large social aggregates which are seen to lie not 
so much in the immediate as in the more distant future, it 
is a process of decision-making that is less concerned with 
finding solutions to immediate demands and hazards, than with
27
See jrungk [19 69] on the distinctions between logical, 
critical and creative imagination, and the special need for 
the latter.
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working out before actions are required what might constitute 
an appropriate response to emerging, or simply possible future 
states of affairs, it is, as Ackoff has said, a form of 
anticipatory decision-making - something done in advance of 
taking action [Ackoff:1970a]. Advance action of this sort 
becomes necessary whenever it is felt that the natural progress 
of events will not lead to the kind of future that is considered 
desirable - when it is realized that active intervention will 
be needed if unwanted outcomes are to be avoided and desired 
ones produced, The future thus constitutes a fundamental 
element of the realm in which planning takes place, over and 
above the particular substantive areas in which they are 
engaged, all planners experience the future as part of the 
ground in which they operate, as a dimension of the environment 
to which their actions must be directively correlated.
Although the traditional social science disciplines 
seem to have been slow in appreciating the need to address 
themselves to the future, both from the point of view of 
engaging in social forecasting on a scale comparable to that 
of technological forecasting, and from the point of view of 
designing and promoting possible societal futures, this 
tardiness has in part been compensated by the remarkable 
development of futurology as a new domain of interest. Largely 
because of the speed with which it has appeared on the scene, 
but also perhaps, on account of its apparent disrespect for 
some of the traditional methodological canons of the empirical 
sciences, futurology and its practitioners are still regarded 
with some curiosity and suspicion. it is nevertheless well 
into the process of becoming institutionalized:
There is a comprehensive literature dealing with 
the issues of prediction, long-range forecasting, 
and “inventing the future', A variety of con­
ferences and publications can be enumerated„
There are plans for futures institutions, lookout 
institutions, and so on, it can be said that in
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most industrial countries the problem discussed 
is no longer the right of existence of futures 
research but rather the problem of its usefulness, 
its limits, and its organization,, Fut.ures 
research is not primarily a methodologically 
fashionable phenomenon, it is symptomatic of the 
stage of development we have reached todayQ 
[Lompe s1968 :48]
A stream of important contributions to the development of 
future studies in the earlier years of the decade culminated 
in a “vintage' year in 1967. Erich jantsch produced the 'bible' 
of technological forecasting “Technological forecasting in 
perspective’, and Bertrand de jouvenel his influential book 
’The art of conjecture’. It was also the year in which Kahn 
and wienerJs massive study ‘The year 2000? A framework for 
speculation on the next 33 years* appeared, and the work of 
the commission on the Year 2000, 'Toward the Year 2000’ was 
published in Daedalus.^
Of the institutions specializing in futures research, 
Washington's Resources for the Future, inc. established in 1952 
with the co-operation of the Ford Foundation, was one of the 
earliest. others to appear since then include the world 
Resources inventory under the guidance and inspiration of 
Buckminster Fuller and John McHale, established in 1963; The 
Social sciences Research Council’s committee on the Next 
Thirty Years in London; de jouvenel“s Futuribles organization 
in Paris (1967); the institute for Futures Research in Berlin, 
headed by Robert jungk; and the commission on the Year 2000, 
already referred to, which was chaired by Daniel Bell. Two 
of the new institutions are now producing journals. The WTorld 
Future Society established in Washington in 1966 publishes 
’The Futurist: A newsletter for tomorrow’s world’, and the
institute for the Future, founded in 1968 with its headquarters
28
See Winthrop [1968] for a more comprehensive review.
166
in Middletown Connecticut, publishes Futures *
The present remarks on the future as an element of 
the planner's environment are not intended to contribute to 
this body of investigation either in the way of further fore­
casts, projections or scenarios, or by examining methodological 
problems of prediction, but they are influenced by the sorts of 
issues that futurology has raised, and more particularly by 
the new perspective on the future that it propounds„
Webber has suggested that the transition from pre- 
industrial to industrial, and the current transition from 
industrial to post-industrial society has been accompanied by 
a shift in societal conceptions of the future from a fatalistic 
to an extrapolative, and now to a “teleological" attitude.
For pre-industrial man, the future is likely to be outside 
his field of vision, and even more likely to be out of his 
control, so that there is a general tendency in the direction 
of fatalism with regard to the material future, under 
industrialization, the managerial shaping of institutions, 
forward scheduling of production, the estimation of budgets 
and investments, population forecasting, and the development 
of actuarial skills in general, contributed to a conception 
of the future as being more or less like the past - a continu­
ation of present trends, such that it was at least in part 
accessible to reason through processes of projection and 
extrapolation„ indeed the entire market and credit system 
was premised on the assumption that the future would not 
depart at all radically from the present.
Post-industrialism is again revolutionizing our 
concept of the futures
oo,among the consequences of the knowledge 
explosion is the emergence of a new way of 
thinking about the future. That conception is 
the derivative of our new capacities for predic-
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tion, our new images of our powers for con­
trolling future events and, hence, a new 
outlook suggesting that, to a considerable 
degree, maybe we really can invent the future«
jf we can characterize a single distinguishing 
difference between the outlooks of the indus­
trial age and of the post-industrial age it is 
thisi that industry and government in the 
recent past had to respond to change after the 
fact; in the post-industrial age they will be 
intellectually equipped to respond before«
That is to say, that the coming style for con­
fronting the future will be forecasting and 
planning« [Webber:1968:180, 181]
The future is now being seen to depart drastically from the 
present, but we are developing powerful new response capabil­
ities that will .permit us more directly to seek to design the 
future, rather than accepting it fatalistically, or trying to 
predict and merely accommodate to change as best we can.
The widespread internalization of this 'teleological' 
concept of the future is an enabling condition for the parts 
of the social field to adapt actively to the world they live 
in on a large scale« As has been noted in discussing the 
concept of adaptation, this requires that purposeful systems 
be able to incorporate some image of the future, in the form 
of desired outcomes or focal conditions, into their present 
state« in understanding the causal strands that connect 
purposeful behaviours with future states of the systems that 
they comprise, it must be appreciated that the openness of 
systems refers not only to the spatial distribution of their 
parts, but also to their temporal distribution - the 'incom­
pleteness' of an open system has a processual as well as a 
structural dimension« A living system is not to be considered 
simply as a spatial conglomeration but also as a temporal 
spread in which the degree of autonomous and heteronomous 
regulation, and the degree of 'openness' or 'badness' of the 
system gestalt may fluctuate over time. one of the attributes 
of consciousness is that it makes possible the anticipation
168
of future system states, which is an essential preliminary 
to the prevention of dysfunction and the creation of more 
benign system states and of higher levels of adaptation«
A given social ecology is an existential phenomena - 
a veridical texture of objects, events and situations with 
which any planning system must interact in the present« The 
'distinctive competence1 of an empirical sociology is its 
ability to describe and interpret these complex patterns of 
human and social interaction. The special status of planning 
activity lies in the fact that it is not addressed directly 
to this contemporaneous reality, but to a perceived hiatus 
between an existing state of affairs and an image, or 'wishful 
projection”, of a state of affairs that is considered on 
certain criteria to be more desirable« More correctly, 
planning is a response to a perceived disparity between a state 
of affairs that, it is believed will exist if nothing is done, 
and the desired future. That is to say, planning is not usually 
considered necessary if it is expected that the forces opera­
ting in the present will of themselves bring about the future 
that is considered desirable. As we have already noted, the 
gap between socially desirable futures, and conditions which 
can be expected to occur if nothing is done, is likely to be 
greatly enlarged under the impact of turbulence.
It is essentially this future orientation that makes 
of planning one of the most difficult intellectual activities 
in which men can engage. The future is an entirely hypotheti­
cal realm. Certain possibilities and probabilities can be 
adduced by forcecasters and futurologists, in a similar way 
that historians and archaeologists can offer us probabilistic 
accounts of the past, but there is nothing in the vast edifice 
of scientific knowledge that lends conviction to our 
anticipations of what is to come. This fundamental uncertainty 
of the future, combined with our dismally limited understanding 
of the dynamics of social existence, conspire to plague the
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planner's world with continuous and immense challenges to 
his problem-solving capabilities, and helps to account for 
the modesty of much that is achieved«
The future becomes an integral part of the behavioural 
environment to the extent that it is transposed to, and incor­
porated in the present. in fact as we have suggested, the 
planner attempts to transpose two futures into his present - 
a realistic and a wishful projection of the future state of 
the system. The former corresponds to what can be expected 
to occur ’naturally", and the latter to the desired future.
Our skills in constructing realistic projections 
have been increasing enormously over the past two decades, 
and their significance is gaining recognition in the estab­
lishment of specialized institutions, the emergence of 
expertise and professionalism, and a body of literature that
is expanding at a phenomenal rate. As one would expect, a
(
far greater level of competence has been attained in the fore­
casting of the gross quantitative changes that can be expected, 
than in predicting the sort of qualitative changes in values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and life styles that are likely, and upon 
which many of the quantitative changes are dependent. it is 
far easier to extrapolate from the present rates of car owner­
ship to a figure for the year two thousand, than it is to 
judge whether a society will be prepared to ban private vehicles 
in cities and invest instead in large-scale mass transit 
systems.
A second major difficulty in societal forecasting 
derives from the pervasive uncertainty that adheres to a number 
of meta-problems which have a potential for totally altering 
the basic structural configurations upon which any methodology 
of prediction must be based. The concept of meta-problem has 
been put forward by chevalier, who writes:
Society has come more and more to perceive and 
articulate a new kind of problem.. It is not
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only a matter of putting related problems 
together: new knowledge and expectations have 
caused a fusion, an interrelation of problems 
into a class of meta-problems. And society, 
once having perceived a meta-problem, begins 
also to perceive that courses of action to 
relieve it are interrelated. in fact, some 
comprehensive attack is now the only strategy 
acceptable to society. [chevalier^quoted by 
Emery and Trist;1972 -123]
For the “global village5, such problems as racial confronta­
tion, the population explosion, nuclear diplomacy, and the 
violation of the ecosystem have this quality, and unexpected 
developments in any such area could entirely vitiate most of 
our assiduously accumulated projections and forecasts in 
other spheres.
The basic difficulty in constructing realistic 
projections lies in determining some basis for identifying 
those phenomena in the present which are likely to have a 
determining influence over the shape of the future. The 
problems of constructing a wishful projection are perhaps 
equally great, but of a quite different sort.. They relate 
primarily to the difficulties of choosing and designing 
objectives which will meet a very wide diversity of needs 
and aspirations. Before any wishful projection can be trans­
lated into programmes of action, some mechanism is needed for 
the reconciliation of multiple interests.
The problems associated with securing a sufficient 
degree of agreement concerning the objectives of action raise 
fundamental questions about the role of the planner and the 
degree to which he should be involved in the processes of 
power and influence that in democratic societies, ultimately 
determine the implementation or abandonment of plans. These 
problems of the democratization of planning will be returned 
to. Our immediate interest is in the future as environment, 
and specifically in the properties of objectives or desired
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outcomes as 3 field forces 8 acting on the planning system in 
the present. one answer to the problem of how imagined 
future states of affairs, such as the objectives espoused 
by planners enters into the contemporaneous behavioural 
environment, has been put forward by Lewin«
We have already had occasion to refer to his concept 
of 'contemporaneous causation' in discussing the meaning of the 
life space« He writes:
This thesis is a direct consequence of the 
principle that only what exists concretely can 
have effects. since neither the past nor the 
future exists at the present moment it cannot 
have effects at the present. in representing 
the life space therefore we take into account 
only what is contemporary« [Lewin:1936:34~5]
How are we then to explain the evidence of our senses that 
the possible outcomes of the things that we and others are 
doing now lie in the future, and yet that they do exert a 
constraint on the way we behave in the present?
The following consideration offer a solution 
to this dilemmao The goal as a psychological 
fact undoubtedly lies in the present«, it 
really exists at the moment and makes up an 
essential part of the momentary life space.
On the other hand the "content8 of the goal... 
lies as a physical or social fact in the 
future, indeed it may not occur at all. The 
nature of the expectation and the character of 
what is expected, in so far as they act as 
psychological conditions at the moment, natur­
ally do not depend upon whether or not the event 
comes to pass. in either case the person 
strives toward a goal which exists psychologi­
cally in the present life space.,..
....Nevertheless, the content is in no way 
irrelevant, but is of greatest importance for 
psychological dynamics, whether, for instance, 
an actual goal refers to a present or a future 
event, whether this event is thought of as some­
thing that definitely exists, or as something 
that is only possible or highly probable - all 
this forms an essential characteristic of a 
goal, [Lewin:1936:37-8]
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A great, deal of confusion and misdirected effort 
has occurred both in psychology and sociology from the in­
ability to see goals as relations between systems and certain 
parts of their environments, and the tendency instead to reify 
them, conceiving them as ‘things" which can be striven for and 
attained once and for all. The goal-seeking behaviours of 
rats have been taken as the paradigm of rational behaviour. 
Studies of motivation and of organizational behaviour in 
particular have been handicapped by the concept of the 
'purpose-ridden' system, that has had to be invented to do 
justice to the notion of goals as things:
The purpose-ridden man's only “rational' activity 
is to seek goals; but since each goal is attained 
once for all, it disappears on attainment, leav­
ing him “purposeless* and incapable of rational 
activity unless and until he finds another.
‘Satisfaction* is impossible to the purpose- 
ridden man or at least forms no part of his ra­
tional activity. He is allowed only a momentary 
'relief from tension*. [Vickers:1965:32-3]
in contrast to this concept, Vickers proposes that the main 
energies in purposeful behaviours are in fact taken up with 
establishing and maintaining relationships, which he calls 
'norm-holding“, with various parts of the environment.
The goals we seek are changes in our relations 
or in our opportunities for relating; but the 
bulk of our activity consists in the 'relating' 
itself. To explain all human behaviour in terms 
of 'goal-seeking', though good enough for the 
behaviour of hungry rats in mazes, raises 
insoluble pseudo-conflicts between means and 
ends...and leave the most important aspects of 
our activities, the ongoing maintenance of our 
ongoing activities and their satisfactions, 
hanging in the air as a psychological anomaly 
called “action done for its own sake*. [ibid:33]
Conceptualizing planning as a process of anticipatory 
decision-making which includes the setting of objectives entails 
that the relevant environment for planning includes various
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aspects or dimensions of the future. Their psychological 
potency (not their actual 'content') is brought into the 
present as temporal gestalten which overlap the "real1 present 
and which enter into the contemporaneous determination of 
behaviours. The special significance of the future in the 
environment of planners cannot be appreciated therefore if 
the future is simply regarded as the locus of planning goals, 
which like battlefield targets can be defined in various ways 
and 'fired at' from various angles and distances. planning's 
concern is with acting in the present so as to ensure that our 
social systems will be able to relate to future environments 
so as to enhance (or at least to maintain) the present 
effectiveness of our purposive behaviours. The planner's task 
is conceiving and designing alternative possible relationships 
among the parts of the social field and the non-social environ­
ment, based on an understanding of the dangers and the oppor­
tunities in the future that can with foresight be avoided or 
exploited.
The difficulties of working out in advance the ways 
in which present organizational arrangements, which are them­
selves constantly changing, can effectively relate themselves 
to future states of the environment which can rarely be 
adequately known, are subject to some variation according to 
the velocity at which the future is seen to be approaching, 
and to the degrees of certainty or uncertainty that attach to 
the anticipations and conjectures that are arrived at. in 
the first place, when it is believed that the future is to a 
degree 'knowable', variances believed to be latent in the 
future which are relevant to the effectiveness of the system 
may be perceived as more or less immediate or distant - as 
urgent, or as no cause for any immediate concern or action.
The perceived distance of relevant aspects of the future is 
of course closely bound up with the speed with which the 
future is seen to be approaching.
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We are aware of the dangers of 'misplaced concrete­
ness ', but there does seem to be some phenomenological basis 
for ascribing to the future certain heteronomous properties, 
and particularly its own dynamic. The uneven development of 
societies means that futures are being created in relatively 
limited and isolated spaces, at the vanguard of technological 
and social innovation. Limited aspects of the future life 
styles we can expect to be moving into are already present 
in our midst; or as jungk as put it, "Tomorrow is already 
here* [jungk;1954]. This is reflected in the now widespread 
appreciation that the discontinuity between Science Fiction 
and 'science fact1 has been steadily eroded, to the point 
that we can often no longer be sure that even the more 
incredible postulates of science Fiction are not the objects 
of systematic laboratory exploration somewhere in the world. 
For large parts of the social field, not at all in touch with 
the cutting edge of technical innovation, the 'discovery' of 
many of the advances that have already been achieved has the 
effect of telescoping their expectations and delivering the 
future into the present.
It is equally true of course, that it in the same 
sense pockets of the past survive in the present, and it is 
a characteristic of our times to want to slow down the rate 
at which the past recedes by diligently preserving and 
amplifying its material manifestations and our powers of 
recollection. planning's concern must be with the rate of 
arrival of the future, and the creation of roles and institu­
tions that are sufficiently responsive and adaptible to cope 
with the scale of change that is coming. The titles of a 
number of recent publications are indicative of a cumulating 
awareness that we stand now in some danger of being overtaken 
by the future: 'The unprepared society: planning for a
precarious future' [Michael:1968], 'Future shock" [Toffler; 
1970], 'The urgent future' [Mayer:1967], 'The temporary
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society” [Bennis and slater;1968], The age of discontinuity' 
[Drucker : 1968] « such a list could be very considerably 
extended„
The scope for a more positive approach to the un­
folding of the future seems to lie in the extent to which we 
are able to impress our own frame upon it, in planning and 
programming our activities at a pace that takes account of 
mens finite adaptive capabilities, and corresponds to a rate 
of learning attainable over an extended social field« in this 
regard some such distinctions as those proposed by Vickers 
[1965] and Ackoff [1970a] between goals, objectives and ideals, 
may be indispensable:
Goals are objectives whose attainment is desired 
by a specified time within the period covered by 
the plan««,.. objectives may be unattainable 
within the planning period, but they must be 
approachable within it.„«. Goals must be attain­
able within the planning period, but need not 
necessarily be attained«, An objective which can 
never be attained but which can be approached 
without limit is called an ideal« [Ackoff:1970a:
23-4]
Ordering the aspirations of an individual or a social system 
into categories of this sort has the effect of imposing a mor­
phology on the future which offers a system of reference points 
for the mounting of effort and a criterion for discriminating 
the order in which different courses of action need to be 
undertaken«
The frequently made distinction between tactical 
and strategic planning can perform a similar function as an 
ordering device for partitioning the relevant future to make 
possible some separation of planning tasks and appropriate 
allocation of resources« Ackoff has pointed out that the 
distinction between tactical and strategic planning is relative 
rather than absolute, and is in fact three dimensional. in 
any particular planning operation these dimensions are the
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time span over which it has effects and the difficulty of 
reversal; the scope of the plan, or the number of functions 
and activities affected by it; and the extent to which it 
is concerned with the selection of means as opposed to the 
selection of objectives, [ibid:4-5].
A related aspect of developments and events that
are thought to lie in the future is the degree to which they
29are foreseeable. Because a behavioural system and its 
field correspond to a dimensional domain in space and time, 
one consequence of anticipation and expectation is to extend 
the system's relevant environment into the future. it is then 
possible for the overall structure of probabilities associated 
with the emergence of favourable and unfavourable sets of 
circumstances in the future, to be interpreted in the classi­
fication of environmental causal textures that are used to 
describe the geo-behavioural environment.
I As a theoretical limiting case, we can envisage situations 
in which the future is regarded as entirely irrelevant, when 
it is felt for example, that 'nothing could happen which would 
make any difference’. For individuals, this corresponds to 
the condition of living entirely for the present, a state 
that may be associated either with pure despair (as sometimes 
with reaction to a bereavement), or with pure hedonism. The 
locus of significance with regard to what might happen in 
the future is felt to lie entirely within the individual (L^).
The sense in which this constitutes a limiting case 
is quite evident. There is usually bound to be some event of 
potential significance to the individual, with a probability
29
The discussions by Ackoff [1970a] and Webber [1968] of 
different types of knowledge of the future provide most of 
the concepts used in this section.
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of occurrence that injects at least a minimal degree of 
relevance into the future prospect, and of course there is 
no meaning to a concept of 'life' that restricts its signi­
ficance entirely to the present» perhaps the closest we 
mortals may approach to a future without relevance is in the 
apprehension of imminent decease. on one interpretation at 
least, it is profound human distaste for such a contemplation 
that has inspired doctrines of immortality.
in real life, social collectivities and organiza­
tions are even less likely to see their futures in such 
terms. one of the well-known synergistic effects of group 
experience is to make confrontations with the unknown toler­
able, in a way that an individual cannot usually achieve by 
his resources alone. Nevertheless, to the extent that groups 
and organizations, as well as individuals, find no relevance 
to themselves in the future, it is improbable that any planning 
or other purposeful activity will be undertaken.
II At. the next level, some significant variability is_ 
believed to lie in the future, but significance is ascribed 
only to those variations which it is believed will emanate 
from the system itself. anc^  L]_2 relat:>-ons are relevant) .
When this is the case, knowledge of the future is likely to 
be characterized by a feeling of certainty - all the signifi­
cant things that are going to happen will be the result of 
what the system itself does, or the development of processes 
already latent in the system or its environment. in an 
environment which is clustered but still placid, the clustering 
itself offers no threats or promises for the future which 
cannot be apprehended in the present. if this were not so, 
we would be considering a higher level of causal texturing.
Certainty about the nature and the location of 
environmental relevancies which are yet to happen, can of
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course be only a relative and never an absolute quality« in 
this context we are referring to certainty relative to the 
degrees of uncertainty and ignorance that are descriptive of 
the more complex levels, and in contrast to the limiting 
case of irrelevance, when all possible relevancies are 
randomized.
This level seems to correspond to the environments 
that are relevant in the medical prognosis of some of the 
simpler diseases« Diagnosis of the symptoms allows an 
accurate prediction of the career of the illness to be made 
and enables the physician to act with a degree of commitment 
in the application of a remedy, in organized social systems 
routinization is the pervasive mechanism whereby a degree of 
certainty is imposed on the future, the classic case being 
that of bureaucracy, as described by Weber, The essence of 
bureaucracy is predictability, and the safe-guard of predicta­
bility is routinization - the reduction of behaviour to 
repetitive cycles of action, carefully programmed and con­
trolled, Thus could the Director of Education in Napoleonic 
France look at his watch and tell what subject every child 
in a French school was studying. For children at school and 
workers in factories - those areas of life in general which 
are institutionally governed - the shape of the future tends 
to a high degree to be mapped out, and to justify feelings 
of certainty with respect to its unfolding.
With regard to those aspects of the future about 
which we can be certain, we can carry out commitment planning, 
of which routinization itself is one of the commonest tools. 
When activities are continuously programmed and repetitive, 
forward scheduling of production and estimates of budgets 
can be carried out with a high degree of exactitude. clearly 
it is not environments of this type that pose the real 
problems for planning. if community planners have any 
opportunity to operate in such favourable circumstances,
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it is in the planning of new towns and new communities where 
they have extensive control from the beginning, and not the 
more typical circumstances under which they operate in the 
established city and the metropolis, it is in environments 
of this amount of predictability that an 'optimizing' 
philosophy of planning is most likely to be successful.
III The next step brings us to futures whose dominant 
characteristic is uncertainty. These are futures in which 
it is understood that important variances may occur, which 
originate in changes happening in other parts of the field 
with which the system is linked in some way. in other words 
the planner has to confront the probability of relevant 
changes occurring in the future as a result of the behaviours 
of others. The possible future behaviours of parts of the 
field to which the system is directly linked, and with which 
it has some established relations can usually be inferred or 
intuited from a knowledge of their past behaviours and an 
understanding of their structural and other relevant properties. 
This means that such futures, although they cannot be approached 
with certainty, can be approached probabilistically or 
"stochastically", The important difference from the previous 
levels is that i^ -^  relations now enter into future determina­
tion, in addition to L-^ and L-^ s
Environments with regard to which our knowledge is 
uncertain provide an essential part of the settings for such 
institutionalized activities as insurance, gambling, and 
competitive sport, The provision of insurance and the rates 
of premium attached to it, is directly related to the dis- 
cernable probabilities of certain events happening in the 
future, and is only required in so far as some threats to 
system maintenance or development can be anticipated,
Similarly with gambling, when outcomes in a game of chance 
are certain, everyone could be expected to gamble but there
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would be no-one willing to take their bets; in situations in 
which we are quite ignorant about outcomes, it is unlikely 
that anyone would want to gamble. Competitive sport loses 
much of its appeal when one side has such an overwhelming 
superiority that the result is a foregone conclusion, or when 
we can have no expectations about the achievement of a
14- 3 0result.
The kind of planning required in environments of 
this sort is contingency planning. of this sort of planning 
Ackoff writes:
Contingency planning is old hat in the military 
but is relatively rare in business. in planning 
for a military invasion, for example, considera­
tion is always given to each possible outcome 
of an operation and plans are made for each.
Military planners do not wait to see what happens 
before planning what to do about it. They try 
to cover every possibility in advance, because 
time is 'of the essence' once a possibility has 
become a reality. [Ackoff:1970a:17]
Contingency planning involves the maintenance of a level of 
preparedness with respect to developments thought possible 
or likely and a readiness to shift resources or change direc­
tion so as to be able to avoid or exploit new situations as 
they occur. uncertainty of this order is descriptive of the 
typical planning environments of business enterprises in 
industrial society and of battlefield planning in warfare 
restricted to what are now known as 'conventional' weapons.
It corresponds also to the sorts of environment confronting 
planners in established communities, in which significant 
uncertainty is created by the existence of other formal 
organizations and interest groups charting their own preferred 
courses into the future.
IV The fourth level, corresponds with the dynamics of the 
turbulent field. in relation to the predictability of the
_ _ _ _  _ _____
This has become the bane of Test Match cricket for example.
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future, the essential novelty for planning at this level is 
having to face the fact that sources of relevant variability 
can be expected lie outside the set of relations about which 
the system has at least 'probabilistic1 knowledge and an 
adequate set of prognostic skills» in other words the 
relation of the system to its future is in critical respects 
one of ignorance - there is no apparent way of telling what 
might happen. As we have argued earlier, this corresponds 
to the state of affairs in which the 'ground' or the field 
within which the connected systems are acting, itself takes 
on dynamic properties. Systems of relations that lie entirely 
within the environment become determinative of the survival 
of individual systems and the character of the interactions 
that take place. ignorance is thus equated with the high 
salience of L^  relations in determining the shape of the 
future.
ignorance of the future has quite different impli­
cations to a conception of the future as irrelevant, because 
it suggests that what ought to be known is not, and possibly 
cannot be known, we have argued throughout, adducing support 
from a number of different sources, that this level of 
unpredictability is becoming more typical in the rapidly 
changing social fields of those societies which are moving 
towards post-industrialism» For the city planner, this order 
of unpredictability has become pervasive with the onset over 
the past few decades of the 'metropolitan crisis'. The 
present distresses and disorders in many of the largest urban 
conglomerations deserve the name crisis partly because planners 
have not been able to cope with such a degree of unpredicta­
bility within the system as a whole. it is in conjunction 
with such fields that Ackoff recognized the need for an 
'adaptivizingf philosophy of planning, and has advocated 
responsiveness planning for corporationsi
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Such planning is directed toward designing an 
organization and a system for managing it 
that can quickly detect deviations from the 
expected and respond to them effectively.
Hence, responsiveness planning consists of 
building responsiveness and flexibility into 
an organization, [Ackoff:1970a:17]
V For the sake of completeness, but at some risk of 'over­
intuiting ', we may suggest that in so far as the future takes 
on a vortical appearance then it again becomes irrelevant to 
the system. The feeling that one is entirely at the mercy 
of what is to become, tends to make any concern for its actual 
content and course of development superfluous. The ascription 
of irrelevance in this case however derives from the sensation 
that the forces shaping the relevant future are entirely 
heteronomous, and beyond any possible intervention by the 
system itself that would make any difference. The L22 
relations are perceived as entirely determinative of the 
future states that will affect the system, At the first level 
we considered on the other hand, the future states of the 
system are felt to be subject only to autonomous determina­
tion - everything outside the system itself being irrelevant 
to its future (i.e. only relations are relevant).
Naturally the 'real' futures that we confront as 
individuals and those that are faced by institutions and 
organizations are complicated mixtures of these abstracted 
models. Much of the future will continue to lie beyond our 
capacities to influence it, other parts of it we can expect 
to be able to invent and plan. some of its aspects we shall 
always have to approach with the attitude of the gambler.
in his illuminating conjectures on ‘planning beyond the
'
industrial age', Webber writes:
Our continuing intellectual problem will be to 
know when it is most useful to view the future 
deterministically, when it is best to view it
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stochastically (and hence as indeterminate), 
and when we can profitably view it teleolog­
ically. That question is likely to take on 
the character of an intellectual dilemma, 
in a setting of rapid technological and 
social change, the possibilities for 'accurate1 
prediction would seem to decline. But with 
improving predictive theory, we should also 
be able more sensitively to anticipate com­
ing changes. And with increasing organiza­
tional capacities for large-scale decision 
and action, we should be able deliberately to 
shape more of the future than was once possible. 
No formula is available for resolving these 
competing views. it may be that the concep­
tual, methodological, and governmental issues 
that surround these images will continue to 
occupy us as we are carried along into the 
coming decades. [Webber:1968:182- 3]
planning; The Active Adaptations of Purposeful systems
planning has been described as a means whereby social aggre­
gates can adapt themselves to changing environmental circum­
stances when these become characterized by certain degrees 
of uncertainty and unpredictability. it is a process of 
anticipatory decision-making which is directed to the production 
of future states of affairs that are considered to be desirable, 
but which could not be expected to occur naturally, without 
active intervention. in environments that are relatively 
unchanging, or when it is felt that existing states of affairs 
could not be improved upon, it is unlikely that planning 
activity will become prevalent.
in order to test the usefulness of the systems 
concepts developed in the first part for gaining a better 
understanding of planning, it is now necessary to consider 
more closely what is to be understood by that term. in con­
formity with the contextualist thought-mode this will be done 
by amplifying the connotations of planning rather than trying 
to specify its meaning definitionally. planning is to be
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understood initially as a particular form of human and social 
activity - a purposive human activity that is directed 
towards influencing the future state of some system of ideas, 
actions, events, objects. it becomes necessary to show in 
what ways it is a distinctive form of activity - how planning 
behaviour differs from other forms of behaviour, and what 
kinds of effects it has in society.
in its most general sense planning is a ubiquitous 
activity, in that all deliberate actions to some extent take 
account of the value implications of choice, consider the 
opportunity cost of alternatives foregone, and attempt to 
relate means to ends according to some criterion of “efficiency1 
These steps are not necessarily taken self-consciously, and it 
is possible of course for “plans' to be conceived which have 
no possibility of ever being translated into action. The 
prisoner's deliberations over the perfect escape, day-dreamers 
spinning images of their paradise on earth, and the gambler 
optimistically planning his orgy of consumption would be 
examples. when we speak of the planning that is carried out 
by armies, corporations, town planners and the like, we there­
fore imply more than idle conjecture. planning in this context 
implies the design not only of a desired future, but also of 
effective ways of bringing it about. These “realistic“ or 
feasible plans differ from those of the day-dreamer to the 
extent that they attempt not only to define the objectives of 
planning, but also to enumerate the appropriate means - 
resources and courses of action which are both available and 
which are calculated to be effective in bringing about the 
desired objectives. The differences between effective planning 
and day-dreaming seem to be differences of degree rather than 
differences of kind. when the best laid plans of men do not 
fulfil expectations, it is often because the required means 
prove to be unobtainable (funds, information, expertise, 
public support) or because they prove to be less effective
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than the plan had anticipated. (The advertising campaign for 
Ford's Edsel would be a classic example).
A further distinguishing characteristic is that 
planning is required only when the decision-maker is confronted 
with a set of decisions that is too large to handle all at once 
and that cannot be divided into independent subsets. This is 
one of the central elements of the definition of planning put 
forward by Ac'koff:
Planning is required when the future state that 
we desire involves a set of interdependent 
decisions; that is, a system of decisions. A 
set of decisions forms a system if the effect 
of each decision in the set on the relevant out­
come depends on at least one other decision in 
the set. some of the decisions in the set may 
be complex, others simple. But the principal 
complexity in planning derives from the inter­
relatedness of the decisions rather than from 
the decisions themselves. [Ackoff:1970a:2-3]
To the extent that a set of decisions can be handled all at 
once, or can be broken down into sub-sets that can be handled 
separately, it constitutes a decision-making or programming 
situation, and not a planning situation. when the set is too 
large to handle all at once, it must be divided into a series 
of stages which are dealt with sequentially, or partitioned 
among a number of decision-making bodies that can work 'in 
parallel'. The difference between planning and simply decision­
making is therefore a difference of degree. planning embraces 
a more or less complex system of decisions in which present 
decisions are made in the light of those already taken and 
earlier decisions are constantly reviewed in the light of new 
requirements.
planning is therefore purposeful, involving the 
choice of appropriate means as well as the choice of goals 
and objectives. For a system to be able to choose a desired 
future and to be able to modify it when circumstances change,
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it must have the properties of a purposeful system. it must 
be able to reconsider and modify its objectives under constant 
environmental conditions, and to go on pursuing a particular 
end within certain limits of environmental variation.
Functional and goal-directed systems, lacking these capabilities, 
are unable to use planning as an adaptive mechanism. Machines 
may help human planners, but they cannot replace them.
individuals and the institutional structures which 
they comprise do have the capacity to plan. At a societal 
level one can usually identify a collection of government 
departments, statutory authorities, and other large formal 
organizations that have responsibility for the development of 
particular regions or development of limited facets of societal 
resources, such as manpower, technology, transportation, trade, 
agriculture, health, and the like. similarly within cities, 
responsibility for the provision and the enhancement of 
resources, amenities and opportunities for the citizens is 
usually functionally divided among a considerable number of 
specialized agencies. The extent to which the planning 
responsibilities of these various agencies are subordinated to 
one overall planning authority naturally varies immensely from 
society to society, and from city to city.
Purposefulness, as opposed to merely goal-directed
behaviour, is a critical capability of such agencies because
of their need to adapt to an uncertain and changing environment.
This may mean sustaining a particular organizational effort in
spite of a radically altered social situation, or reformulating
the organizational mission at a time when the social context
is relatively unchanging. it is however, perhaps more typical
to observe organizations reconsidering their goals only in
31response to some manifest dysfunction or crisis.
Crozier [1964] has argued that in the traditional French 
bureaucratic structure, change occurs only with the crises 
that punctuate periods of routine.
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The significance of purposiveness to planning 
activity may be made more evident by considering a non­
purposeful mode of 'planning', which, as one might expect, 
is typically better known for its failures than its successes. 
We can think of it as 'target planning', and it is essentially 
a goal-directed activity.
It begins with the formulation of a comprehensive 
and systematic specification of the state of affairs that is 
to be aimed at - the target - and prescribing the time schedule 
for attaining this goal. Thus for example, in many of the 
five-year or ten-year development plans for under-developed 
societies, the goals are set once and for all at the commence­
ment of the planning period. similarly with the galaxies of 
Master plans that have been drawn up to guide the progress of 
communities. civic authorities in many parts of the world 
have optimistically sought to improve the common good through 
the construction of comprehensive land-use and transportation 
maps which purport to describe the state of the community at 
the end of a 15 or 20 year period of 'planned development'.
The reasons for the failures of such development 
plans and Master plans to reach fruition are not of course 
always simple, but in many respects they seem to derive 
principally from the adoption of inflexible objectives which 
cannot take account of events and situations emerging during 
the planning period which challenge the feasibility of the 
original targets. it may often be the case in practice that 
'plans' of this sort are not intended to be realistic in their 
promises, but are designed to serve shorter run political ends.
To describe planning as a process of active adapta­
tion is a corollary to the proposition that a planner must be 
at least a purposeful system. planning is more than simply 
reacting to changes in the environment (passive adaptation),
or responding to changed circumstances in either the system
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itself or in its environment (directive correlation); it 
involves active interventions that will create the starting 
conditions for further adaptive behaviours. As we have seen, 
the process of active adaptation embraces a connected series 
of directive correlations in which the earlier system actions 
and the outcomes that they produce constitute successive 
steps towards the realization of objectives. We tend to 
speak of planning when such sequences of directively corre­
lated behaviours are deliberately structured at the outset 
in order to increase the probability that the desired out­
come (s) will be produced (i,e, things are not left to chance), 
and the effectiveness with which it is produced.
in such planned sequences it is usually possible 
to identify a number of constituent parts of the planning 
process itself. Ackoff for example has identified five such 
parts: the setting of objectives, the determination of
means (courses of action, practices, procedures, programs, 
and policies), the acquisition of resources, the design of 
implementation procedures, and of a feedback or control 
system for evaluating performance [Ackoff:1970a:6]. Thus 
for example the National capital Development commission upon 
assuming responsibility for the planning of Canberra, the 
Australian capital, in 1958, announced as its immediate 
tasks:
"1. to survey problems and needs and fix 
both short term and long term objec­
tives .
2. to produce a revised town plan.
3. To establish the resources available, 
both government and private enterprise, 
and the roles for each.
4. to prepare a programme which relates what 
needs to be done to the instruments, 
physical resources and funds available.
5. To make the programme work."
Annual Report:1958]
[NCDC s
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Such parts of the planning process are not to be 
thought of as essential or invariant stages in a linear 
causal train, commencing with the unambiguous specification 
of goals and concluding with the selection and implementation 
of the 'best5 course of action for achieving them, but are 
better understood as constituting a system in themselves.
As such they are in interaction with one another throughout 
the planning activity, each subject to variations in the 
impact they have at each stage on the total process. As the 
relations between these parts themselves may be quite complex 
and unstable, it is usually necessary for planning itself to 
be planned.
A man lighting a fire in order to be able to cook 
is an instance of purposefulness and active adaptation. The 
present area of interest however is limited to those deliberate 
actions which are directed towards the state of large-scale 
social systems - society and its major sub-systems - and is 
not particularly concerned with the active adaptations of 
individuals. Friedmann, in referring to this kind of activity 
as 'societal action“, directs attention to planning as a 
socio-cultural force, as well as an activity that needs to 
be understood on the bio-psychological level [F riedmann;19 69] . 
Societal action is inevitably tied up with the distribution 
of such field forces as power, knowledge, values and material 
resources within the social field as a whole, and is therefore 
unavoidably concerned with its operative political and 
ideological systems. it therefore tends to reflect and to 
perpetuate the prevailing 'Zeitgeist' even though this may 
seldom be a conscious aim.
The importance of this link tends to be revealed 
only at those times when the Zeitgeist, is abandoned in favour 
of expediency or efficiency, and the needs stemming from 
peoples cultural roots are overlooked. Much of the criticism 
of modern functionalist architecture for example, draws
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attention to its cultural superficiality. The mountains of 
glass-covered steel boxes taking root in central business 
districts all over the world and the global uniformity of 
airport lounges and cafeteria contribute to the emergence 
of a universal style and form at the expense of cultural 
distinctiveness. More generally the cultural specificity 
of the planned achievements of society are threatened by the 
emergence of a ‘positivistic’ approach in planning that aims 
to reduce it to a form of programming. Techniques in business 
planning developed in the united states for example, are 
commonly 'packaged' into a marketable form and exported to 
the rest of the world, similar homogenising tendencies are 
apparent in metropolitan planning, America's earlier 
experiences with mass car ownership and the vast amounts of 
money spent there on traffic and transportation research 
give a special appeal to the solutions arrived at in the 
design of traffic systems, and they have consequently been 
imitated in other places. inner city freeways continue to 
devour houses, and clover-leaf junctions acres of valuable 
land, more in response to what are regarded as the universal 
requirements of the motor car than to more basic cultural 
values which are less readily apprehended and given expression.
With the great debate over planning versus individual 
freedom now generally resolved in favour of planning, it may 
be necessary to caution that the success of planning has to 
be measured in terms of its capability to respond to, and 
elaborate the expression of, the spiritual values and cultural 
axioms of its historical period, as well as its ability to 
produce good 'technical- solutions to engineering problems 
(the ‘technological fix'), to the extent that it takes 
account of cultural values and uncertain futures, planning 
is resistant to claims of special expertise in its practice, 
and to the 'professionalization of planning into an esoteric 
craft beyond the comprehension of its supposed beneficiaries.
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To the extent that the legitimation for societal action is 
sought in societal choice, planning has to become in part 
a political activity# and the planner, like the social 
scientist, is under pressure to define and to defend his 
concept of the role he plays»
Difficulties of this sort are common to the whole 
range of occupations whose resources necessarily include an 
element of applied behavioural science. Educationalists, 
penologists, management scientists, welfare officers, and 
city planners share the difficulties that arise from the 
permeation of their subject-matter with social values, and 
in each case, the questions of what the basic aim of their 
activity is, and how it may best be served, represent 
significant and enduring problems, one suspects that where 
such aims as "serving the public interest', 'rehabilitation', 
and 'increasing job satisfaction1 can be agreed upon, this 
is precisely because they are too vague to allow the deduction 
of particular courses of action» current planning literature 
reveals widespread disagreements over whether the planner 
should be advocate or dictator, adviser or policy-maker, 
technical expert or involved humanist.
A further delimitation is that we are interested 
in those types of planning, or societal action, which are 
dependent upon and make maximum use of scientific-technical 
intelligence» interventions in society that are premised 
upon religious conviction or traditional beliefs, or that 
are dependent upon the charismatic properties of an individual, 
are of direct concern to the social scientist, but they fall 
outside the scope of the concept of planning to be considered 
here. Formally institutionalized planning is characteristically 
information-dependent to a very high degree, and could always 
use more information than is available at any particular time,
planning that is based on scientific knowledge has
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the further characteristic that it espouses rational thought,
discussion, and argument to the exclusion of extra-rational
thought-modes such as intuition, wisdom, and tradition0
More particularly, as Friedmann has argued planning's typical
32medium of exchange is a form of bounded rationality':
This refers to the fact that thought and con­
sequent action intended to be rational are 
contingent on environmental conditions - the 
social context of planning - which represent 
the medium in and through which planning 
decisions are made«, [Friedmann: 1967 :234]
in Friedmann s schema, bounded rationality is con­
trasted with ideological and utopian thought, which he calls 
non-bounded rationality« ideological and utopian thought is 
at least potentially rational, in that its constructions can 
be logical and coherent, and they may be concrete representa­
tions of abstract social values such as equality, freedom and 
justice, There is clearly a place in planning for the produc­
tive use of utopian thinking, or the exercise of creative 
imagination, Martin Meyerson for example has called for a 
revival of utopian thinking to test new possibilities for 
city growth, and advocates the bringing together of the 
social utopianism of such men as More and Owen and the physical 
utopianism of people like Lloyd Wright and Corbusier [Meyerson-. 
1961] .
Bounded rational thought is in turn dichotomised 
into functionally rational and substantially rational thought - 
thought which is rational with respect to the means only, and 
thought that is rational with respect to both the ends and
32
This concept was of course introduced by March and Simon 
[1958] o it has obvious correspondences with the viewpoint 
that open, behavioural systems can only be adequately under­
stood if the properties of the environment and the nature 
of system-environment interdependencies are also understood«
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the means of action» Both types of rationality can usually 
be found in the activities of planning systems» in the first 
case the 'ends' of the planning activity are assumed to be 
given, while substantially rational thought; "„..implies the 
possibility of altering the ends during the action as a 
result of changing circumstances or new information"
[Friedmann;opoC.it:236] .
It is of interest to note the degree of correspon­
dence between this classification of types of thinking and
33the Ackoff-Emery systems taxonomy discussed above» Functional 
rationality and substantial rationality express the action 
potentials of goal-seeking and purposeful systems respectively; 
the former have choice only with respect to course of action 
or means, while the latter are able in addition to choose and 
to change their goals. Further, Friedmann's concept of non- 
bounded rationality corresponds fairly closely with the 
characterizing properties of ideal-seeking systems.
in such thinking there is a picture of an ideal 
social order.... The images of perfect commu­
nism and perfect capitalism are such utopias, 
as are the corporate state, national socialism 
and participant democracy. [ibid;237]
FUNCTIONALLY
RATIONAL
THOUGHT
'RATIONALITY
(ideal-seeking)
(derived from Friedmann [1967])
33 (see next page)
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in trying to describe some of the general character­
istics of planning, planning activity has been contrasted with 
day-dreaming, 'wishful thinking’ and the like, on the grounds 
that the former must be deferent to feasibility while the 
latter recognizes no such boundaries, in many actual 
situations however there is pressure towards improving upon 
mere feasibility as a criterion for action, and searching 
instead for the optimal solution, or at least the best among 
the courses of action that are deemed feasible. The poten­
tiality of the system being planned for and the relevant 
environment to change over time promotes a third criterion 
in the actual formulation of planning decisions - adaptability 
insofar as the phenomena to which planning is related is 
subject to unpredictable and uncontrollable variations during 
the course of the implementation of the plan, the plan must 
incorporate some sensitivity to changes of this sort, and 
must be modifiable when the situation so demands, Ackoff 
has identified three "philosophies of planning' that are 
related to the degree of emphasis given to each of these 
important criteria - feasibility, optimality, and adaptability 
The three planning philosophies are satisficing, optimizing, 
and adaptivizing [Ackoff:1970a:6ff.].
Satisficing planning simply aims to do well enough1 
in any situation, and reflects the 'art of the possible'. 
Limited aims are adopted which make no novel demands on the 
structure and capabilities of the planning system. The 
satisficer tends to use only that information which is readily 
available or can be acquired easily. The great attraction 
of satisficing is that it makes very moderate intellectual
33 (from previous page)
Its value as a basis for further conceptualizations however, 
is limited, due to the fact that the basic category of 
'thought1 or "types of thinking8 is rather nebulous.
19 5
demands» and requires comparably limited resources» Aims 
are chosen that tend to exclude the need for subsequent 
revision ’adaptability), and there is no attempt to optimize»
Optimizing on the other hand searches for the best 
possible course of action in any situation, and for this 
reason is intellectually more challenging, and more likely 
to recognize the need for fairly constant review and correction 
during the implementation period. The optimizer needs far 
more information, and spends considerable amounts of time and 
other resources searching for the information that is needed 
but which is not readily available» in fact optimizing 
planning tends to become dependent, on information of a 
particular sort - that which yields to quantification and is 
therefore amenable to the mathematical techniques of optimization
Adaptivizing (or ‘innovative") planning is a rela­
tively new concept., the development, of which has been largely 
due to Ackoff himself. it. is presented as the 'richest* of 
the three philosophies in the sense at least that. it. addresses 
itself not to a limited set of feasible aims, or to optimizing 
the performance of those parts of the system which can be 
quantified, but to improving the adaptability of the whole 
system» it is the richest too in that, it includes the 
possibility of moving towards the best feasible set. of 
decisions, without, necessarily placing a premium on optimality 
or pre-judging what, is to be considered feasible» The most 
important single ingredient of the adaptivizing philosophy 
is its premise that the actual process of planning is more 
important than the product; the way in which planning is 
organized and carried out, and the people who are involved 
in it, is more important than the plans that are produced;
.».the process of planning is its most, important 
product. The benefits of planning are derived 
more from participation in the process than from 
consuming its product» [Ackoff:1970b;22]
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Although it seems to be historically the case that 
planning has emerged as a prevalent mode of decision-making 
in connection with the shift from agricultural to industrial 
society and in those parts of social fields in which actors 
have had to meet disturbed-reactive types of environmental 
conditions, there is nothing about these new conditions which 
makes planning obligatory, or guarantees that it will be 
carried out effectively» in the first case this is only to 
say that practically all of the problems in society that may 
be perceived in some sense as planning problems' can be 
expected,, if ignored, to regulate themselves at some level 
of activityo Vickers, in his discussion of the Buchanan 
report on traffic in towns, considers the consequences of 
doing nothing about the traffic problem;
Traffic, outstripping road capacity, will 
generate self-magnifying traffic blocks in 
which no vehicle can move and through which 
it. is impossible even to walk. This self- 
defeating situation will both prevent and 
deter the further flow of traffic; and when 
the blocks have been cleared, a reduced 
volume will move for a time in relative 
freedom, which will soon attract enough 
traffic to generate another jam. The volume 
of traffic will stabilize, oscillating about 
a mean at which it is just sufficient to 
deter what the roads cannot handle. [Vickers:
1965; 2809]
The purpose of human intervention, as he points out, is to 
regulate such relationships at a level which is more accept­
able to those concerned than that at which the inherent 
logic of the situation would otherwise provide»
in past historical periods (and today among some 
political conservatives) it has been widely believed that 
these tolerance limits are most effectively and fairly 
established by the operations of a market system in which 
each is equally free to buy and to sell, and a political 
system in which each is free to record his vote, in 19t.h
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century England, the organized restraint of laissez-faire 
was held to produce institutional structures that were 
robust and durable, representing the 'fit.' elements that, 
were able to survive the competitive machinations of the 
laws of supply and demand - the scarcely concealed 'hidden 
hand0„ The steady and continuous increase in the amount of 
resources allocated to societal planning in both the developed 
and the developing countries has gone on alongside accumulating 
signs, some mundane and some spectacular, that the hidden hand 
is in fact highly fallible, and a growing awareness that the 
alternative to planning, at least in such contexts as the 
metropolis, may be no longer laissez-faire, but 'laissez 
mourir!,
Notwithstanding the judgement that the use of 
planning is very much on the increase, it is already a very 
widespread form of activity, and has developed its own 
professional bodies and 'invisible colleges', a substantial 
body of literature which includes a large number of journals, 
and a respectable standing in a very wide range of public 
and private institutional contexts. Moreover it is not at all 
restricted to the developed societies in its impact, but has 
been one of the most significant 'social exports' to the third 
worldo Today's missionaries preach planning as one of the 
roads to national salvation. Naturally in circumstances where 
a regular meal for all has yet to be achieved, economic 
planning of one sort and another has taken precedence. Yet 
there are grounds for hoping that an earlier start on broader, 
societal planning may permit the emerging African, Asian and 
Latin American societies to avoid some at least of the worst 
consequences of the relatively undisciplined industrialization 
of the west.
Spectacular and compelling support for a larger 
scale of intervention in the functioning of society was 
forced upon those who in this century experienced the
1^8
unexpected and unwanted turmoil and convulsions of the two 
world wars and the Depression that intervened» The apparent 
heteronomy of the processes behind such massive breakdowns 
in social life created a climate that at least was not 
resistant to greater intervention and control, while the 
actual mobilizations of resources on a societal scale, both 
to fight the wars, and to 'reconstruct' after the fighting 
and after the Great Depression offered a powerful demonstra­
tion effect of what could be achieved by a mobilized society,
As the pace and scale of change have boomed over 
the last few decades, the belief appears to have grown that, 
the avoidance of similar catastrophes is in an important way 
contingent upon our ability to anticipate, regulate, and 
where possible create, the changes that are going on» The 
media, and television in particular, have made global issues 
of race conflict, over-population, the ecological crisis, 
and so on, and we appear to have no 'guiding fiction' equivalent 
to the 19th century belief in 'progress8 which offers us even 
a pretended immunity from the traps that lie ahead» it would 
be facile to suggest that such immunity might now be found 
in planning. it would appear however that the application 
of scientific and technical intelligence to problems of the 
future and our means of arriving there is now commonly regarded 
as a more hopeful approach to the preservation and enhancement 
of our social worlds than the attitude of old-fashioned 
liberalism and a purely therapeutic approach to societal 
malfunctioning» The limited starts on preventive maintenance 
in industry, and preventive medicine in the field of public 
health have to be generalized to society itself.
CHAPTER SIX
PLANNING AND THE SOCIOSPHERE
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planning s Expanding Horizons? the Sociosphere
in the developed societies we are acustomed to the 
fact that planning enters into a vast range of purposeful 
social activities, routine and innovatory,. The waging of 
wars, the exploration of space, business activity, environ­
mental control, the preparation of National Budgets, the 
administration of social welfare - for all such activities, 
planning - taking decisions now that will affect the future 
state of affairs - has become indispensable, in refining 
the concept of planning we can make some preliminary 
distinctions according to the different substantive areas 
in which planning is habitually applied, That is to say we 
can distinguish a number of broad types of system that are 
planned for;
lechnological systems: human enterprises such as space
exploration and the development of supersonic transport,
the design and construction of huge dams and hydro-electric
schemes. Sometimes the label of Project planning is attached
to planning of this sort, in which the critical problems are
the piecing together of men, material and machinery to make
34a successful working system. The intellectual resources 
for such activity are characteristically from mathematics 
and the natural sciences, engineering, etc., but are likely 
to include operations research, systems analysis and so on 
when the end product is a complex man-machine system 
requiring the integration of the technology with human 
capabili ties,
Natural systems: mans interventions in nature, intended to
exploit, preserve, and augment the natural environment.
Flood control, reclamation, conservation, resource planning, 
policy-making for minerals, agriculture, fisheries and the
34~ “ “ ”
See for example, jungk's account of the world war n  
'Manhattan project' [jungk:1960] .
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like, all fall into this category, (with Departments of 
the Environment' springing from the ground like mushrooms 
after a thunderstorm it could be that our planning for natural 
systems will become far more systematic). The main intelli­
gence called upon derives predominantly from the biological 
and geographical sciences - botany, ecology, oceanography, 
geology, meteorology, and the like. planting deserts, ocean 
farming and weather control are some of the prospects for 
natural system planning.
institutional systems: the institutional arrangements in
society for serving mens physiological, psychological, 
spiritual and social needs, encompassing institutions for 
welfare, production, recreation, education, communication, 
health, etc, - organizational mechanisms deliberately 
structured for the creation, allocation and control of rela­
tively scarce material and non-material resources„ The 
critical tasks of institution building, maintenance and 
change involve organizing the capabilities of an aggregate 
of individuals into a functioning whole, and the key resources 
for planning for institutional systems derive from the 
behavioural sciences - psychology, social psychology, sociology 
and their 'applied' wings of industrial psychology, sensitivity
training, psycho-therapy, corporate planning, management
35science, administrative science, etc.
Economic systems: economic systems are referred to separately
because of the special interest and expertise that has 
developed in civilized societies in relation to problems of 
the creation and allocation of those resources that are given 
a monetary value for the purposes of their exchange and
35
Dror sets out a compelling case for a more systematically 
organized area of 'policy science' [Dror;1968] „
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distribution, in planning for economic systems the concept 
of resources typically has a rather limited connotation which 
relates to mans material requirements to the relative exclusion 
of his appetites for beauty, peace, freedom and the like, or 
even clear air and water.
The 'routine preoccupations' of national economic 
planning - the maintenance of a high level of employment, 
the stabilization of price levels, and the promotion of a 
favourable balance of payments, and of business economics - 
profits or profitability, abstract one dimension of the systems 
that they are applied to, and it is a dimension that has come 
to assume an overriding significance in the management of 
industrial society. planning for economic systems draws its 
expertise from the various branches of economics - welfare 
economics, econometrics, accounting, etc. and the professional 
experience of banking, finance, trade and the like.
Conflict systems• it is seemingly inherent in the nature of 
the social world that particular forms of competition, fights 
and struggles are recurrent:., so that both their occurrence 
and the way in which they unfold can be to some degree 
anticipated and thus prepared for, planning for conflict 
systems, whether the aim be to avoid, contain or achieve 
ascendance in the conflict has a characteristic expression 
at a number of different levels of social behaviour, but its 
formalization has perhaps proceeded furthest in military 
planning and some aspects of business planning, preventive 
planning for international conflicts incorporates defence 
strategy, diplomacy (including its expressions through foreign 
aid, trade and cultural arrangements), and the study of 
international relations. Among institutional systems, 
business and political conflict are the most salient and have 
their own characteristic ground rules and procedures, which 
are the planning intelligence of political parties and
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corporations. The development of Game Theory is an attempt 
to generalize the dynamics of competitive situations through 
the investigation of conflicts in microcosm, although its 
real value for planning for conflict systems is not yet evident. 
Conflicts at these differing levels naturally require for their 
negotiation expertise that is built upon past experience of 
such conflicts and expertise that is based upon knowledge 
and understanding of the possible and probable behaviours 
of the aggressor on competitor. Expertise of the first sort 
is generally consolidated into bodies of law, constitutions, 
and sets of rules.
Social systems: planning for large-scale social systems has
been widely aspired to and discussed, but infrequently carried 
out. Much more has been achieved in the context of 'middle 
range' social systems - organizations and institutions, and 
limited aspects of them - economics and conflicts for example. 
However, planning for social systems per se, at the national, 
legional and community levels is becoming more feasible, and 
more essential for societies moving into post industrialism. 
Along with the rapid expansion of other forms of technology, 
the technology of the social sciences, and its resources in 
scientists, methods, understandings and institutional arrange­
ments for teaching and research has also been subject to 
escalation. to date, social planning has generally proceeded 
on limited fronts - demographic (birth control), health and 
welfare, educational, leisure and recreation - with relatively 
little co-ordination of these facets and often a low level of 
understanding of the relations among them.
Little can be claimed for a list such as this, and 
certainly it cannot be said that such categories are likely 
to be exhaustive of planning's concerns, or that they are 
mutually exclusive. it does imply that the future states 
towards which planning activity has been geared have been
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thought of in systems terms, such that planning is understood 
as a process of improving the existing state of a system by 
guiding its change towards a more desirable state, as a 
process of making more systemic, or improving the coherence 
among an existing set of elements, or as a process of design­
ing and bringing into being a completely new system. Thus 
improving the performance of a racing car entails successive 
adjustments to each of the engines parts and the relations 
between them, in a search for a combination that will optimize 
speed without sacrificing endurance; the more adequate 
provision of adult or continuing education facilities may 
involve bringing into conscious and coherent relations a 
number of existing and fragmentary providers; planning for 
such projects as the giant Aswan dam and the Apollo mission 
involves the creation of substantially new systems.
The complex institutional arrangements and systems 
of action that have become reliant on some sort of planning 
activity are not represented by any one of these types of 
systems, but rather represent the overlap and points of 
intersection of many of them, in the past even though the 
corporation may have been thought of fundamentally as an 
economic system - one whose functions were defined in terms 
of profits or profitability - it had to be viewed also as a 
technological and a social system, and planning had to try 
to reconcile the competing constraints of economics, engineer­
ing and psychology. The city is another example of a complex 
socio-environmental system within which a bewildering 
heterogeneity of functions have to be performed, aims have 
to be satisfied, and relations established and maintained.
If corporations and communities are managed and planned for 
as if they have systemic properties, then it is necessary, 
in spite of the complexity and variety of structures and 
actions that they encompass, that there be some image of them 
in systems terms. The origins and phases of city planning
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as a special form of activity can be related to changes in 
the image of the city as a distinctive entity in the minds 
firstly of reformers, and later of politicians and professional 
groups,
While planning has in its origins been divided 
according to its subject matters, giving rise to separate 
fields of planning and separate experts within them, there 
are now increasing signs that the best thinking about planning 
today is becoming oblivious to disciplinary boundaries and 
special subject matters. This may be reflected in the decision 
of the American institute of planners to identify them­
selves primarily as planners, and to extend membership to 
those not specifically trained in traditional 'city planning', 
and is certainly reflected in the output from such enterprises 
as the OECD's 1Bellagio Symposium" on long-range forecasting 
and planning, in which the dimensions of the coming style of 
planning are charted. The ‘Bellagio Declaration' issued by 
the participants in this symposium begins with the following 
observation:
Social institutions face growing difficulties 
as a result of an ever-increasing complexity 
which arises directly and indirectly from the 
development and assimilation of technology.
Many of the most serious conflicts facing man­
kind result from the interaction of social, 
economic, technological, political and psycho­
logical forces and can no longer be solved by 
fractional approaches from individual disci­
plines . The time is passed when economic 
growth can be promoted without consideration 
of social consequences and when technology can 
be allowed to develop without consideration of 
the social prerequisites of change or the 
social consequences of such change, [jantsch:
1969:7]
At the forefront of the planning literature there 
is an increasing concern for large-scale societal planning, 
or 'integrative' planning, which would have the effect of
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bringing into closer relations the segments into which 
planning endeavours are currently separated, both by con­
ceptualizing them individually as facets of a large-scale 
system for which interventions in any one part has effects 
for all of the others, and by focussing on the activity of 
planning as such, as a generalized means for attaining a 
satisfactory level of societal regulation. Wentworth 
Eldredge, in outlining the need for "total environmental 
planning1, is a characteristic apostle of this new concern:
The conservation, rehabilitation and development 
of both natural and man-made environment is a 
massive task clearly calling for the upgrading 
of our planning technology, or resource alloca­
tion for agreed-on goals, from a micro- to a 
macro-scale level in three specific ways to 
match the ever-growing increase in the socio­
economic complexity and extent of the rapidly 
expanding American scene. specifically, con­
siderations of (1) area, (2) function and 
(3) time are all too limited in our planning 
capabilities. [Eldredge:1967•1158]
It seems most likely that such identified areas as corporate, 
defence, regional, city, economic and social planning will 
retain their identity, but most probable also that they will 
become increasingly salient as parts of each others planning 
environments in a wider definition of the realm in which 
planning takes place. Some of the groundwork in preparing 
the necessary intelligence for this more comprehensive scale 
of societal intervention has already been undertaken in the 
studies on 'social intelligence" and 'social indicators' by 
Raymond Bauer, Bertram Gross and others [Bauer:1966, Gross: 
1969] .
The need for such a development is one that is being 
forced upon us by the changing pace and scale in the environ­
ments that we inhabit:
Our present revolutionary waves differ not only 
in their quantitative aspects from those of the
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recent past, but also in their qualitative 
characteristics. whereas in the 19th century 
we might have dealt conventionally with rela­
tively separate revolutionary strands within 
their local geographical context, our present 
revolutions are now global in their spatial 
and quantitative aspects. Their quality is 
no longer that of isolable sequences of events 
whose interrelations were more separated in 
time, in numbers of people, and in the social 
and physical processes affected.
Our present series of revolutionary trans­
itions are more specifically characterized by 
their simultaneity - the swift interpenetra­
tion, increased feedback, and interdependence 
of one group of changes upon another.
Global in scale, potentially affecting the 
physical balance of all life on the planet 
itself, and reaching into every aspect of 
individual human life and society, our on­
going change patterns now constitute an 
ecological revolution. [McHale:1969:63]
McHale advocates a conceptual extension towards a 'planetary 
ecology', which assumes that 'its prior concern is with the 
maintenance of the planetary society'.
One of the consequences of the drift towards post­
industrialism is that many of the terms and tools of planners 
have become obsolete and inadequate to the dimensions of the 
task. The thoughtways of industrial society are no longer 
helpful in confonting the planning problems of extended social 
fields in which turbulent systems of interaction and inter­
dependency mean that the basic units are ecological in 
character. This, as has been noted, becomes a prevailing 
condition in social fields undergoing transformation from 
Type ill to Type IV environments. planning for social fields 
requires that they be treated as_ fields, and not simply as 
collections of systems performing different functions, with 
different structures and sizes, such that each system can 
be planned for in isolation from the others and the overall 
context that they share. it therefore requires ecological
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concepts and understandings that will encompass populations 
of systems and their environments, and show ways in which 
these can be modified and governed as ecological units.
To reconceptualize the relevant domain of planning 
on this planetary scale raises more forcibly than has 
previously been so those kinds of problems which churchman 
has identified as problems of the ethics of large-scale 
systems'. The central difficulty is that of finding criteria 
of 'rational conduct1 with regard to interventions in one 
part of the whole system when its effects upon the state of 
the whole system can never be adequately grasped, As churchman 
himself puts it: "...there is no such thing as improving a
part of the system without taking into account what happens 
to the whole system as a consequence." [churchman:1968b:70]. 
Before exploring possibilities for 8 a science of the ethics 
of the whole system', we need some concept of the dimensions 
of the 'whole system' that we are to concern ourselves with, 
and it is towards such a concept that the following discussion 
is directed.
If systems theory is to be of real value in com­
prehending the expanded ecological realm of planning, then 
what is needed in systems theory is a set of concepts that 
go beyond the system-environment dichotomization, which 
emphasises their structural differentiation, to describe 
the 'system plus environment1 as a unit, emphasing their 
essential continuity in terms of process. Lewin's concept 
of life-space, and his equation b = f (p «, e) - behaviour 
is a function of the person plus his environment, accomplishes 
this for the psychological individual, but the problem has 
been more systematically treated by Angyal in his discussion 
of life, not as an intra-organismic happening, but as a 
process which takes place between organism and environment.
We referred in the last chapter to his concept of
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the biosphere. in introducing this concept he writes:
....The life process does not take place only 
within the body surface, but involves a much 
broader realm of events. such a broad defi­
nition of biological happenings is unconven­
tional but necessary in order that justice be 
done to the problems of the total personality.
The broadened concept of life does not refer 
to an intra-organismic happening, but to a 
process which covers a much broader field than 
the body. Life involves both intrasomatic 
and extrasomatic happenings. The limits of 
life extend as far as the organism is able to 
exert an influence on the events in the world...
Accordingly i propose to call the realm in 
which the biological total process takes place 
the 'biosphere“, that is, the realm or sphere 
of life. [Angyai;1941:99- 100]
He rejects attempts to distinguish between the organism and 
the environment in structural or morphological terms as un­
productive, if not impossible, and argues that the subject 
matter of the sciences of life is primarily processes and 
not structures. This being so, it is more appropriate to 
distinguish between organism and environment in dynamic terms 
and to examine the processes of life in terms of the extent 
to which they are determined by the system or organism itself 
or by heteronomous, environmental forces.
We cannot tell whether a structure belongs to 
the organism or to the environment, but we can 
determine to what extent a process is respec­
tively organismically or environmentally 
governed.
Those factors which are prevalently under 
autonomous government constitute the organism 
or self or subject, while the factors which 
are prevalently under heteronomous government 
form the objects of the environment. [ibid:
95, 102]
The biosphere therefore is not an amorphous domain but is 
differentiated in the dimension of autonomous versus 
heteronomous determination, between the subject and the object
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poles» No biological process is determined entirely organ- 
ismically or entirely environmentally, but is a resultant 
of both kinds of forces» These may be expressed in the ratio 
(a:h), the ratio of autonomous and heteronomous government.» 
The limits of the opposing poles of the biosphere thus 
correspond to pure organism (processes governed entirely 
autonomously - the subject pole) and pure environment 
(processes governed entirely heteronomously - the object 
pole), neither of which refer to real phenomena, but which 
have the status of theoretical limiting cases»
The relative values of a and h,..are very 
different in the various biological manifes­
tations. For example, the processes going 
on in the gastrointestinal tract are, on the 
one hand, heteronomous, environmentally 
determined through the physical chemical 
properties of the food but, on the other 
hand, they are also autonomous, organismically 
determined: mechanical work of the stomach
and intestines, secretion of the digestive 
glands» in the biological processes taking 
place in the blood, the external determina­
tions play a smaller role and internal deter­
minations a larger role than in the processes 
of digestion. [ibid:94-5]
An analogous term for describing and interpreting 
the realm or sphere in which social life takes place has 
been suggested by Boulding - the 0 sociosphere'» He writes:
The social system consists of all human beings 
on the planet and all their interrelationships, 
such as kinship, friendship, hostility, status, 
exchange, money flows, conversation, informa­
tion outputs and inputs, and so on, it 
includes likewise the contents of every person's 
mind and the physical surroundings, both natural 
and artificial, to which he relates» This 
social system clings to the surface of the earth, 
so that it may appropriately be called the 
sociosphere, even though small fragments of it 
are now going out into space. [Boulding:
1966:3]
As Angyal uses the concept of the biosphere to overstep the
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structural dichotomization of the organism and the environ­
ment, so the concept of the sociosphere points beyond the 
separate consideration of the structures and properties of 
social aggregates, and of their environments, to a way of 
understanding social activities entirely as processes which 
take place between such aggregates and their environments, 
in which the shape and direction of the activity is jointly 
governed by the properties of the behaving systems and by 
the properties of the environment.,
For the biologists, the,image of the existential 
form of the organism as a dynamic one, expressed in the 
precept 'the organism is a process', occasioned a fairly 
radical re-orientation of the focus of their investigations, 
but also a certain amount of confusion and disagreement, in 
sociology, the analogous point of view state that "a social 
system is a structuring of events or happenings rather than 
of physical parts and it therefore has no structure apart 
from its functioning" [Katz and Kahn:1966:31] , This image 
too demands a re-orientation from the prevailing organismic 
and mechanistic conceptions of the social structure, towards 
a new conception of it as a system of action, interaction, 
exchange, process, and so on - a dynamic complex in which 
structure is 'immanent' rather than transcendental, being 
constantly refashioned, destroyed and elaborated in every 
sequence of social interaction.
To view the subject matter of the sciences of 
behaviour as processes rather than structures is a necessary 
consequence of conceptualizing the entities with which they 
deal as open systems whose capacity for survival, for 
performing their functions, and for growth is a direct 
function of their ability to incorporate free energy from 
the environment in a constant exchange process. The processes 
of exchange themself and not the particular morphological 
characteristics or substantive appearance of the system are
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the phenomena to be understood» we are inclined to say 
therefore that discussions concerning where we should draw 
the boundaries of an organization for example, are no more 
fruitful than arguments over where one might locate the 
boundaries of the organism»
in this regard Etzioni has suggested that we 
distinguish between participants and non-participants 
according to whether the individual achieves a high rating 
on at least one of the following criteria; the nature and 
intensity of the actor's involvement in the organization; 
the degree to which he is subordinated to organizational 
powers, and the amount of performance required of him by the 
organization» "Thus students, inmates, soldiers, workers, 
and many others are included» customers and clients on the 
other hand, who score low on all three criteria, are considered 
’outsiders'" [Etzioni;1961:21]. March and Simon have taken a 
broader view: "when we describe the chief participants of
most business organizations, we generally limit our attention 
to the following five major classes: Employees, investors,
suppliers, distributors and consumers" [March and Simon:1958:
89]» of themselves, such deliberations are relatively 
sterile, and need to be geared to the investigation of 
specific systems of action before they are of any practical 
significance«
The consequences of adapting Boulding“s concept 
of the sociosphere to our own conceptual scheme become clear»
The sociosphere is the region, or “dimensional domain*
(Angyal) in which social activity goes on© Like the bio­
sphere, it can be roughly differentiated into two fields, 
corresponding to the ratio of autonomous and heteronomous 
determination of the events it encloses. Towards the subject 
pole, events in the sociosphere are predominantly under 
autonomous government, or system-determined; towards the 
object pole they are predominantly under heteronomous government,
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or environmentally determined* This derivation may be 
clarified in the following quotation from Angyal in which 
terms appropriate to the sociosphere replace the specifi­
cally biospheric terms:
The differentiation of the [sociosphere] into 
subject and object is the basic organization 
of the [sociosphere] and forms the foundation 
for further structuralizations. The single 
factors have no fixed position in the [socio­
sphere] . processes which, at a given moment, 
stand prevalently under environmental govern­
ment may at the next moment come under 
prevalently [system] government. strictly 
speaking, one cannot generalize and state to 
what extent a given type of [social activity] 
is [systemically] or environmentally governed*
The exact value of this ratio can be determined 
only in specific instances» There is, in other 
words, a continuous flux between the two poles 
of the [sociosphere]» [Angyal:op cit:102]
in making this conceptual transposition, full account 
must of course be taken of the qualitative differences between 
the organism or the individual, and the social group or social 
aggregates as centres of autonomous government and of the 
related differences between the substantive forms of environ­
mental determination in the biosphere and the sociosphere. 
Nevertheless there are substantial continuities between the 
two concepts which have some important methodological 
consequences. primarily, they are contextualist categories, 
and in emphasizing the dominance of process over structure 
they refer back directly to the root metaphor of the historic 
event or act. in investigating and interpreting the relevant 
parts of the universe, this implies that understanding is 
sought in terms of field determination rather than the 
discovery of linear causal trains and functional relation­
ships - in fact that understanding and not explanation 
becomes the aim of research itself. This is discussed by 
Angyal in terms of the differences between relations and
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systems:
Dealing with relations and dealing with systems 
involve two different logical manipulations to 
which two psychologically quite different 
processes may correspond,».. Relational think­
ing aims at the establishment of the direct 
connection between two objects. For instance, 
in the study of causation one has to find for 
member A (effect) a second member B (cause) 
with which it is necessarily connected, in 
causal research the task is to single out from 
a multiplicity of data pairs of facts between 
which there is a necessary connection, in 
system thinking the task is not to find direct 
relations between two members but to find the 
superordinate system in which they are connec­
ted or to define the positional value of 
members relative to the superordinate system,
[ibid:254]
The directions and the outcomes of social actions 
are shaped both by the properties of the social actors, and 
the properties of the relevant environments - psychological, 
technological, natural - in which social life is carried on. 
This basic differentiation of the sociosphere into subject 
and object poles - the regions of autonomous and heteronomous 
government of social behaviours - leads to further structura- 
lizations. The subject pole corresponds to the loci of 
purposeful social behaviours in the social field - the nodal 
points in the mesh of field forces and interdependencies at 
which social relations are sufficiently organized and enduring 
to give them an identifiable form or structure» The socio­
sphere as a whole incorporates not. only articulated social 
aggregates and their interrelations, but also the natural 
physical environment of the surface of the earth (the bio­
sphere in conventional terminology), the technological 
environment that man has created on this same surface, and 
the symbolic-cultural environment that derives from the 
properties of man as psychological individual. This object 
pole of the sociosphere, the domain of heteronomous determina-
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tion, has not been subject to the same systematic attention 
as has the subject pole.
The subject Pole of the sociosphere
in a sense the subject pole of the sociosphere may be thought 
of as the social field itself, because it is the existence 
and the properties of the field as a whole that makes possible 
degrees of system government over sociospheric occurrences.
We are more accustomed however to thinking of the various 
types of social aggregates within the field as the actual 
sources of government - the family and the kinship organiza­
tion, the informal group, community, organization, nation and 
so on, the varieties of social units that are frequently 
presented as the 'elements of the social structure' in 
beginning courses on sociology.
Distinctions are drawn among these units according 
to such criteria as their size, duration, cohesion, complexity, 
and the activity they carry out. we are not concerned here 
with elaborating such distinctions, but only with exemplifying 
the 'subjects' of the sociosphere. Social aggregates belong 
to the region of autonomous government in the sociosphere.
Their characteristic 'cultures', the internal structuring of 
their parts into a division of labour, structures of authority 
and control, their characteristic climates, and so on - create 
ways in which occurrences in the sociosphere can be regulated 
and controlled, and sometimes designed through systemic 
functioning.
From the point of view of carrying out planned 
interventions in the social field, some of the differences 
among the various forms of social organization that are 
maintained within it are far more important than others. one 
set of distinctions which is fruitful in this regard, and which 
is particularly consonant with the systems approach is based
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on the concepts of geneity and nodal.lty [Ac'koff and Emery: 1972; 
13.35ff]> The distinction between homogeneous and hetero­
geneous organization that derives from the concept of geneity 
has already been alluded to. Geneity refers to the relations 
between a system and its parts. The homogeneous organization 
is one which has greater control over its members than they 
have over it - the members function so as to serve the 
organization's objectives. The heterogeneous organization 
is one whose members have greater control over it than it 
has over them - the organization exists to further the 
objectives of its members.
We have argued that the individual psychological 
system man, is a purposeful system. He can exhibit different 
behaviours and produce different outcomes under constant 
environmental conditions, and he can exhibit identical 
behaviours and produce the same outcome under varying environ­
mental conditions. in a homogeneous organization a large 
number of men are required to limit, their possible behaviours 
to those which are calculated to co-produce the objectives of 
the organization. Their possible range of responses must 
therefore be constrained in some way. jn various circumstances 
this may be achieved by coercion, persuasion, the manipulation 
of incentives, the voluntary compliance of individuals in 
support of the organizational “ideology“, and so on. The 
essential point is that for a group of men to effectively 
pursue the objectives of the larger system of which they are 
part, the potential variance in their purposeful behaviours 
has to be reduced. organizational control refers to the 
characteristic ways in which human behaviour in organizations 
is limited and rendered sufficiently predictable for their 
separate functions to be consistently connected within a 
functional division of labour. with respect to the behaviours 
of their members therefore, homogeneous organizations are 
variety decreasing.
216
While homogeneous organizations use their members 
as instruments, heterogeneous organizations are used by their 
members as instruments» (A definition and discussion of the 
concept of 'instrument2 is given above, p„73 )„ For an 
organization to function so as to increase the possible 
courses of action and expand the range of outcomes available 
to its individual members (the function of instrumentality), 
it must be responsive to their will, and not impose its own 
objectives upon them,
in order to serve the ends of its individual members 
such organizations have to be aware at every stage of what 
these ends are. This type of awareness has typically been 
sought through such mechanisms as the market place, the ballot 
box, censuses and surveys, the actual participation of members 
in decision-making, and the like. when an organization 
functions as the instrument of individuals, enabling them to 
do things through belonging to the organization that they 
would not otherwise be able to do, the organization is variety 
increasing with respect to members behaviours. A community 
is usually thought of as an organization of this type.
The relationship of instrumentality entails a 
difference in system level between the actor and the instru­
ment. For an individual or a social group to use an object, 
a person, or a group as an instrument in the production of 
desired outcomes necessitates that the ’used' entity function 
at a lower level of system behaviour than the user. Because 
individuals and social systems have the property of purposive­
ness, for them to be used as instruments implies either that 
their response patterns are downgraded to the level of goal­
seeking behaviours (or possible even functional behaviours), 
or that their 'user' functions as an ideal-seeker. in the 
latter case the purposiveness of individuals and groups need 
not be inhibited. Thus in the case of homogeneous organizations 
variety reduction generally corresponds to the restriction of
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members' behaviours to the goal-seeking level, A social 
system is variety increasing when it allows its members to 
function at the level of purposeful or ideal-seeking behaviour. 
Examples of organized systems which tend to be predominantly 
homogeneous in character are corporations, prisons, army 
units, and ships. on the other hand political parties, 
universities, clubs, cities, and communities are predominantly 
heterogeneous.
Nodality refers to the way in which authority is 
distributed. A uninodal organization has a hierarchically 
structured authority pyramid capped by a system part which 
functions as an ultimate decision-maker, which also, as a 
consequence, carries the final responsibility for what the 
organization does. This part is able to resolve disputes 
among decision-makers at any lower .level. A multinodal 
organization has no such ultimate decision-maker, and there­
fore in making decisions about the system as a whole requires 
a certain level of agreement between two or more relatively 
autonomous decision-makers,
UNINODAL MULTINODAL
HOMOGENEOUS
corporation; army; 
prison; ship
Multi-national cor­
poration; coalition 
government;
HETEROGENEOUS
clubs, profession­
al associations pol­
itical party;
university; employers 
and trade union associ­
ations; city and com­
munity
An Empirical classification of Organizational Types
Homogeneous organizations: a number of critical problems
focus on the organizational requisite for obtaining and main­
taining the participation of members and a sufficient level 
of involvement by them for the organization to achieve its
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objectives. Either the members must be coerced in some way, 
or there must be a favourable balance of rewards to induce 
them to stay.. The use of coercive means for obtaining parti­
cipation is generally unstable in the long run, and with the 
progress of industrialism has given way to the manipulation 
of monetary and psychological rewards, as advocated for 
example by the scientific Management and the Human Relations 
Schools respectively»
Etzioni has classified organizations according to 
the dominant mode of ’compliance", where compliance refers 
to "a relationship consisting of the power employed by superiors 
to control subordinates and the orientation of the subordinates 
to this power" [Etzioni:1961:xv] „ The three kinds of power are 
coercive, remunerative and normative, and the three kinds of 
involvement are alienative, calculative and moral. cross­
classification gives nine cells, of which three correspond 
to the conforming types: coercive-alienative (coercive
organizations); remunerative-calculative (utilitarian organi­
zations) ; and normative-moral (Normative organizations)» He 
suggests that each of the non-conforming types will experience 
a strain towards one of those in which power and involvement 
are commensurate. in homogeneous organizations other than 
those based on coercion, members have to be compensated for 
the reduction of variety in their behaviour. Etzioni's 
typology is useful in drawing attention to a number of the 
issues involved for organizations in managing compliance.
planning for a homogeneous system involves identify­
ing a set of goals for the system which are compatible with 
the state of its environment, and with which the goals of the 
individual members can be reconciled.
Heterogeneous organizations: a number of critical problems
for heterogeneous organizations relate to the mechanisms by 
means of which the members can make their goals known, and
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to the adequacy of organizational resources for helping them 
to achieve these goals once they are known. Demands for the 
'democratization' of universities* workplaces* professional 
associations, schools and a host of other institutional 
domains have become more pervasive and more persistent during 
the last decade or so, and there is currently a great deal of 
experimentation going on in all kinds of institutional 
settings to find ways of supplementing or replacing the 
traditional mechanisms such as the ballot box and the laws 
of supply and demand. various strategies for consultation, 
participation, and 'power to the people are beginning to 
emerge.
A related difficulty that is also characteristic 
of heterogeneous or conizations concerns the tendency of those 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the organization to 
subvert its actual raison d'etre by formulating and defending 
goals for the organization itself which conflict with its 
ability to serve its members interests. in this regard the 
conception of the organization as a resource l(or instrument) 
is quite critical. so long as the organization remains a 
resource for the benefit of its members it can be variety 
increasing. As soon as it attempts to use its members as 
resources for its own ends it becomes variety reducing.
planning for a heterogeneous system involves firstly 
that the needs and goals of the individual members be known. 
These goals must be reconciled amongst themselves, and with 
the constraint of being part of a system in a particular 
environment.
Uninodal organizations: The problematic consequences of
uninodality for the organization relate on the one hand to 
the quality of the ultimate decision-maker, and on the other 
to the ability of the membership in some respects to keep 
this decision-maker under control. This latter problem is
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of course especially relevant to heterogeneous uninodal 
organizations. The key consequence for planning is that the 
institutional leader in general has to be in agreement with 
planning decisions that affect the state of the organization 
as a whole,
Multinodal organizations; in organizations that are charac­
terized by a multi-centred allocation of authority many of 
the key problems are to do with the reconciliation of the 
judgements and the aspirations of the various relatively 
autonomous decision-makers, in order for things to get done 
and for the organization as a whole to fulfil its mission 
some mechanisms for resolving disputes have to be developed,, 
There has to be some agreement both concerning the relevant 
'courts of appeal' (precedent,, constitution, seniority, etc.), 
and the appropriate means for working towards solutions 
(bargaining, compromise, arbitration, etc). planning for a 
heterogeneous system requires a minimal Level of shared 
understanding of, and commitment to the plan amongst the 
independent decision-makers,
The object Pole of the sociosphere
As has been indicated in commenting upon the neglect of the
environment in the behavioural sciences, as a region deserving
study in its own right, the object pole of the sociosphere -
the region of environmental determination, is less well
understood and we are conceptually less well equipped to 
3 6describe it. one path towards further structural separations 
in this domain is suggested in the identification and analysis 
by jantsch of what he has called the nature-man-society-
36
See Duncan [1964] for one exploration of the relations 
between social organization and the ecosystem.
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technology system [ jantsch•,» 1969] 0 The manner adopted here 
of conceptualizing these dimensions and of interpreting the 
relations among them differs, however, from that pursued by 
jantscho
We may think of purposeful social activities, which 
are for social scientists the most significant types of 
occurrences in the sociosphere, as being shaped and directed 
by the properties of- four main structural elements - the 
social field (social aggregates), the natural universe, 
technology, and psychological individuals, From these we 
have identified social aggregates with the subject pole of 
the sociosphere, which means that for courses of action 
originating within the social field the psychological proper­
ties of man, and the properties of nature and technology 
represent the principal sources of heteronomous government 
and environmental influence.
SOCIAL
AGGREGATES
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INDIVIDUALS
in this context 'nature' is intended to connote the 
natural material universe in contrast to the man-made, 
'artificial' environment. it embraces such phenomena as 
climate and topography, flora and fauna - geographic and 
biological phenomena in general» it may be thought of as 
incorporating the other major 'spheres' that men have identi­
fied in the universe - the atmosphere, the lithosphere, the 
hydrosphere, and in its conventional meaning, the biosphere, 
Man is thus inherently part of nature as the species homo
sapiens«,
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Technology is conceived as a dimension that has 
been progressively added to the sociosphere since the dawn 
of civilization, referring therefore to the man-made environ­
ment of artifacts, machinery, buildings and so on, its 
status is ambiguous, because while it appears fundamentally 
as a tool of man for controlling and reshaping the natural 
universe - in a sense an extension of man, it. has also achieved 
a certain independence, and presents itself in some respects 
as an autonomous realm of development. From the point of view 
of many actors in the social field at least, it has achieved 
a phenomenological independence from both man and nature, with 
which in a sense, it has come to compete.
While the psychological properties of man enter 
into the texture of the social field and the determination 
of its global properties, the individual nevertheless remains 
in an important way distinct from the field, as a part of it 
which is free to locomote and choose its own lines of action. 
Social aggregates have to confront and adapt to the unique 
characteristics of men as psychological individuals, in much 
the same way that they have to adapt to certain phenomena of 
nature and the technological environment. Man as individual 
is the primary locus of psychological activity which is based 
on the ability to symbolize, it is in particular the psycho­
logical properties of man, but also of course his biochemical 
properties, that exist as constraints or supports for social 
activities, and can therefore be thought of as belonging to 
the realm of heteronomous government of social behaviour.
The schema implies that the persistence of a social 
aggregate entails that it become connected in certain ways 
with each of these other elementary dimensions of the socio- 
sphere, Social activity occurs in a realm that may be 
differentiated conceptually into three major spheres - a 
natural 'physical-organic® environment, a technological or
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man-made environment., and a psychological or symbolic- 
cultural environment, characteristics of nature, technology 
and man may equally influence the nature of occurrences in 
the sociosphere, and thus constitute sources of heteronomous 
government from the point of view of the purposes pursued in 
social aggregates. At a mundane level, climate and topography 
limit and dispose the types of social activity that are engaged 
in as surely as the pattern of roads and buildings. The 
psychological constraints and demands that characterize the 
individual, his needs for support, achievement, and so on 
give rise to structural prerequisites for modes of social 
organization.
in the present context the connections between 
social aggregates and these three other spheres are of the 
most significance, but these connections themselves are bound 
to be affected by the three other types of relations that this 
schema draws attention to: man-nature, man-technology, and
nature technology. we have seen that while individual human 
beings belong to the subject pole of the sociosphere in terms 
of their inclusion in the social aggregates which are the 
locus of social activities, there is also a sense in which 
some of the properties of man as an individual can constitute 
boundary conditions for social activities. We may note in 
particular, that in his relations with the other dimensions 
of the sociosphere man has the capacity both to become 
estranged from them, or to idealize them. insofar as the 
feelings an individual has and the ideas he propogates reflect 
his estrangement or alienation from the world, or his ideal­
ization of certain components of it, he may come to affect 
the quality of the aggregate experiences in which he shares.
Mans alienation from society - the loss of social 
identity and of a sense of purpose - is a common theme 
amongst writers and philosophers, as well as social scientists, 
and has been captured in the concept of anomie, The
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idealization of society on the hand is expressed in social 
utopianism, and Jesuitical notions of the relative values 
of nature and nurture. Alienation from nature is held by 
some to be the typical state of the city-dweller (despite 
his attempts periodically to remedy this by ‘going bush'I), 
and consists in an estrangement from the land and the organic 
world in general. The idealization of nature on the other 
hand is perhaps most commonly associated with the ideas of 
Rousseau, agrarianism, and such images as the “noble savage'» 
Finally, alienation from technology has been a very pervasive 
theme from Marx to Marcuse, and is associated with such ideas 
as the separation of man from the means of production, the 
'disenchantment of the universe“, and the crushing of the 
human spirit» The idealization of technology appears just now 
to have a limited life expectation, but it seems to have been 
an essential ingredient in the 19th century adulation of 
“progress8, and is perpetuated by a breed of people whom it 
is currently conventional to denigrate as “technocrats'. The 
significance of the nature-technology relation is discussed 
below.
Returning to the interdependencies between social 
aggregates and the three major spheres of heteronomous 
determination, it is apparent that these relations may or 
may not be subject to conscious deliberation and purposeful 
structuring in the course of social activities. on the one 
hand, many of the purposeful activities which are necessary 
to maintain and elaborate the social field require that 
certain sociospheric relations be consciously organized and 
carefully controlled, while on the other many aspects of 
these relations remain unorganized and diffuse.
There are for example, systems of action in which 
the social field and the individual are deliberately brought 
into systematic relations. The ancient institution of the 
school is perhaps the exemplary case, insofar as education
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is concerned with the deliberative transmission of culture,
but family socialization and the various institutions for
37're-socialization' have the same character„ on the other 
hand it is perhaps more common for the individual and the 
social structure to come into contact and impinge upon one 
another without self-consciousness. The bulk of behaviour 
and its consequences belong to the area of non-specific, 
casual, or spontaneous occurrences being guided possibly by
38some deep-lying assumptions, but not consciously organized,
Again, with regard to the relations between social 
aggregates and nature there is a considerable variation in 
the degree of specificity and purposiveness with which the 
natural world is taken into account. in many circumstances, 
dimensions of the natural world such as time and space, 
diurnal and seasonal variations, topography, sexuality and 
territoriality, exist principally as the setting or context 
of social life and are not themselves subject to purposeful 
manipulation or exploitation, other social actions on the 
other hand involve organized and controlled relations with 
nature to a far greater degree. The archetype here seems 
to be agriculture, standing in contrast to hunting and gather­
ing forms of existence, and the related contrast between a 
nomadic life and the permanent occupation and development of 
a natural site in the form of a settlement. As we will argue 
later, the progression of technology has had the effect of 
successively reducing the salience of the nature-society nexus.
Finally, the interdependence of the social field
37
See McKorkle and Korn [1962] and Brim and wheeler [1966] 
on the concept of re-socialization.
38
The 'ethnographic' approach of Goffman and others has 
encroached into this neglected area of 'taken-for'granted 1 
behaviours. see especially Goffman's study of 'Behaviour 
in public places' [Goffman:1963].
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and technology present a rather different case, because 
technology is entirely an "artificial1 creation of man, and 
we tend to assume at least, that its very existence is a 
ref lection of deliberation and purposiveness. There is never­
theless a significant area of social life in which technology 
has the character of context, or an extension of the natural 
setting rather than an integrated part of an organized social- 
technological complex. Thus for example the city can be 
considered as man1s technological habitat - a human ant-hill 
in which nature has been very extensively subordinated by the 
artificial environment. Everyday pursuit of social activities 
entails contacts with technical constructions and experiences 
with technology in such activities as communication and trans­
portation, that correspond to the “non-specific“ confrontations 
of men and the social structure. These relatively haphazard 
meeting places of technology and society stand in considerable 
contrast to the various types of deliberately organized and 
controlled interactions of men with machinery and instruments 
that are typically known as production organizations.
Those relations between social systems and the 
other elementary dimensions of the sociosphere which are 
deliberately structured and controlled for the purposes of 
attaining particular social ends may be conceptualized in 
terms of three pure types of socio-environmental system: 
Socio-physical systems, socio-technical systems, and socio- 
psychological systems. These are “pure* types in the obvious 
sense that the real environments of social systems are 
invariably a mixture of them. The typology is therefore 
based on the existence in any system of social action of a 
set of relations - with nature, technology, or man - that 
are dominant in terms of the functions of the system, and 
not necessarily exclusive.
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Socio-technical and socio-psychological systems 
have been identified and discussed in the literature. They 
are to be thought of here in rather broader terms as corres­
ponding to the social system-technology, and social system- 
individual interfaces. The socio-technical system concept 
was developed initially from a series of investigations of 
coal-mining conducted by the Tavistok institute in London, 
to draw attention to the fundamental interdependence of the 
social and the technological systems in production systems 
[Trist and Bamforth:1951; Trist et al:1963]. in the process 
of systematically applying the concept of open system in the 
investigation of enterprises, Emery and Trist write as 
follows;
The technological component has been found to 
play a key mediating role and hence it follows 
that the open system concept must be referred 
to the socio-technical system, not simply to 
the social system of an enterprise, it might 
be justifiable to exclude the technological 
component from the system concept if it were 
true, as many writers imply, that it plays 
only a passive and intermittent role. However, 
it cannot be dismissed as simply a set of 
limits that exert an influence at the initial 
stage of building an enterprise and only at 
such subsequent times as these limits are over­
stepped, There is, on the contrary, an almost 
constant accommodation of stresses arising from 
changes in the external environment; the techno­
logical component not only sets limits upon what 
can be done, but also in the process of accom­
modation creates demands that must be reflected
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m  the internal organization and ends of an 
enterprise„ study of a productive system 
therefore requires detailed attention to both 
the technological and the social components»
[Emery and Trist:1960:86-7]
Subsequent application of essentially the same 
conceptual framework in the investigation of institutions 
whose main purpose is the processing of people rather than 
things, suggested that it is not primarily the nature of the 
technology, or the physical apparatus of such institutions 
that constitutes the critical boundary condition, but the 
unique and the common characteristics of the individuals 
that are to be acted upon. Thus in describing his research 
in a prison, Emery writes:
The key to the difference would seem to be in 
the obvious and indisputable fact that one is 
primarily concerned with things, the other with 
human beings» The prison achieves its insti­
tutional ends only by doing certain things with 
and to its inmates. it must therefore give 
primary consideration to the psychological 
properties of the inmates, because these make 
some measures effective and others non-effective.
These common psychological properties constitute 
the key boundary conditions of the prison - they 
are an essential part of the prison and yet they 
must, in large measure, be treated as a 'given', 
i.e. as existing and obeying laws and influen­
ces that are independent of the wishes of prison 
administrations.... Basically, the prison is 
one of the class of socio-psychological insti­
tutions. it differs from hospitals - medical 
and mental - and from religious, educational 
and political institutions in that it is based 
on the premise of doing something against the 
wishes of its inmates, and usually against their 
interests, [Emery:1970:2]
The third type of socio-environmental system, the 
socio-physical system, corresponds to organized interrela­
tions between social systems and the natural organic environ­
ment - institutional settings in which neither technology nor 
the psychological properties of individuals, but the objects
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and events in the natural universe constitute the chief 
boundary conditions,, The fact that this third class of 
system has not been identified in the literature, and that 
it is difficult to think of any good examples of such systems, 
seems to be due to the fact that the direct mutual interaction 
between social and natural systems has been progressively 
effaced by the rise of technology»
Much of the earlier part of this work has been 
concerned with the particular very powerful effects of tech­
nology upon the sociosphere, and it has been repeatedly 
suggested that technology is responsible for a number of 
important ecological imbalances. The thesis of the drift 
into post-industrialism promotes a different version of the 
diagrammatic representation of the sociosphere which may be 
of some help in identifying where these imbalances occur:
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The process on industrialization is characterized 
by technology becoming the 'leading part3 and tending to 
dominate the system of relations in the sociosphere as a 
whole» The “reification’ of technology and the ascription 
to it of an autonomous status may be a human mistake, but 
there is no doubt of the tremendous power of technology to 
refashion the shape of the world, and of our present relative 
ignorance of its impact upon sociospheric relations. A 
corollary to this is that socio-technica1 systems come to 
assume the dominant position in industrial societies.
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One of the most critical consequences of the 
relative ascendancy of technology as has been suggested, is 
the attenuation of the direct link between society and nature, 
the social field and the organic environment, that has a far 
more prominent place in pre-industrial societies. The mechan­
ization of agriculture for example has the effect that the 
set of relations between society and the organic world that 
are designed to satisfy the food requirements of a population 
are increasingly mediated through technology, such that we 
become more inclined to think of agriculture as simply another 
industry.
The other central consequence of this imbalance is 
that technology and nature, which have previously had a 
relatively indirect relation to one another, mediated through 
man and society, are now brought into a direct relation - one 
which we have come to know as the ecological crisis. The 
significance of this has come to be appreciated by a number 
of ecologists who are urging and attempting to create a new 
social consciousness of the fundamental importance of the way 
in which society relates to its natural environment, with the 
goal of re-establishing a direct link between society and 
technology.
Some implications for societal planning
This interpretation points to the usefulness of the concept 
of the sociosphere for thinking about planning. if planning 
is viewed as a form of human activity designed to enhance the 
adaptive capabilities and possibilities of individuals and 
the institutions they comprise, then the concept of the 
sociosphere embraces comprehensively the realm in which 
planning takes place.
First of all, to think of the sociosphere as the 
realm in which planning takes place, suggests that planning
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itself has to do with activities and processes, rather than 
objects and structures. As we shall see, many of the more 
recent and more useful concepts of planning now stress its 
significance as process rather than a product - as a process 
furthermore that aims to enlarge and improve the range of 
activities and outcomes available to purposeful individuals 
and groups.
It suggests also that the deliberate interventions 
of men in the universe ought to be guided by some image of 
the balance in which its main components stand to one another - 
an image of the overall system of interdependencies between 
man, nature, technology, and society. The inference to be 
made from this is that from the point of view of the fitness 
of the sociosphere as a whole, the development of any one of 
these four sub-systems must be directively correlated with 
the states of the other sub-systems. insofar as planning is 
directed towards altering existing relations or effectuating 
changes in the sociosphere, it needs to be highly sensitive 
to the possible consequences of intervention in any particular 
domain for the interdependencies among the main components 
and the state of the whole system. it does not seem possible 
in any actual instance of large-scale change that the existing 
social structure, the psychological state of an individual, 
the technological system, or the natural environment can be 
acted upon and ’improved" in isolation from changes in some 
of the other elements. Experimentation in the social sciences 
which has tried to isolate the effects of these different 
sorts of elements, both in natural and laboratory settings, 
has been more distinguished by its failures than by its success. 
To the extent that they jointly enter into the systems of 
activity to which planning is directed, planning must seek 
their joint optimization.
While it is possible for the choice of immediate 
courses of action to be guided by an image of some necessary
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balance in the sociosphere, practical constraints to do with 
the amounts of time, money and other resources available, 
and the sheer limitations of human cognitive abilities, dictate 
that actual courses of action tend to be limited to highly 
circumscribed facets of the totality, such as those identified 
at the beginning of this chapter. in terms of the structural 
differentiation between the subject and the object poles it 
is apparent and to be expected that greater attention has 
been directed to the subject pole, in the design, transforma­
tion and control of social systems, than to the object pole - 
the environmental sphere. while principles and understandings 
to do with the 'engineering' and management of the dimensions 
of social environments - such phenomena as the ecosystem, 
man's technological habitat, and group and organizational 
'climates' are becoming better understood, methods of directly 
influencing the structures and performances of social systems 
themselves attract more attention and have been far more 
extensively utilized.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CHALLENGES FOR URBAN PLANNING
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Having now considered planning activity in the 
abstract, as a mechanism within social fields for adapting 
actively in the face on complex and uncertain futures, and 
having spread this appreciation outwards in exploring the 
sociosphere as the realm in which planners of all kinds are 
now being required to integrate and co-ordinate their 
efforts, we now turn to the particular substantive field 
of urban, or city planning. The rationale for this is two­
fold. in the first place this can be expected to enrich 
understanding of the activity of planning as such, by 
adding to the abstract investigation of planning as an 
adaptive mechanism for integrating and regulating the forces 
within and impinging upon social fields, an examination of 
the practical difficulties and achievements of planners in 
a particular area. This may be thought of as part of a 
contextualist mode of exposition, in which understanding of 
a particular kind of behaviour or process is sought both by 
'shearing outwards' into its wider contexts, and by focussing 
inwards on particular expressions of it. This stands in 
contrast to definitional, classificatory, and typological 
approaches, without however, denying their potential value.
in the second place, as has already been indicated, 
the quality of city planning becomes an increasingly critical 
concern as a consequence of the world urbanization process, 
which means that for greater and greater proportions of people, 
the urban environment is determinative of the quality of the 
lives that they lead. This is not to forget or to ignore 
the fundamental importance of the workplace in this regard, 
and thus to devalue the importance of corporate and institu­
tional planning in general. Nevertheless the continuing 
abbreviation of the working week, and the tendencies now to 
seek greater connections between the workplace and the 
community (and to make workplaces more like communities), 
accentuate the importance of creating 'communities' in the
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full traditional meaning of that term, and enhance the 
significance of the urban realm as a determinant of the 
'quality of life 80
Further than this, it is in the giant urban, indus­
trialized regions of the sociosphere that its basic psycho­
logical, social, natural and technological forces are most 
imbalanced and vulnerable to quantum changes in their effects. 
As a machine for maintaining human life the city represents 
the most extensive and complete domination of the natural, 
organic universe, by structures that men have made themselves - 
an attenuation of the society-nature interdependence that is 
inadequately compensated by annual rushes to coast or 
mountains.
City planning and city planners - the Background
It is only in the last 100 years or so that communities on 
the city and metropolitan scale have become predominant in 
industrial society, and it is only within this time that the 
city as a whole has come to be taken as a unit for policy­
making, reform, and planning. Even within this period it 
has nevertheless been more common for problems of urban 
living to be treated separately - housing conditions, poverty, 
open space provision, traffic and transportation, and so on, 
have typically been isolated under the administrative rubric 
of a special organization or department, and treated as 
though solutions may be found to each of them independently 
of one another„ since the middle of the last century however, 
active intervention to improve urban conditions has been gui­
ded by a more and more comprehensive concept of the city.
_ _ _ _ _ _
This necessarily perfunctory exposition concentrates upon 
the main ideas and events that shaped city planning in 
Britain and America0
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It is within this period also that the combined 
effects of the industrial revolution and the greatly accele­
rated increase of population that it nurtured, began to 
seriously outstrip the capacity of the urban centres to 
sustain and enhance existing standards of living for the 
majority of the population. Giedion has commented:
From 1870 onward, the great cities developed 
continuously toward what they are today - 
unserviceable instruments. No one knows when 
this tremendous waste of time and health will 
be stopped, when this pointless assault on 
human nerves will end, when this failure to 
achieve a dignified standard of life will be 
remedied. [Giedion:1967:778]
It is within this time therefore that city planning (as 
distinct from city design which can be credited with a much 
more ancient lineage) was recognized as a distinctive field 
of activity, in response to the gradual emergence of the 
kind and scale of problems that have become characteristic 
of the modern metropolis.
The metropolis is a system much described and 
little understood. we know that it has emerged 
at its present scale only in the last 100 years, 
and this phenomenon appears as a phoenix-like 
birth from the ashes of the old city, which 
was a manageable and easily recognized politi­
cal and social unit with fixed boundaries.
[Dyckman:1964:220]
in fact as Benevolo has recognized, a distinctive professional 
interest and competence in urban planning did not appear 
until some decades after this new pace and scale of urban 
development began to transform the face of industrial society 
and 'metropolitanise' the city landscape:
The birth of modern town-planning did not co­
incide with the technical and economic move­
ments which created and transformed the 
industrial town; it emerged later, when these 
changes began to be felt to their full extent 
and when they began to conflict, making some
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kind of corrective intervention inevitable«
[Benevolo:xi:1967]
Many historical forces have shaped city planning 
from its earliest days - political, ideological, economic, 
social» cherry suggests that the emergence of a comprehen­
sive planning philosophy can be related in particular to 
two 'universal streams' - "The search for the ideal city in 
architectural terms, and the social idealism of utopia"
[Cherry:1969:12]„
The first stream can be traced back to antiquity, 
and the first 9 urban revolution' in the fertile crescent of 
the lands bordering the Nile, Euphrates, and Indus, where 
there is evidence of designed layouts« Five centuries B-C. 
the Greeks were building cities on a chequer-board layout, 
and a good deal of evidence of civic design from Roman times 
has been unearthed in England and other European countries 
that the Empire at one time encompassed« in the modern era 
the tradition is kept alive but such endeavours as william 
Penn's plan for Philadelphia, the work of Nash and wren in 
London, L Enfant's Washington, and Burley Griffin's plan 
for Canberra, the Australian national capital. This civic 
design tradition corresponds more readily with popular 
conceptions of the nature of city planning than the social 
reformist tradition, and is usually evaluated according to 
artistic and aesthetic criteria with which architects and 
landscape designers are most familiar«
The roots of the second stream - social utopianism - 
may if anything stretch even further back, certainly the 
works of Plato and Aristotle have been an inspiration and 
model for much subsequent speculation on the perfectibility 
of man and the possibilities of social harmony, a tradition 
maintained by men such as Francis Bacon in his cNew Atlantis' 
(1623), and games Harrington“s 'Oceana' (1656), and translated 
into practice in industrial societies in the design of model
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towns and villages» Of a number of community experiments in 
Britain in the 18th century, Robert Owen's New Lanark is 
perhaps the best known, while many other ideal factory- 
communities such as Titus salt's saltaire at Bradford, opened 
in 1853, George Cadbury's model community of Bournville 
(1895), and william Lever's profit-sharing industrial community 
of Port sunlight (1890) were established during the 19th 
century»
in some respects it is in these model communities 
of the later part, of the 19th century that the convergence 
of the two streams becomes most apparent. The big reformist 
movement in England during the 1830's and 1840' s was largely 
concerned with the deplorable conditions of urban living and 
the human inequalities in the towns and villages that had 
grown fat on industrialization. The immense overcrowding and 
lack of sanitation that so seriously jeopardized health in 
the large towns, and the general deficiencies in housing and 
public utilities made it apparent that the true happiness of 
man was not to be found simply or directly in the transforma­
tion of his social institutions and organizations, but depended 
also on the radical improvement of his physical environment.
Self-consciousness about the city as a qualitatively 
novel living environment, and a conception of it as a closely 
connected system of buildings, roads, activities, communica­
tions, begins with the reform movements in England and America 
in the middle of the 19th century, which had to address them­
selves to the hopeless interferences and confusions amongst 
these elements» while the aims of these movements are in 
general limited and remedial, they reveal embryonic conceptions 
of the city as a total environment and attempts to understand 
the inequities and pathologies within their populations in 
terms of the properties of this environment as a whole. Thus 
in Britain parliament initiated enquiries that lead to reports 
such as those of the select committee on the Health of Towns
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(1840) and the Royal commission on the state of Large Towns 
(1844-45) which became the basis for reform legislation such 
as the Public Health Act of 1844 [Ashworth;19 54] . Gans 
comments that the civic Reform movement got under way in 
America during the 1850s in response to a similar rapid and 
unregulated growth of urban areas which had resulted in the 
inadequate provision of utilities and services, the accumu­
lation of slums, and the diminution of municipal open space 
[Gans:1968] » The first large-scale interventions designed 
to influence the course of urban developments therefore, were 
largely motivated by humanitarian, and often socialistic 
ideals, and were the product of groups of dedicated reformers, 
in England, the housing conditions of the urban poor was a 
major problem. it was attacked by the sanitary reformers - 
men such as parr, Chadwick and Shaftesbury (who sponsored 
the first housing acts in 1851); by the establishment of 
philanthropic building societies; and through the construc­
tion of new model estates.
This reformist movement dominated attempts to improve 
the urban areas up to the end of the century. in England, 
further health, housing and employment acts continues to 
attack the inner urban blight, and investigation into condi­
tions of urban living developed on a new scale under the 
guidance of men such as Seebhom Rowntree, who was responsible 
for the Report of the Royal commission on the Housing of the 
Working classes (1884-5), and Charles Booth, whose monumental 
'Life and labour of the people of London' was produced in 
1889.
A new kind of more positive outlook gained prominence 
during the 1890s with the launching of the ‘garden city" 
movement in England and the tremendous interest created by the 
Columbian Exposition at Chicago which epitomized the "city 
Beautiful' movement in America. The Chicago Fair of 1893, 
celebrating the quadricentennial of Columbus" landing in the
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New world, comprised a 600-acre demonstration landscape 
known as 'white city' on the shores of Lake Michigan. More 
than 20 million Americans visited this 'temporary wonderland':
Here was an enthralling amalgam of classic 
Greece, imperial Rome, Renaissance Italy, and 
Bourbon Paris, as improbable in the Midwest 
as a gleaming iceberg would be in the Gulf of 
Mexico, yet somehow expressive of the boast­
fulness, the pretensions, the cultural depen­
dence, the explosive energy, and the ingenious 
optimism of industrial America... the millions 
gaped and admired and almost disbelieved that 
so much beauty had sprung up in Chicago, city 
of grain and lumber and meat, city of rail­
roads and smoke and grime. The entire enchan­
ting spectacle was a thrilling revelation of 
the power of architects, landscape architects, 
sculptors and painters to evoke rapture and 
delight. [Scott•1969:33]
The role of this 'plaster fantasy" as a symbol of what was 
possible, and as an inspiration to other city fathers and 
young professionals far surpassed its intrinsic significance. 
The park landscape of white city, largely the work of Frederick 
Olmsted, set standards for the beautification of the city 
through the development of fine parks integrated with an up­
graded civic architecture.
The publication of Ebenezer Howard’s 'Tomorrow - 
A peaceful path to real reform' in 1898, the subsequent 
foundation of the Garden city Association, and the establish­
ment of the first garden city at Letchworth in 1903 had a 
similar catalytic effect on ideas for town development and 
improvement in England. Few of his proposals were entirely 
novel, but he was able to pull together many existing strands 
of critical and innovative thought and present them as a 
cogent and comprehensive scheme for the construction of new 
towns. The garden city was to grow to a maximum population 
of around 30,000, organized into a series of concentric 
circles demarcating the civic centre, residential, industrial
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and recreation areas, with the outer fringe devoted to 
agriculture- Growth would be by the establishment of another 
garden city beyond this zone of country, until gradually a 
cluster of such cities would come into existence.
The idea of the garden city was advanced as a 
panacea for the many dwelling problems of the 
late 19th century. The essence of the plan 
was that the community should control the 
ground, and that all profits through increases 
in the value of the land should be returned 
to the community in order to discourage specu­
lation of any sort...it was no mean achievement 
at which Howard aimed. He aspired to nothing 
less than the abolition of the evils of the 
industrial revolution, the elimination of slums 
and overcrowded industrial districts.
[Giedion:1967:782]
His actual achievements of the ground were relatively modest, 
being plagued chiefly by financial difficulties, but his work 
crystallized new insights into the possibilities of bridging 
the gulf between town and country and taking control of town 
growth out of the hands of speculators.
The permanent legacy of the apostles of the city
beautiful and the garden city is not found in the bricks
and mortar of white City or Letchworth, but in the powerful
idea, backed by demonstration, that cities could be transformed
and built anew, along quite different principles to those that
40had guided the initial urbanizing frenzy. in the garden 
city in particular the utopian vision of the social reformer 
and the determinism of the civic design tradition meet in a 
new conception of the city that is sensible and practicable. 
Even though resources were scarce for such innovations, 
conceptual barriers to a more active orientation towards the
40
See Rodwin [1965] for a good historical appraisal of the 
garden city idea and its impact on the British New Towns 
policy.
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the problems confronting urban populations were removed by 
such visions, and it became more possible to think in terms 
of creating urban habitat more responsive to human nature, 
as well as coping with the existing conditions.
At the turn of the century, housing and the social 
malaises of crime, poverty and disease were still the critical 
problems that aspirant planners had to face in England, though 
the Royal Commission on London Traffic in 1905 marked the 
recognition of a powerful new debilitating force. progres­
sively, the opportunistic interventions of reformers were 
supported by the introduction of legislation giving positive 
powers and responsibilities to city and municipal authorities, 
and by the development of a professional interest and concern 
in planning as well as simply building cities, among architects 
and engineers0 England's first Town planning Act of 1909 was 
in some regards simply an extension of provisions previously 
enacted, but was of critical importance as a symbol of change 
in orientation of policy towards recognizing the need for a 
more comprehensive form of attack„
Most of the main arguments of the town-planning 
movement had been absorbed,, it was accepted 
that the scope of town planning must be wider 
than that of the old sanitary and housing legis­
lation, The new act stated that the general 
object of town planning schemes was to secure 
'proper sanitary conditions, amenity and con­
venience in connection with the laying out and 
use of the land [covered by the scheme], and of 
any neighbouring lands'. [Ashworth:1954:184]
in that same year the opening of the school of civic Design 
at Liverpool university under Patrick Abercrombie symbolized 
the growth of a specialized interest in the problems of city 
development, and it was only a few years later, in 1913, that, 
the British Town planning institute was founded, drawing its
membership principally from the Royal institute of British
«
Architects, The institution of civil Engineers, and the
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Surveyors institution» The American institute of planners 
was founded shortly afterwards in 1917»
According to Hancock the emergence of the planning 
profession in American belongs to the period 1907-1919, 
America’s 'progressive era c » The full building up of the 
urban areas exhausted the adaptability of the stark grid 
pattern, and the increasing density and conflicts of users 
drew more attention to the welfare dimensions of planning»
Aside from a few inspiring piecemeal reports 
prior to 1906, there were no surveys, general 
planning, or professional planners as such»»»»
Between 1907 and 1917 over 100 towns undertook 
'comprehensive planning' - half of the 50 
largest cities* 13 per cent of all with popu­
lations over 10,000. Ninety-seven municipal 
planning commissions and two dozen zoning 
codes were enabled in a few urban states» By 
1917 there were dozens of municipal informa­
tion clearing houses, a shelf of technical 
literature, and three planning-oriented 
magazines 'to record knowledge of intelligently 
and earnestly and systematically planned cities f 
and 'the history of municipal science in the 
making'. [Hancock:1967:294]
As in England, 1909 was a pivotal year, being in this case 
the date of the first National conference on city planning 
and the problems of congestion, convened at Washington, with 
representatives from ‘health, housing, law, social work, 
engineering real estate, gardening, government, philanthropy, 
conservation, architecture, landscape architecture'» The 
NCCP, as it became in the following year, developed into the 
chief forum for the discussion of urban reform and technical 
means for achieving it»
in the early decades of this century therefore, 
planning became institutionalized, and set about the formu­
lation of legislative instruments and planning techniques 
that would make the conscious and deliberate control of city 
expansion a normal policy concern of local and central
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governments. Then as today, the planners were part of a 
relatively small intellectual elite who saw more clearly 
than the masses of city dwellers the traps of congestion, 
spiralling land costs, neighbourhood decay and ghettoization, 
the loss of open space and other amenity, but as the servants 
of less far-sighted political masters, their advances had to 
be piecemeal and not revolutionary. Generally, to extend 
the existing city was easier than to conceive and implement 
new forms for urban areas and try to win acceptance for them, 
and the development of housing estates and "garden suburbs* 
on the urban fringes, often influenced by perry's neighbour­
hood unit.' concept, absorbed far more of the young profession's 
attention than new town ventures.
planning became identified with the spatial problems 
of land use, and identified as its chief instruments the 
Master or statutory plan, which combined zoning regulations 
with a variety of codes establishing standards for the con­
struction of housing, roads, utilities and so on, Gans 
records that the early decades of 20th century planning in 
America were characterized by the emergence of semi-indepen­
dent commissions staffed predominantly by architects and 
engineers, whose bias towards physical determinism was 
consolidated in a Master planning ’ideology's
The typical Master Plan, which has changed 
relatively little since the first, one was 
drafted in 1914, portrays a future ideal: a
city without slums, divided into zones for 
each major land use, with efficient highway 
and mass transit systems, vastly increased 
amounts of open and recreational space and 
other public cultural facilities, and served 
by a system of neighbourhood, district and 
downtown retail and civic centres.. The propo­
sals for new facilities and re-arranged land- 
use and transportation patterns are synthesized 
into a master plan map, with proposals for 
implementing this map through a zoning ordinance 
to order land use as prescribed by the plan, 
building codes to discourage slums, subdivision
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regulations to guide the development of vacant 
land, and governmental re-organization schemes 
to implement the proposed changes» [Gans:1968:
130]
Scott notes that the foundation membership of the 
American institute of planners numbered 52, and included 
"fourteen landscape architects, thirteen engineers, six 
attorneys, five architects, four realtors, two publishers, 
two 'houserss, and an assorted group of writers, tax speci­
alists, land economists, educators, and public officials" 
[Scott:op cit:163], in comparison to England however, the 
prospects for extending physical planning into the socio­
economic realm were already advantaged by the establishment 
of sociology as a respectable discipline, and the interest 
of men such as Park and Burgess in the specific problems of 
’urban social ecology'. There was also in America an earlier 
recognition of the need for extending the concern for metro­
politan planning beyond the city boundaries to embrace 
regional planning, a need formally recognized in the New- 
Deal programme of the 30s, and given its model expression in 
the Tennessee valley Authority. The inter-war period was 
also marked by growing recognition of the importance of 
national economic planning, and the need to integrate urban 
development with planning at this level. The Roosevelt 
administration championed national planning, and in its first 
year approved a National industrial Recovery Act from which 
the National planning Board was created in 1933„
A number of new ideas in community development 
were put forward and experimented upon: perry's concept of
the neighbourhood unit of between 3,000 and 10,000 people, 
centred on their own schools and shops; The Radburn housing 
and estate development in New jersey (1929); Tugwell's 
ambitious programme for Greenbelt towns - satellite communities 
on the parimeters of existing cities to house in garden city 
conditions the inhabitants of inner city slums, which were to
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be torn down and replaced, with parks; Frank Lloyd Wright's 
concept of Broadacre city - a self-sufficient, low density, 
rural community; the 'parkway5 system, precursor of present 
urban freeways, largely the inspiration of Olmsted«
The early years of town planning in England also 
boasted some far-sighted and creative individuals, in men 
such as Raymond unwin, Patrick Geddes, and Patrick Abercrombie, 
As in America however, the need for a radical redirection of 
urban development patterns was not sufficiently obvious or 
sufficiently pressing at that time for any comprehensive 
policy to replace the practice of coping with the expanding 
population and their increasing mobility through the accretion 
of suburban housing schemes, and from the 1930s, the construc­
tion of city tower blocks, many of which became slums on a 
vertical plane, replacing their horizontal predecessors.
The garden cith idea was 'corrupted' by translation to the 
"garden suburb', and raised objections due to the amount of 
agricultural land thereby consumed, and the commuting problems 
that it enormously amplified.
Nevertheless, just as the basis of intervention had 
previously been enlarged from health, and welfare concerns to 
the regulation of land use and building structures, the 
horizons of town planning continued to enlarges
..othere were signs that among a few people a 
changed concept of the scope and nature of 
town planning was gaining acceptance. Emphasis 
was passing from the design of residential 
estates to the more general problem of the 
allocation of land among various uses, plan­
ning was beginning to be seen less in terms 
merely of visual appearance, health and amenity, 
and more in terms of social and economic func­
tion.... in 1930 these changed views were 
those only of a minority and their subsequent 
spread through the town planning profession 
and their achievement of some influence on 
public opinion is of major significance in the 
development of a recognizable national town 
planning policy. [Ashworthsop cit:202]
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Many of the strengths of the British town planning 
tradition (and perhaps some of its weaknesses) derive from 
its national statutory basis,, and the strong links which 
this has forged with the local government organization0 
Since the first revision of this statutory basis in 1919, 
which obliged every borough and urban district with a popu­
lation of more than 20,000 to prepare a town-planning scheme, 
to the latest town planning act, of 1968, which includes a 
statutory guarantee for the citizen - that he must be given 
the pertinent information about intended schemes and the 
opportunity to comment, town planners and town planning have 
had a recognized role in local government administration, 
and urban development has been an agenda item of local 
politics, while practice has seldom matched provision, there 
is as a result a well established tradition of public involve 
ment at least of the negative sort - undesirable or unwanted 
schemes being blocked by public protest.
The current urban crisis: cities in Turbulence
The first 40 years or so of professional town planning in 
Britain and America was naturally a period of trial and error 
in which the young but rapidly expanding body of professional 
planners strove for legitimation in the eyes of public and 
politicians by originally cautious and usually poorly-funded 
attacks on the worst problems of the city, brought about by 
the rapid industrialization of society during the preceding 
century. Experience in such problem-solving accumulated, 
and together with the expansion of planning education in 
the universities, contributed to an ever-enlarging base in 
information and relevant skills. The two world wars and the 
intervening Depression were perhaps in the long run a boon 
to planners, helping to establish a climate of opinion more 
favourable to active large-scale interventions, while
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the widespread destruction during the second war in many 
industrial centres in Europe, provided a unique opportunity 
for extensive rebuilding» Although all this occurred many 
decades after the industrial age city had arrived, there 
were signs that its novel dimensions and their implications 
for an industrial way of life were being recognized and 
attracting the special attention and larger resources that 
they deserved»
From the vantage point of the present, it appears 
that the emergence of town planning as a separate specialized 
function of government was in itself no more than the orthodox 
reaction in society to Type m conditions of complexity.
Under such conditions, as in the oligopolic market, the 
identification and conceptualization of a new problem area 
or of new opportunities arising in the field is met by the 
creation of a new functioning body with a mission explicitly 
directed at exploiting or neutralizing the changed circum­
stances. There thus arises a rough one-to-one correspondence 
between organizational elements and publicly identified areas 
of jurisdiction, with some elements disappearing as they 
pass from the public policy agenda and fall to the bottom 
in budget priorities, and others being added as new causes 
are won or new contingencies arise» At the national level 
the titles of government portfolios and public service 
departments not only allocate responsibility, but condition 
and reflect the way in which societal problems are perceived» 
The establishment of separate organizations, sections and 
positions with responsibility for city planning has generally 
reflected the felt need for some co-ordination and guidance 
of the processes of the growth and regeneration of urban 
structures, that cannot be adequately met within the frame­
work of existing administrative responsibilities. in the 
government of cities, city planning therefore took its place 
alongside departments of housing, health, employment,
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education, social welfare, water, sewerage and electricity 
authorities, and so on, with prime responsibility for the 
physical structure of the city. Although it is obvious that 
the separation of domains of concern such as housing, educa­
tion, and employment inevitably imposes a somewhat artificial 
division upon often very complex individual and social 
circumstances, it is a system that can work at quite a 
complex level of needs and demands, providing that there is 
an adequate level of co-ordination among the many providers 
and regulators, so that their governmental roles are not 
only to a degree mutually exclusive of one another (avoiding 
duplication) and collectively exhaustive of the reasonable 
demands of the community they serve, but that they are 
sufficiently in touch and in agreement on objectives to be 
able to re-allocate resources and responsibilities among 
themselves when the need arises.
There now seems to be general agreement that in 
the years since the end of the last world war a whole new 
order of problems has arisen in the city, to the extent that 
the ’urban crisis' has become a world meta-problem, and the 
metropolis the theatre of war in which some of the most 
divisive and pervasive problems of societal regulation are 
currently having to be faced. The rapid growth of the 
metropolitan areas, their coalescence into connurbations
Iand 'megalopolis', caused by rural-urban migration and 
natural increases in population, is itself an element of the 
drift into post-industrialism; the pathologies of the metro­
polis, which have been so thoroughly described over the last 
two decades, are symptoms of turbulent society - the unregu- 
lable residue of disorder and distress beyond the powers 
or capacities of existing institutional arrangements.
As the city planners were winning for themselves a 
recognized and respected role in urban government, and 
working out the manifold ways in which their responsibilities
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for planning the physical environment related to the 
responsibilities of other bodies concerned with local 
government, health, public transport and so on, the environ­
ment to which their activities were adapted was itself in 
the embryonic stages of a revolutionary change which may now 
be summed up as 'metropolitanization'.
The preconditions for the present crisis are to be 
found largely in the phenomenal rates of growth of urban 
areas during this century. in the period 1900-1950 in the 
United states for example, when the total population increased 
from 76 million to 150 million, the number of cities with 
populations in excess of 100,000 increased from 82 to 147, 
and their total population from 24.1 million to 84.3 million, 
representing a percentage change in the metropolitan population 
from 31.9 per cent to 56 per cent of the nation's population, 
in 1960 approximately 63 per cent of the total population were 
living in 212 standard Metropolitan statistical Areas, whereas 
the proportion of the population living in urban areas 
corresponding to these SMSA's in 1940 was only about 40 per 
cent of the total. Behind these rates of population increase 
lies a qualitative change in the nature of the urban areas 
and the nature of urban living:
The metropolises of the 20th century, whose 
growth constituted the most dramatic demo­
graphic development to be found in statistics 
of united states population, were much more 
than greatly enlarged traditional cities, 
involved in the concept of the modern metro­
polis are complex changes in function and 
structure within the city and its suburban 
areas - decentralization of numerous 
activities, separation of areas of residence 
and work, and a high mobility over greatly 
extended spatial areas Also involved are 
many relationships with other cities and 
areas outside the immediate limits of the 
urban region. [Glaab and Brown:1967]
Whereas the term 'metropolis' has been used to refer to the
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extension of the influence of the large city over enormous 
metropolitan peripheries, the term 'megalopolis' has had to 
be invented to describe vast urban regions such as the 
eastern seaboard that contain several linked metropolitan 
centres.
The notion of the united states as consisting 
essentially of three or four loose, sprawling 
megalopolises separated by small stretches of 
largely empty countryside is by no means 
remote. we can almost say that the city is 
destroyed by its own success. The paradox 
here is that by the time 90 per cent of the 
population are urban, the city has really 
ceased to have any meaning in itself.
[Boulding:1963]
It still occasions surprise that Australia, with a 
fraction of the population of the united states occupying an 
area not a great deal smaller, is in fact more highly urban­
ized. Not only is the population as a whole highly urbanized, 
but it is concentrated in the six state capitals, which 
contained 57 per cent of the national population in 1966, 
and this concentration has increased progresively throughout 
this century:
percentage of metropolitan
state's population area population
state capitals 1911 1966 1966
Sydney 42 58 2 ,447,219
Melbourne 45 65 2 ,110,336
Brisbane 23 43 719,278
Adelaide 45 66 720,279
Perth 38 59 500,246
Hobart - 32 119,469
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Whereas only 30 per cent of the national population lived in 
the capital cities in 1901, it is expected that 70 per cent 
will do so by the end of the century. The current planning 
for the Sydney region envisages a growth in Sydney's popu­
lation from 2.7 million in 1968 to about 5.5 million by the 
year 2000, by which time the annual growth rate may be 
approaching 100,000 people a year. Rural New south wales, 
of which Sydney is the capital, represents something of a 
mirror image, with 85 of its 130 shires having negative growth 
rates in the period 1961-1968.
Although the scale of urbanization and its conse­
quences are of a different order of magnitude for Australia, 
compared to North America and most of the European countries, 
the planning problems of the large metropolitan regions are 
equally those of regulating turbulence. The failure so far 
to meet the requirements of such highly uncertain and volatile 
planning environments is acknowledged in the major resolution 
of the 'Canberra Forum' in 1970, a novel alliance of planners 
and architects who met in Canberra to consider the theme - 
'Towards cities of the 21st century':
We, the Canberra FORUM of Australia's Architects, 
Planners, Landscape Architects and Architectural 
Students, having met in serious discussion and 
considered expert analyses of the future of our 
urban areas, are forced to the following con­
clusions :
* Australia is facing an urban crisis.
* Our sordid, sprawling cities are the result
of past indifference and lack of co-ordination 
and forethought.
* our environment has not been planned - it 
has just happened.
* in part, the cause has been that the respon­
sibility for our cities is divided amongst 
dozens of authorities.
* in part, it has been that we have not con­
sidered carefully enough the long term 
consequences of economic, political and 
social policies.
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We voice our alarm to all levels of government 
and offer a National Alliance for immediate 
action in order that our urban society is not 
overwhelmed by this crisis.
The abilities and the resources to deal with 
these issues already exist. what is required 
is mobilization of these resources and the 
opportunity to get on with' the job.
[Canberra Forum 1970, proceedings:xi]
The American authors of 'Metropolis in crisis' 
caution against the exaggeration of the difficulties to be 
faced:
The widespread use of the concept crisis calls 
for a sober appraisal of the very term and the 
reasons why we use it so freely...it should be 
recognized that excessive use or misuse of a 
concept may result in a weakening of its 
impact. The word crisis calls for a response 
and if it becomes commonplace it may no longer 
convey a sense of urgency. our use of the 
word crisis in the title of this volume is not 
without some misgivings. But if crisis is an 
appropriate word to use at all, it seems to us 
appropriate to apply it to the city. [Hadden 
et al:1967:vi-vii]
The prevailing image, even in the early years of this century 
of the city as 'urbs' in an agricultural surround, determined 
in its form and function by physical considerations such as 
the need for defence, access to production and topographical 
characteristics, and maintained by fixed and established net­
works of transportation, communications and service facilities, 
has guided the management of urban systems even while such 
considerations became obsolete or irrelevant.
While the more obvious obstacles to the whole­
sale replanning of cities are those of financial 
and real estate interests, much of our present 
failure to conceive of new city forms lies with 
our traditional ideal form model. This has 
become curiously restricted to the 19th century 
version of the multi-purpose city as a static 
agglomeration of commercial enterprise/industrial 
production and distribution points related to
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materials transportation and warehousing.
Urban living was tucked into the interstices 
of a system for earning a living or control­
ling the production and flow of material goods 
and wealth. [McHale:1969:289]
in contrast to this conception, the city has become during 
the last two decades a chronically self-exciting system, 
initially primed by its dramatic increase in size and scale. 
Radical increases in urban population due to the focussing 
of economic activities in the city areas places an intolerable 
strain on both housing capacities and the capacity of original 
core areas. The multiplication of users chokes the central 
business district, where commercial and office enterprises 
continue to expand upwards to meet new demands. inner city 
dwellers, in the face of new levels of inconvenience and 
soaring land prices retreat to the suburbs, already expanding 
into the countryside to cope with migration to the city and 
the rehousing of slum dwellers and aggravate the greater 
costs of utility provision in outlying districts. The expan­
sion of suburbia defeats its own benefits when employment is 
left behind in the city and the 'journey to work' problem adds 
psychic costs and volumes of exhaust fumes to the balance 
sheet of city living. The industrial and manufacturing 
enterprises required to produce the consumer goods of the 
swelling population and the wages to guarantee their consump­
tion, further destroy the natural amenities of clean air and 
water, and freedom from noise. The construction of city 
freeways and requirements for on-site parking in city offices 
bring more vehicles into the centre faster than before, at 
an enormous cost in land acquisition and rehousing schemes, 
and at the same time reduces the appeal of public transport 
systems. The forced relocation of industry, and the voluntary 
relocation of retailers away from the centre, enhance its 
environmental possibilities and help solve suburban shopping 
problems, but at the same time remove the tax base from which
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comprehensive improvement schemes might be financed.
While a village may grow into a town through 
increases in the scale and capacity of its retail, residen­
tial, production, recreation, transport and utility systems 
and continue to function without undue interference between 
the requirements of these different elements, the passage 
to metropolitan scale has resulted in their mutual invasion 
and excitation with the increasing competition for space, 
freedom of movement, and other scarce resources. The tradi­
tional jurisdictional boundaries of government and administra­
tion are overtaken by the appearance of meta-problems, and 
the probabilities of the effective co-ordination of agencies 
successively reduced by their increasing numbers and 
specialization. Traffic is just one example of such a meta­
problem. As the Buchanan report has clearly demonstrated, 
the problem of city traffic can no longer be thought of as 
a problem that has to do simply with vehicles, roads and 
journeys if we are to have any chance of working out a 
tolerable solution, but has to be approached conceptually 
and operationally as a problem of the whole system [Buchanan: 
1963] .
Contemporary literature on the city as a human 
habitat is characterized by its pathos, reflected in many 
of the titles that have been chosen: "The death and life
of great American cities" [Jacobs:1962], "cities in trouble" 
[Glazer:1970], "cities in a race with time" [Lowe:1967], 
"Metropolis in crisis" [Hadden et al:1967], "The exploding 
metropolis" [Fortune:1957], "Sick cities" [Gordon:1963],
"Taming megalopolis" [Eldredge:1967]. Their chapter headings 
catalogue the meta-problems that the metropolis has to 
confront. crime and juvenile delinquency, racial conflict 
poverty and urban blight, traffic congestion, pollution, 
psychological distress and mental breakdown. in the heightened 
density of interaction and interdependence of metropolitan
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living each of these assumes the character of a systemic 
malfunctioning, its occurrence and perpetuation being inti­
mately bound up with the conditions that constitute urbanism 
as a way of life, such that their improvement or eradication 
is a problem of effectuating change in the whole system.
Although Duncan and his colleagues were not primarily 
concerned in their study of 'Metropolis and region' with 
exploring the dimensions of this urban crisis, they comment 
informatively on the underlying structural conditions with 
which they are connected:
The maladies on this familiar roster - traffic 
congestion, housing obsolescence, frictions 
among shifting population groups, financial 
quandaries, governmental fragmentation, and the 
like - are most likely not fundamental problems 
in themselves. Rather they symptomatically 
reflect an accumulation of lags in the mutual 
adjustment of units and functions of the metro­
politan community-lags which are perhaps 
inevitable in a period of sporadic and unco­
ordinated, though not unrelated, changes in 
community structure, [Duncan et al:1960:1]
These lags or failures of adjustment are reflected especially 
in the multiplication of governmental and other agencies and 
the lack of co-ordination among them. such organizational 
maladjustments are typically exacerbated by the continuous 
shortage of funds in view of what needs to be done, and by 
the characteristic difficulties of sharing out planning 
functions between state, city and local governments in a 
fashion that preserves strategic control while making the 
best use of initiatives and resources at the local level.
More fundamentally, the global characteristics of the field 
within which these meta-problems become manifest include 
conditions which are inimical to their solution. The concepts 
of private property developed during the agricultural and 
industrializing eras, and in particular the concept of private 
property in land, constitute a formidable field resistance
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to the guidance of change m  the form and functions of the 
city* This concept is supported by other notions of indivi­
dual rights that have failed to take account of the increasing 
vulnerability of the public good, and the need for responsi­
bilities as well as rights to achieve social recognition.
As internally the metropolis brings a new order of 
complication to public policy-making, so externally it is 
more and more deeply implicated in national and international 
systems of interdependence. The extension and filling in of 
the communications net at these levels put geographically 
distinct urban regions more closely in touch so that formerly 
isolated occurrences can become national topics of interest 
within hours. The race riots and the campus rebellions of 
the late 60s in America 'went off' like a string of fire­
crackers, with similar armouries and tactics being used from 
east to west. At the same time the desperate need for Federal 
financial assistance links the fates of the metropolitan areas 
even more tightly within the ambit of national economic 
strategy and success. Even though the costs of completely 
rebuilding the decaying city centres will be enormous, compari­
sons with the costs of the indo-China war are invidious, and 
outspoken leaders such as John Lindsay have made an issue of 
reconstruction at home versus destruction overseas.
The dimensions along which social fields are becoming 
transformed - the acceleration but uneveness of change, 
increasing overall size and complexity together with greater 
interdependence of the constituent parts, and such symptoms 
of this transformation as future shock, fragmentation of the 
social fabric, alienation, and increasing vulnerability to 
becoming ecologically trapped, are especially descriptive of 
those regions of the sociosphere in which the metropolitan 
way of life has become established. The rapidly altering city 
skyline - new buildings going up and the old coming down, and 
new road configurations requiring adjustment to mental maps
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of the city; the powerlessness and insignificance of the 
individual voice and the diminution of the individual's 
private world; the immense vulnerability of the life of the 
city to power, garbage, and transport strikes; the great 
stumbling blocks of personal motor transport and private 
ownership of land, threatening the adaptive capabilities of 
the public body by upholding its democratic traditions.
Both those formally engaged in the maintenance, 
management and planning of the urban habitat, and those for 
whom it is the milieu of their social existence experience 
an expanding range and variability of conditions that, have to 
be taken into account, an increasing differentiation and 
specialization of the component parts and functions, and an 
overall volume of change and variety that challenges institu­
tional and cultural capacities of absorption.
For example, the growth of cultural pluralism and 
the variegation of values across the social field, that are 
the reflection of cosmopolitanism, present both puzzles and 
threats to the culturally orthodox, and further complications 
to the managers and planners obliged to respond to community 
value preferences. while the segregation of ethnic groups in 
the cities of Australia, England and America enhances their 
prospects of cultural survival and self-control, this increases 
the heterogeneity of the whole system and may be at the expense 
of its control when the relations of the life of such sub­
systems to the goals of the total systems are not well appre­
ciated. The individualism and cultural permissiveness of 
districts such as San Francisco's Haight Ashbury, Chelsea's 
Kings Road and Soho's Carnaby street in London, and Sydney's 
Kings cross, evoke reactions as varied as the individuals they 
attract, but. as enclaves of individual and social experimenta­
tion they compound the 'surfeit of subcultures' (Toffler), 
adding to the bewildering variety of alternative life styles.
2 58
The crisis for city planners engendered by the 
urban population explosion and the 'metropolitanization' of 
the city is that of reconciling the gap between present 
planning capabilities and the kinds of responses that are 
demanded by an environment that is beginning to assume its 
own dynamic. The problem of regulation for the formal 
metropolitan planning organization is one that can no longer 
be met through its 'organization set' - the network of reci­
procal relations with other powerful organizations. Greater 
co-ordination here is a holding action, but no solution in 
the long run when the ground underneath all of these systems 
is itself shifting. Toynbee introduces an extremely apt 
metaphor for comprehending the transformation that is occurring, 
when he refers to 'cities on the move':
By 1969 some people in technologically 'advanced' 
countries have become aware that our cities are 
now on the move, and have become alive to the 
consequent menace to the well-being of mankind 
and perhaps even to its survival. we have 
awoken late in the day, and we cannot yet tell 
whether we shall have been too late to save 
ourselves from being overwhelmed by the onrush 
of our mobile cities. present-day cities are 
moving at the speed of an avalanche rather than 
of a lava flow, not to speak of a glacier.
[Toynbee:1970:3-4]
Maladaptive Responses
The earlier analysis of system adaptations to their environ­
ments identified two forms of maladaptive response to tur­
bulence, the active and the passive, the former corresponding 
to the persistence of strategies appropriate at the 
disturbed-reactive level of environment, and the latter to 
attempts to downgrade the inherent complexity of the situation 
by artificially segregating it into segments that can be 
coped with by already understood behaviours. The dynamics of 
the passive maladaptations were suggested by Angyal, and have
been elaborated by Emery:
It seems only natural that men will seek ways 
of reducing the turbulence to the point where 
their learnt responses to disturbed reactive 
environments are again adaptive. Any generally 
effective way of doing so implies segregation 
(dis-integration) of the social field so that 
men have to cope with only a part or an aspect 
of that field. All such responses are forms 
of passive adaptation. They are triggered off 
by the environment. They are also essentially 
defence mechanisms in that they seek to negate, 
downgrade, the environmental texturing with 
which they are confronted. [Emery and Trist:
1972:58]
purposeful systems have choices in the ways in which they 
can segregate turbulent environments and counter their over­
complexity and over-stimulation, yielding the three patterns 
of superficiality, segmentation and dissociation. They can 
sacrifice their psychic and the deeper cultural bonds, or 
Zeitgeist, as axioms for determining the basis of what is to 
be responded to; they may concentrate on the pursuit of their 
separate and selfish ends in disregard of the integrative 
needs of the wider systems of which they are part; and they 
may dissociate themselves from the collaboration with others 
on the co-production of social ends. These defensive strategies 
are more likely to be pursued by those parts of the field con­
stituting the ground upon which the figural matrix of powerful 
organizational elements imposes structure under disturbed- 
reactive conditions. They have already been spelt out in 
some detail [Emery and Trist:ibid:57ff] .
The three corresponding active maladaptations, which 
have not been previously identified - synoptic idealism, 
authoritarianism, and evangelicism, are mechanisms of ‘attack* 
rather than defence, and seem more likely to be adopted by 
those units which represented the loci of power and field 
determination under the simpler environmental conditions. 
Responses of this sort are based on a misperception of the new
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field forces coming into operation, and treat the over­
complexity of turbulence as though it were a purely quanti­
tative modification of the existing level, requiring greater 
organizational capacity to mobilize resources and the 
refinement of existing regulative procedures.
passive responses to the bewildering transformation 
of personal and organizational environments in the zones of 
concentrated urbanization are manifest in withdrawal and 
reduction of commitment - a greater indifference of incom­
prehension, both personal and institutional, to the fate of 
the wider systems and the quality of the whole environment. 
Attempts to define a new and more constructive role for the 
corporation in the post-industrial urban realm offer hopes 
of a more positive engagement between corporate and community 
requirements, but still lack significant practical expression.
At the personal level, apathy towards local govern­
ment organizations as potential vehicles for action, and 
limitation of involvement in the planning process to obstruc­
tive protests when self-interests are threatened, simplify 
personal worlds at the cost of energies available to the 
community as a whole. The physical withdrawal to suburbia, 
and thence behind family walls and fences, has similar effects 
in severing possible lines of action.
After reviewing some of the commoner criticisms 
of suburbia - the psychological consequences of scattered 
low density living, the increased cost of utilities/ the use 
of valuable farm land and so on, Gans comments:
A much more valid criticism of suburbanization 
is its effect on class and racial segregation,
41
For an exception, see Hill's [1971] study of the company 
development programme and new management philosophy of shell 
UK Ltd.
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for the fact that the suburbs have effectively 
zoned out the poor and the non-whites is resul­
ting in an ever-increasing class and racial 
polarization of city and suburb. [Gans:1970:
44- 5]
C- Wright Mills exercises a popular theme of his, the con­
trasts between 'private troubles' and 'public issues', in 
discussing the comparable strategy of the rich:
For many upper-class people, the personal 
solution to 'the problem of the city' is to 
have an apartment (with private garage under 
it) in the heart of the city, and 100 miles 
out, a house and garden by notable architects, 
on a 100 acres of private land. in these two 
controlled environments - with a small staff 
at each end and a private helicopter connec­
tion - most people could solve many of the 
personal problems caused them by the facts 
of the city. But all this, however splendid, 
does not solve the public issues that the 
structural fact of the city poses. [Mills:
1963:395]
By such means as these social and psychological distances 
can be maintained and personal worlds can remain relatively 
inviolate in the midst of revolutionary changes. The power 
of such defence mechanisms become manifest when 'undesirable 
elements' intrude into homogenized suburbs and educe communal 
rejection symptoms, and in the staggering dissociation of 
passers-by from violent personal assaults on city streets.
insofar as superficiality of responses becomes a 
dominant characteristic in social aggregates, and conformism, 
fashionability, conventionality and the like come to guide 
the selection of objectives and activities, eccentricity and 
non-conforming behaviour are likely to be viewed as subversive
Members are thrust aside or move aside, not 
because they constitute a viable social sub­
system with goals in conflict with the larger 
system, but because as individuals they are 
non-conforming. They refuse to be indifferent 
to the roots of their individual behaviour and
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are outcast as alcoholics, perverts, beat- 
nicks, or eggheads. This maladaptive mode 
can become such an unquestioned part of 
social life that integrated communities of 
schools and families can tear themselves 
apart on the length of boys hair, without 
even laughing while they do so. insofar as 
the non-conformists are an identified source 
of social variance, then their exclusion 
seems to reduce the total amount of relevant 
variance in the environment. [Emery and Trist:
1972:62]
Dissociation on the other hand is primarily a psychological 
coping mechanism that does not require or create social con­
sensus :
The pay-off, the apparent adaptiveness of this 
mode, is some sort of positive function of the 
extent to which the individual lives his daily 
life, travelling, eating, working, entertain­
ing in mass conditions. Little wonder that 
dissociation (anomie) has always been a charge 
laid by traditional societies at the gates of 
the cities. in turbulent environments it is 
not so much the mass character and anomie per 
se that encourages this mode of passive adapta­
tion but the increasingly unpredictable nature 
of what might follow from even seemingly trivial 
involvements with others. [ibid:65]
Similar strategies are available to planners and 
others with responsibilities for the guidance of change within 
the whole system, when this becomes dynamic and unstable to 
a degree that makes attempts at overall regulation appear 
futile. such segregation is likely to appear conceptually 
as well as in the performance of tasks, in the way in which 
the system to be planned is conceived, and the way in which 
planning roles are defined and defended. Thus even while the 
tides of urban-rural migration were flooding the cities and 
laying bare the countryside traditional master planning with 
its basic tool of the zoning ordinance stopped at the city 
limits, drawing a political boundary around its area of concern 
when the decisive phenomena were socio-economic. while it is
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now almost de rigeur for metropolitan plans to be conceived 
in regional terms, including the area within which the 
metropolis exerts a decisive influence, and within which its 
growth may be contained, the major change thereby effectuated 
is often greater control over peripheral subdivision and the 
inter-metropolitan communication net, and not the needed 
reconceptualization of the metropolis as an organic part of 
the wider state and national networks of resources and 
activities.
just as areas of concern can be physically circum­
scribed in a way that places some limits on the problems to 
be faced, so can the planners role be defined in a way that 
demarcates his responsibilities. The lengthy preoccupation 
of city planners with physical land-use planning has thus had 
the effect of insulating them from many of the problems and 
pathologies of city life that appear to be extraneous to the 
system of relationships operating between the built environ­
ment and the behaviours of people. Davidoff quotes from 
Farbman on the consequences of the 'physical bias':
The physically biased planner plans on the 
assumption (conviction) that the physical 
problems of a city can be solved within the 
framework of physical desiderata; in other 
words that physical problems can be adequately 
stated, solved and remedied according to 
physical criteria and expertise. The physical 
bias produces both an inability and an unwil­
lingness on the part of the planner to 'get 
behind' the physical recommendations of the 
plan, to isolate, examine, or discuss more 
basic criteria.... [Davidoff:1965:338]
When city planning is reduced to physical planning 
it tends to be seen as a set of design and engineering prob­
lems and not of socio-economic and political problems. in 
these terms the city may be viewed as a functional system, 
or instrument, for satisfying the needs, or at least some 
of the needs of its inhabitants. The task of planning centres
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on the ordered provision of all the ingredients that are 
deemed necessary for city life - such elements as housing, 
industry and commerce, education, transport systems, health, 
sporting and cultural facilities have to be provided and 
functionally related to one another. For these purposes 
people may be regarded simply as house-holders, members of 
the labour force, consumers of power, goods and services, 
car drivers, and so forth. if behavioural assumptions are 
added, they tend to be assumptions about tendencies of 
individuals to maximize or optimize certain behaviours. Thus 
for example the model of economic man may be adopted and 
employed in planning decisions concerned with the provision 
of public transport or retail facilities, and together with 
other simplifying assumptions, issues in planning techniques 
such as gravity modelling and central place theory. other 
assumptions may be made - for example that vehicle drivers 
will always take the most direct or the fastest route between 
two points, that people want to maximize their standards of 
living, that people prefer clean and modern buildings to ancient 
and decayed ones.
This may be something of a caricature, but not 
necessarily too exaggerated. physical planners must be 
concerned to optimize the physical environment of the city - 
to build a system for living in that is functional, economic 
and efficient. The important things to know about people 
are what they need and what they want in the way of facilities, 
and whether they like or do not like various aspects of the 
built environment, so that when the opportunity occurs for 
building it again, their needs may be better satisfied. For 
the physical planner the relevance of the social sciences, 
if any such thing is acceded to, is thought to lie in their 
ability to explain and predict the relations between particular 
physical structures and environmental settings, and the kind 
of social behaviours that they give rise to.
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A further consequence of viewing the city primarily 
as a physical system from the point of view of planning, is 
that it becomes easier for the planners to seek legitimation 
in terms of expertise and professional qualifications, and 
correspondingly more difficult for the layman to penetrate 
to the planner as a human being and to discuss planning issues 
with him from a position of equality. computerized 'retail 
market potential' and 'travel demand and traffic assignment' 
models for example, and most problems that are defined in 
'engineering' terms, tend to have optimal solutions. in 
locating these, the planners can acquire a good deal of useful 
information, and may be able over time, to improve their 
performance through learning. on the other hand the citizen 
is effectively excluded as a partner in the exercise, never 
having enough understanding of the principles involved to be 
able to differ with confidence. This would seem to be as 
much a problem for the planner as the citizen.
The negative regulatory mechanism of zoning ordinances 
and municipal standards have in the past accentuated the seg­
mental tendencies inherent in a style of planning that 
maintains a simplistic physical determinism. The absurdities 
of this style are irrefutably demonstrated in the contrasts 
between physically decayed slums which are the home of 
vigorous communal life, and physically superb planned neigh­
bourhoods in which individual isolation and loneliness reflect
42the lack of any communal life.
The planning profession can seek to defend itself 
from over-complexity by defining the planner's role as one 
of limited and specialized responsibility in urban management, 
by fracturing planning into isolated 'projects' of renewal,
42
jane Jacobs [1962] is particularly insightful on the myths 
of environmental determinism and the relative independence 
of social structure from physical conditions.
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residential development, road construction, redevelopment 
schemes and so on, or by 'dampening' or ignoring the unwanted 
'noise' of the socio-political repercussions of physical 
planning. such strategies are pursued at the cost of the 
increasing irrelevance of the planner and greatly enhanced 
prospects of a massive structural breakdown.
Of the three passive responses Emery has concluded
that:
(a) they are mutually facilitating defences, 
not mutually exclusive;
(b) they all tend to fragment the spatial and 
temporal connectedness of the larger 
social fields and focus further adaptive 
efforts on the localized here and now;
(c) they all tend to sap the energies that 
are available to and can be mobilized by 
the larger systems and otherwise to 
reduce their adaptiveness. [Emery and 
Trist: 197 2 : 66]
It may help to place the active maladaptive responses in 
perspective by attempting at the outset a similar summary 
statement of their impact. Because they too correspond to 
the set of system dimensions - the dimensions of depth, 
progress, and breadth - they also tend to be mutually facili­
tating and supportive, rather than exclusive. in the second 
place however, they are each intended to impose a greater 
coherence and integration on the field rather than to fragment 
it, and attempt to do this by focussing adaptive efforts in 
the field as a whole towards defined objectives lying in the 
future. Finally, they also tend to reduce the total adap­
tiveness of the larger system, but in this case through 
attempts to impose limits on the potential variability of 
the constituent sub-systems.
As with dissociation, evangelicism seems to differ 
from the other two types of response in that it is essentially 
an individual response rather than a symptom of socially
induced forces. it differs from dissociation in seeking to 
make the anonymity and uncertainties of mass living manageable 
not by the erection of barriers to involvement with, and 
concern for others, but by seeking to unite people under some 
common cause, or within a common ethical system. simplistically, 
the contrast is between the controlled 'management of self' 
learned by regular travellers on the subway or underground, 
and the curiously regarded inter-personal enthusiasms of the 
commune and the salvation Army singers.
in some respects the evangelical response may be 
more potent for the individual as a tactic of withdrawal, 
allowing him escape from the stresses of his situation in 
'folk' or communal settings. it becomes an active response 
in the context of field problems through proselytization and 
the promotion of solutions which rely on consensus of beliefs 
and values. while the belief that the world's problems would 
dissolve if everyone was willing to subordinate themselves to 
the same ethical system is clearly a persuasive one, any 
programme for bringing this state of affairs about must be 
hopelessly idealistic.
Authoritarianism is more commonly institutionalized 
as a response to turbulent conditions. in the unconventionally 
wide sense in which authoritarianism is thought of here, it 
refers to the tendency of existing powerholders and decision­
makers to try to maintain their control in more dynamic fields 
by curtailing the freedom of movement of other parts so as to 
limit the variability of their possible behaviours. The 
strategies of absorption, parasitism, co-optation, competition 
and so on which are found to be appropriate in fields charac­
terized by the dominance of a number of powerful organizations 
are 'stepped up' in an effort to cope with the new dimensions 
of instability.
Gouldner1s analysis of the problems faced by the
new manager of a gypsum plant, that had been rather loosely 
and benevolently governed by his predecessor, and the way 
in which he reacted to these problems is an instructive 
example of the conditions which may generate an authoritarian 
response and of the difficulties that its implementation 
encounters. The efficiency of the plant, a subsidiary of a 
larger organization, had been suffering from a system of 
management that Gouldner characterizes as an 'indulgency 
pattern' in which workers enjoyed considerable freedom of 
movement, took home raw materials, and showed a high rate of 
absenteeism. The young new manager from head office perceived 
this as a situation which demanded much closer control:
...there were other, less dramatic indications 
that Peele's actions were uprooting the indul­
gency pattern. one of these hinged on the 
increasing amount of paper work which he intro­
duced. whereas in the past this work was held 
to a bare minimum, peele's new directives 
called for weekly and daily reports from 
foremen and building supervisors. in this 
manner he secured a more careful check on 
production results and on accidents and break­
downs. The new reports required that greater 
care and effort be expended for the front 
office could now detect failures more quickly, 
in its return, this constant check on the 
foremen necessarily constrained foremen to 
check up on the workers.... Along with the 
new reports came increased restrictions that 
slowed down job shifting and curtailed conver­
sation groups and loitering. [Gouldner:1954:
66]
The successor reflected the main office's emphasis on rational 
administration, and was oriented to 'rational, efficiency­
enhancing values'. His efforts to achieve a higher degree 
of integration and control by imposing these values was not 
entirely successful:
Workers viewed close supervision as a kind of 
'strictness' and punishment. in consequence, 
the more a supervisor watched his subordinates, 
the more hostile they became to him. workers
shared standardized conceptions of what a 
'good' or legitimate foreman should be like, 
and almost universally these insisted that 
the good foreman was one who 'doesn't look 
over your shoulders'. From the worker's stand­
point a 'driving' foreman was 'bad', and they 
would retaliate by withholding work effort.... 
in other words close supervision enmeshed 
management in a viscious circle. [ibid:160]
in the cities in recent years it has been the 
political and moral confrontations of the sit-in and protest 
demonstrations that have evoked the authoritarian response 
in its clearest form. The declaration of a state of emergency 
in the state of Queensland, entailing an increase in police 
powers and the suspension of civil rights, to contain the 
skirmishes anticipated with the visit of the South African 
Rugby team, and the more dramatic over-reaction of the 
authorities during the democratic convention in Chicago in 
1963 fail in not making possible further steps towards more 
positive solutions even though short run goals may be achieved. 
The rising tide of public protest movements, for which the 
city is in some respects an incidental though obvious stage, 
may itself sometimes take the form of an authoritarian response 
to intolerable circumstances, but if further battles for the 
mind are to issue in battles for the streets, it seems 
important that some non-authoritarian coping mechanisms be 
devised that create opportunities for mass demonstrations 
within the city without prejudging them as conflict situations. 
Australian moratorium march organisers have understandably 
complained when city streets effortlessly closed to traffic 
for Anzac Day marches are closed to them to protest a later 
war.
Usually denied the exercise of any such direct 
power in the control of their environments, planners are 
nevertheless able to seek the simplification of the problems 
they have to confront by acting with respect to value frames
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that fail to reflect the real pluralism of community values, 
thus tending to constrict the choice of outcomes that are 
preferred by the 'deviant' groups. charges of middle-class 
bias have been laid against most of the professions at some 
time, including city planners. The concept of a slum which 
equates high density and physical detioration with the genesis 
of social pathologies has been repeatedly attacked on this 
score, and so too have some concepts of recreational open 
space which regard its provision in isolated islands as 
inherently healthy and beneficial. stretton has attacked 
the bias in suburban planning in Australia towards meeting 
the requirements of male bread-winners at the expense of the 
needs of the young, the aged, and the housewife [stretton: 
1970] .
It is in general far easier for planners to inter­
act with other middle-class business and professional groups, 
and to adopt some variant of the power elite model of the 
structure of community influence than it is for them to 
adopt a more pluralistic model and try to interact equally 
with the poorly organized and less articulate segments of 
the community. in a study if the way in which two different 
planning directors approached the same Boston south End urban 
Renewal project, Hyman has analyzed the way in planner's 
conceptions of the community distribution of power influence 
the planning process - the way in which influence is exerted 
and the kinds of groups that the planner works with.
Hunter's model of how power is organized and 
how social changes occur in a community appears 
to best describe how pt l's [the first planning 
team] director modelled his work; his team 
served as an agent of the community power elite....
in contrast pt 2's director studied city 
planning at a university where the pluralistic 
model of power as developed by Banfield, Dahl 
and polsby was emphasized. These authors contend 
that power is fragmented in a community, so to 
achieve a goal it becomes necessary to concert
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relevant power centres through influence and 
bargaining. [Hyman:1969:106]
While the first planner proceeded deductively to the produc­
tion of a technically and architecturally fine solution, the 
second worked with neighbourhood groups "to produce several 
discrete plans for various sub-areas, then co-ordinated them 
into a coherent whole through community wide citizen planning 
bodies" [ibid:106] „ in drawing the conclusions from his 
study, Hyman comments:
The issue revolves around planning style, what 
Donald Foley has termed a 'unitary' versus an 
'adaptive' approach...the planners own profes­
sional orientation will strongly influence 
which segments of the population he will 
identify with; community-wide elite or neigh­
bourhood groups. working with community-wide 
leaders will require a greater emphasis on 
conceptualizing holistic plans in which 
relationships of various parts are identified 
and analyzed, as in pt l's plan. planners who 
emphasise working with neighbourhood bodies 
should be prepared to work out specific sub­
stantive programs which may or may not be 
related to each other but which meet the 
resident's immediate needs. [ibid:112]
'inductive' planning which pieces together part solutions 
from the grass roots level is most likely to result in solu­
tions to the whole problem which are sub-optimal in terms of 
professional standards, and to be more costly in terms of 
time and the effort needed to engage with previously unorgan­
ized groupings. planning responses which avoid these diffi­
culties in searching for optimal solutions agreeable to the 
community elite are authoritarian in so far as they de-value 
or ignore the needs of under-privileged and less articulate 
groups. The need to rectify such approaches from the 
'consumer' end has been urged by Davodoff's concept of 
'advocacy planning' [Davodoff:1965] and the energetic and 
creative work of Saul Alinsky in organizing the ghetto and
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the poor in self-help programmes.
The final form of maladaptive response, synoptic 
idealism, corresponds to efforts to maintain a level of 
control across the field by the more neutral means of com­
prehensiveness in analysis and rationality in policy and 
decision-making. of the considerable amount of critical 
comment on the possibilities of such comprehensiveness in 
the management of large and complex systems, the attack by 
Braybrooke and Lindblom [1963] is one of the most penetrating.
The classical decision-making model, which they call 
the 'rational-deductive ideal', represents 'an ideal of science 
transferred to the world of values'. it begins with the 
unambiguous expression and ranking of 'ultimate values', from 
which intermediate principles to cover actual situations are 
derived. Thence, actual policies may be selected deductively 
according to the sum of values that they would promote. Thus 
ethics has been concerned with constructing a total deductive 
system for the derivation of moral principles to cover all 
human choice situations. The welfare function is a variant 
of this which substitutes rules for manipulating numerical 
variables for the more general techniques of deduction that 
are envisaged in the rational-deductive ideal, such that all 
the costs and all the benefits of all possible alternatives 
can be assessed, and that one which maximizes 'welfare' 
selected.
There are a number of criticisms of these received 
ideals, beginning with the fact that they are actually 
impossible to implement. when one of the chief virtues of 
the rational deductive ideal is claimed to be its
43
Alinsky's 'Reveille for radicals' [1946] is a timeless 
statement of the values and purposes of communal organiza­
tion - 'peoples organizations' - for promoting community 
welfare and development.
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comprehensiveness, the benefits of only partial attainment 
are dubious. The multiplicity of values affected in complex 
policy choices is such that they can never all be taken into 
account., and it is in fact often those values which are 'used 
up' in achieving others which are ignored. Further, the 
instability and fluidity of values over time, and the 
difficulties encountered in totally novel situations for 
which no relevant value priorities are available, together 
with the pervasive conflicts among values and combinations 
of them, challenge the worth of attempting to sum values at 
a particular point of time. in fact value costs are typically 
incommensurable, as when decisions have to be made as to what 
level of unemployment is tolerable for the maintenance of a 
certain standard of living.
The rational deductive and welfare function ideals 
imply a model of 'synoptic decision-making' in which fact 
and value are radically separated, and policy-making is 
comprehensive in all aspects. in such a model the goals are 
first established, and then a review of all the possible 
alternatives and their effects is undertaken. From such a 
review the 'best' solution can be identified in the light 
of the previously established goals. This synoptic ideal 
fails in practice because it is not adapted to the real 
complexities of the decision-making environment and problem­
solving situations that are encountered in social policy­
making. Braybrooke and Linblom identify a number of specific 
'failures of adaptation' of the synoptic ideal:
(i) it is not adapted to mans limited problem-solving 
capabilities - it offers no strategy for achieving 'cognitive 
economy', but insists on omnipotence.
(ii) it is not adapted to the inadequacy of available 
information.
(iii) it is not adapted to the costliness of analysis -
274
"the value of the solved problem imposes some limits on the 
energies worth expending to achieve the solution; and a 
problem-solving method patterned...after analytical methods 
in pure research, where the research activity is valued for 
its own sake, is irrational by any ordinary standards of 
rationality" [ibid:50-51].
(iv) it is not adapted to failures in constructing a 
satisfactory evaluative method - i.e. it offers no guide to 
action when a deductive scheme of values cannot be worked 
out.
(v) it is not adapted to the closeness of observed 
relationships between fact and value in policy-making. The 
consideration of values cannot be realistically 'cut off' at 
some point, and attention devoted to means. in particular, 
consideration of available means frequently generates new 
value questions.
(vi) it is not adapted to the openness of the system
of variables with which it contends - "for synoptic problem­
solving it is difficult or impossible to define rationality 
except in relation to a closed system of variables...the 
would-be synoptic problem-solver aspires to comprehend all 
interacting variables" [ibid:53] The ideal however
gives no account of how 'closure' might be achieved, nor as 
to how the conclusions reached at any time should be handled 
pending closure.
(vii) it is not adapted to the analysts need for 
strategic sequences of analytical moves - the ideal describes 
what analysts should have done by the time a problem is 
solved, but contains no road maps for getting there.
(viii) it is not adapted to the diverse forms in which 
policy problems actually arise. in complex social situations, 
problems are not simply 'something which blocks an organism's 
attempts to reach a goal', but are typically synthetic and
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fluid - complex adjustment-of-interests which require 
continuous attention. "The synoptic ideal is too rigid in 
its prescription that a 'solution be found for a problem, 
where all that is actually required and all that can at best 
be defended as a right 'solution' is that a series of 
reconciliatory moves be made" [ibid:55],
Bolan, drawing attention to weaknesses of this sort, 
and the immense variability in the decision-making environ­
ments in which planning is carried out, comments as follows:
Most planners, in accounting for these differences, 
have not thought through alternative planning 
strategies or ‘styles'. instead they have tried 
to develop alternative ways of selling compre­
hensive or 'master' planning» planning method 
has not adjusted and adapted to circumstances; 
instead the ways of imposing the classical ideal 
have been altered. Accompanying this is the 
usual wishful thinking that some day, given 
enough time and education, circumstances will 
change and the classical ideal will come into 
its own - even though more careful examination 
could reveal that the classical ideal might never 
be appropriate to present of future circumstances.
[ Bolan : 1967 : 235]
Planners deferent to the synoptic ideal are likely to see 
themselves as the guardians of the public good, which they 
attempt to realize not so much by the coercion of other parts 
and their relations, but by an omniscient appreciation of the 
state of the whole system under consideration that will allow 
them to calculate optimal solutions. This typically entails a 
heavy emphasis on capacities for gathering, storing centralized 
data information - the development of powerful centralized data 
systems, macroscopic cost-benefit analyses, intensive forward 
programming, and so forth. Another emergent manifestation 
of the ideal is the design of all-embracing schemes for living 
in the year 2000 (or some other equally arbitrary date) which 
lack the self-honesty of utopian visions by appearing in the 
spurious garb of scientific statement.
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We may say of the active maladaptations in general 
that they are capable of bolstering existing organizational 
patterns and processes and fending off the emerging turbulence 
in the short run. There is usually some slack to be taken up 
in the degree of effective co-ordination among major organiza­
tional elements, so that for a while tightening the links that 
tie them together may enhance survival prospects. similarly, 
big impressions can be made and ultimate confrontations post­
poned by large-scale and conspicuous efforts, such as the 
Anti-poverty campaign, addressed to the more tangible and 
visible societal problems. when organized planning persists
with such strategies however, it is likely to be appreciated
44too late when the surrounding world has become transformed.
As we have seen, the direction of transformation is towards 
a world requiring greater sensitivity to far more complicated 
environments, much speedier reaction times, and the ability 
to collaborate successively with changing configurations of 
other elements of the field. institutions which have concen­
trated on self-aggrandisement, monopolistic practices, 
centralized, bureaucratic and mechanistic forms of management, 
and the preservation or improvement upon the status quo by 
the accumulation of power, are likely to find themselves 
outflanked by the heteronomous processes of the turbulent 
environment.
44
See the examples of the British canning company and the 
National Farmers union discussed in Emery and Trist [1965] .
CHAPTER EIGHT
A NEW PARADIGM FOR PLANNING
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The problems of the metropolis are enormous and 
pressing, and with the phenomenal rates of urban growth 
reliably expected, become more critical with each year that 
passes. Already vast amounts of money are being expended 
on urban renewal, housing programmes, urban freeways, trans­
portation studies, anti-poverty programmes, new towns and 
cities, and so forth., Many planners and others who have 
identified the symptoms of turbulence are already engaged in 
search and debate directed towards finding strategies for 
coming to terms with rapid and uneven change, and its 
unpredictable consequences. The intention here is not to 
review the lines of search that are currently being pursued, 
although a number of them are referred to, or to advance a 
set of solutions for planning in a turbulent environment.
It is to propose, tentatively, a new paradigm for planning 
that better comprehends the emergent over-complexity of the 
planner's world, and in so doing suggest some new perspectives 
on the nature of the problems to.be overcome.
Susanne Langer begins her exploration of philosophy’s 
’new key* with the observation that "the ’technique, or 
treatment, of a problem begins with its first expression as 
a question. The way a question is asked limits and disposes 
the way in which an answer to it - right or wrong - may be 
given" [Langer:1963:3] . in so far as the concepts that have 
been developed to talk about cities and city planning are the 
product of the industrial age, they are likely to be in need 
of revision when the phenomena that they describe are 
becoming part of a post-industrial world. it becomes 
necessary therefore, to spell out some newly emerging concepts 
of the city, of planning, and of the role of the city planner. 
The retention in thought of concepts rendered obsolete by 
the changes that have taken place in society constitutes a 
substantial barrier to the right questions being asked, and 
retards progress towards appropriate responses.
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This has been much the case, as we have seen, with 
city planning. For decision-makers employing the conceptual 
apparatus of industrial society, the appearance of greater 
and greater amounts of novelty and unpredictability in the 
social environment is likely to be perceived as a problem 
which demands the augmentation of existing capacities and 
the mobilization of further resources. planners ask how they 
can become better, more expert at their tasks - with what 
tools can they enhance their existing capabilities« How can 
they really 'get at' the values and goals of the people that 
they plan for? And once these objectives are known, how can 
the best means for attaining them be found?
When it is believed that the relevant uncertainties 
are such as may be overcome by increased organizational 
efforts, solutions will be sought through acquiring more 
powerful systems for information gathering, data storage and 
analysis, model-building and simulation. For others, the 
significant uncertainties may be thought not to stem from 
shortages of information or inadequate calculative capacity, 
but to emanate from the inappropriate distribution of land 
uses - the haphazard interrelations of industry, commerce, 
residence and recreation, and the physical deterioration of 
parts of this urban plant. such people would seek to regain 
control at the wheel of the bulldozer and the replacement of 
the entire urban plant over the next 30 years. others again 
see the extension of uncertainties as a reflection of the 
multiplication and fragmentation of authorities, and the 
answer to the problem thus conceived is a drive for greater 
agency co-ordination.
All the indications are that coping with turbulence 
will require a substantial conceptual leap, and that this 
constitutes a far more decisive condition than the amplifica­
tion of special mechanisms of control. it is not simply new 
concepts that are needed however, for there is plenty of
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evidence that individually, promising new concepts can be 
assimilated into existing thought-ways and emasculated of 
their power to reorder perceptions. Empiricist writings have 
managed to make the Marxian concept of class such a dogsbody 
concept. if new concepts are to survive and to effectively 
promote new frames of reference, they must draw their strength 
from a network of concepts, and from conceptual rather than 
simply empirical definition. what we are concerned with then 
is a new paradigm (Kuhn) - the contextualist frame of 
reference - which offers not simply an alternative language, 
but also a fresh vision, a new appreciative system.
Many of the elements of this new paradigm have 
already been referred to, but they must now be pulled to­
gether. The direction of the shift is from closed to open 
systems, and from open systems to the fields in which aggre­
gates of open systems interact; from a strictly physical to 
a geo-behavioural concept of space, which is more fluid and 
subjectively determined. it is, in pepper's terms, the 
transition from a vertical to a horizontal cosmology, and a 
surrendering of the belief that if only one had enough power 
and patience, one might always be able to push analysis 
finally to the bottom of things, in favour of a more pragmatic 
world view under which solutions may be approached, but never 
conclusively attained, by seeking to understand problems and 
difficulties and to correct them in terms of the more inclusive 
contexts. The accompanying movement in the aim and techniques 
of enquiry is from the making of explanations which derive 
from the analytical decomposition of linear causal trains to 
the furtherance of understanding deriving from the exploration 
of field determinations.
The new paradigm breaks away from the presumption 
of an inherently orderly universe, in which individuals pursue 
goals within an essentially stable framework of objects and 
structures, and substitutes instead a universe in which change
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and novelty are categorical features, and behaviour is a 
continuous interactive process of which the directions and 
outcomes are shaped equally by the properties of the indivi­
dual and of his environment. such degrees of structure and 
stability as exist are properties of the field itself, and 
not of its parts or elements.
The implications of this contextualist frame of 
reference for the way in which planning is understood and 
carried out, and the contrasts with existing modes, are con­
sidered in the following sections, but may usefully be 
summarized at this point. The underlying grid, and the key 
reference points for urban planners have been geographical 
and territorial - producing cognitive maps in which physical 
spaces and movements represent the essential parameters.
Within this frame, planning has become a process of 'tooling 
up' for the construction of large living machines - 'urban 
capsules' with efficient and economic environmental controls, 
in which urban man can do his educating, working, playing, 
and resting. 'Tooling up', because it has characteristically 
stopped short of designing and facilitating the process of 
living itself. The social structure and social pathologies 
of urbanism have invariably been a lagged function of the 
built environment.
The planner has operated outwards in space and 
forward in time from the existing conditions of the physical, 
territorial city, modifying his practices as attention shifts 
from the dense core of the business district to the scattered 
peripheral suburbs and back again to redevelop the core, and 
as the shape of the future that his planning has to be 
correlated with becomes more and more uncertain. The formal 
planning commission has become the major instrument, deploying 
its expert technicians and policy advisers to control growth 
and development on behalf of the whole. Rising uncertainty 
and unpredictability have evoked from it an emphasis on
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rational, legal, and bureaucratic means of control - on the 
importance of planning ordinances and formally enunciated 
contracts and constitutions in restricting the activities of 
powerful organizations, legally defining their fixed recip­
rocal obligations *
The new paradigm proposes a new set of non-territorial 
units for the fundamental mapping of the planning realm, which 
are built of behavioural complexes incorporating concepts of 
social and psychological, in addition to physical space. This 
makes it possible to overstep the rather clumsy proposal to 
ameliorate the consequences of physical planning by supplemen­
ting it with 'social planning'. This distinction is lost when 
attention shifts to the social field, behaviour settings, and 
the life space, and the units of analysis become occurrences 
in the sociosphere.
The synthetic and dispersive bias of the contextualist 
world hypothesis makes it possible to think in terms of a 
reversal of the planning process - to plan inwards from the 
field, and backwards from a vision of the future. To begin 
planning in other words, not from the extant city, but from 
the region of which it is a part, not from the immediately 
given goals and noxiants, but from a conception of a position 
in the future from which actions may.be decided upon by 'back­
ward determination'. in such a context planners may have to 
be identified in terms of what they are and what they do, 
rather than by their membership of a particular organization 
or possession of certain qualifications. Their personal 
qualities come to rank with the power and status of the 
planning commission when the environment for action calls for 
the creation of visions, and the regulation of complexity 
through the formation and negotiation of shared values.
From 'city' to 'urban Field'
in the framework of the politics and planning of the industrial
282
era the city has been regarded as a geographic, economic and 
political entity, standing out as an island of concentration 
of population and economic activities in the pristine rural- 
agricultural realm. The geographic frame of reference is 
concerned with topographical situation and the different ways 
in which land may be used, leading to a concept of the city 
as a spatial distribution of land uses and prompting investi­
gations of the relations between such areal patterns and other 
geographic features such as drainage systems, geomorphology, 
soils and so on. This merges with the economic image of the 
city, as a centre of production and distribution of goods 
and services, with a regional sphere of influence determined 
by such factors as the availability of raw materials and 
labour and the quality of the communication linkages with 
other centres. Politically, the city has emerged as a separate 
area of government and administrative responsibility, demar­
cated from its surrounding hinterland by precise, legally 
constituted boundaries which delimit and therefore constrain 
in an important way the carrying out of governmental and 
administrative functions, including planning.
The rather rigid 'town and country', 'rural-urban' 
dichotomies in terms of which problems have been identified 
and policies worked out have been placed under an accumulating 
strain to the point that their retention can now seriously 
inhibit progress towards improving the quality of life of 
both urban and non-urban dwellers:
We are passing through a revolution that is un­
hitching the social processes of urbanization 
from the locationally fixed city and region.
Reflecting the current explosion in science and 
technology, employment is shifting from the 
production of goods to services; increasing 
ease of transportation and communication is dis­
solving the spatial barriers to social inter­
course; and Americans are forming social 
communities comprised of spatially dispersed 
members. A new kind of large-scale urban society
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is emerging that is increasingly independent 
of the city. in turn, the problems of the 
city place generated by early industrialization 
are being supplanted by a new array different 
in kind. [Webber:1970:2]
The traditional idea of the city fails to apprehend the new 
dimensions of urban aggregations, the reality of which are 
now generally recognized. Vickers comments in typically 
succinct style:
...the conception of the city itself, as an 
entity bounded and supported by the basic 
rural world, seems to be dissolving, giving 
place to the concept of urban space, extending 
indefinitely, within which social and political 
divisions may have no more natural validity 
than the frontiers which colonial powers left 
behind in Africa. [Vickers:1970:40]
Recognizing the poor 'fit' of an existing concept 
is an important first step, preparing the way for the more 
difficult task of formulating a new concept that better arti­
culates the phenomena to be understood. in this case we have 
already developed the skeleton of a new frame of reference in 
adopting the concepts of social field and the sociosphere, 
and tracing strands of meaning from planning to them, rather 
than to the concepts of society and social structure. This 
framework may be extended by thinking of cities as regions 
in which the sociosphere is relatively contracted or concen­
trated, standing in contrast to those regions in which it is 
thinly spread and diffused. The basic considerations then 
become the degree of concentration of purposeful social activi­
ties and the extensiveness of their influences. The concept 
of urban field proposed by Friedmann and Miller expresses very 
well this conception of the urban phenomenon:
The inherited form of the city no longer corres­
ponds to reality. The spatial structure of con­
temporary American civilization consists of 
metropolitan core regions and the intermetro­
politan peripheries. The former have achieved
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very high levels of economic and cultural 
development at the expense of the latter, 
leaving the periphery in a decadent state.
Current and projected trends in technology 
and tastes suggest that a new element of 
spatial order is coming into being - the urban 
field - which will unify both core and peri­
phery within a single matrix.
The older established centres, together with 
the intermetropolitan peripheries that envelop 
them, will constitute the new ecological unit 
of America's post-industrial society that will 
replace traditional concepts of the city and 
the metropolis. This basic element of the emer­
ging spatial order we shall call the urban 
field. [Friedmann and Miller:1965:312, 313]
The two major forces underlying the emergence of 
urban fields in America are continued demographic concentration 
in the established metropolitan core areas, and a number of 
centrifugal forces pressuring towards the reintegration of the 
peripheral areas as resource bases and activity centres. Its 
space, scenery, relative ease of travel and cheapness of land, 
its historical assets and so forth, make the intermetropolitan 
periphery increasingly popular for such activities as recreation, 
the location of high land use institutions, the establishment 
of new towns and specialized communities catering for retire­
ment, vacations, and cultural activities, and economic 
activities which are either space extensive, or which do not 
depend upon intimate contact with large population concentra­
tions (airports, agro-business, mail order houses, insurance 
companies and warehouses).
They identify some 70 potential urban fields in the 
United states, constituted of a core area of at least 300,000 
inhabitants and having a radius of approximately 100 miles.
A population of around 300,000 is held to be the point at 
which distinctively metropolitan characteristics emerge, while 
the distance of 100 miles from the centre represents the 
approximate geographic limit for commuting to a job and the
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limit for intensive weekend and seasonal use of the periphery 
for recreation. The urban field thus transcends town and 
country, urban and rural distinctions, suggesting that any 
sharp distinctions of this sort have become relatively 
meaningless from an economic or sociological standpoint in 
the urbanized society.
The corresponding view of the city is no longer 
of a physical entity, but of a pattern of point 
locations and connecting flows of people, 
information, money and commodities. [ibid:314]
The idea of the urban field is based on the criterion of inter­
dependency: "To define this region on a map, the main crite­
rion should be that exchange relations within each field are 
more intensive than among them" [ibid:315].
The concept of urban field, together with the social 
field and the sociosphere, belongs to the field-theoretic, 
contextualist framework. The resultant notion of 'field 
planning' directs attention beyond concern with the physical 
urban plant and the social structure of the city, and the way 
in which these separate systems interact, by incorporating 
concepts of perceptual and behavioural space as well as the 
more readily understandable physical time-space co-ordinates. 
Further, the field notion points to the continuity of planning 
as a system of decision-making that extends in time both 
backward (existing possibilities being conditioned by all 
past decisions) and forward (present decisions influencing 
future decisions both by changing the shape of the world and 
by establishing new precedents).
We thus come to a new appreciation of the metropolitan 
crisis as a crisis over finding ways in which to cope adap­
tively with turbulent urban fields. The crisis in other words 
is one brought about by a qualitative change in the character 
of urban areas, which in order to be met effectively requires 
qualitatively different responses. The turbulence lies in the
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ecologically connected patterns of activity, and needs to be 
approached in ecological terms. in this regard the recent 
article by Holling and Goldberg [1971] on 'ecology and plan­
ning' is an important step towards the better understanding 
of turbulence.
The concept of urban field by itself provides a 
valuable new perspective. By itself however, it is a fragile 
innovation, and could easily become fashionable in the 
literature without challenging established perceptions of 
the phenomena it alludes to. planning activities below the 
level of overall strategic planning for metropolitan regions 
must typically focus on parts and not the whole of the field, 
and an analogous shift is needed from concepts that have been 
used to distinguish spatially the different parts of the city 
to concepts referring to component zones of activity. it is 
now quite widely appreciated that the neighbourhood concept 
no longer corresponds, if it ever did, with patterns of family 
and friendship interaction and the uses that are made of urban 
amenities and resources. The primary reference of other 
notions such as the suburb, district, and 'territorial unit' 
is similarly locational and spatial, and they are more suited 
to describing the divisions of cities than the purposeful 
groupings within urban fields.
It seems far more appropriate to consider communities 
as the units of the urban field to which planning should be 
oriented, and abandon the administrative, areal, and pseudo- 
sociological distinctions to which planners have become 
deferent. community is not to be thought of therefore as 
necessarily a territorial unit, although it may be. A 
community is a social group within which members co-operate 
to provide, use, and maintain the resources that enable them 
to pursue their shared and analogous objectives. Thus 
associations and interest groups, clubs, unions and professional 
bodies as well as the residential locality may be or can become
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communities„ To regard communities in this sense as units 
for planning may further liberate traditional notions of the 
processes of planning and politics from preoccupation with 
fixed geographical areas, and encourage in its place a "multi­
faceted* conception of planning with numerous overlapping 
communities, and a non-territorial conception of democracy.
Conventional frameworks for the management and 
planning of cities move from metropolitan area to city area, 
district, suburb and neighbourhood, and thence to families 
and individuals as the units of administration. The emphasis 
is then on providing homes and amenities for families, and 
understanding patterns of "household activities', and provi­
ding jobs, and school places and buses, and so on for 
individuals. The unit at this level in the new paradigm is 
the behaviour setting.
in the course of their intensive investigation of 
the socio- psychological dynamics of behaviour in the real 
world community context of "Midwest", Barker and Wright made 
a 'discovery' that was obvious to native Midwesterners - 
"that behaviour comes not only in particle form, but in 
extra-individual wave patterns that are as visible and 
invariant as the pools and rapids in slough creek west of 
town. The Presbyterian worship services, the high school 
basketball games, and the post office, for example, persist 
year after year with their unique configurations of behaviour, 
despite constant changes in the persons involved" [Barker 
and wright:1955:7]. They noted that these 'standard behaviour 
patterns' were attached to particular place-thing-time con­
stellations, the non-psychological context or milieu, and 
that there was a "perceived fittingness' (synomorphism) 
between the patterns of behaviour and this milieu. They 
further observed that these behaviour-milieu units, which 
they came to call behaviour settings, were quite ubiquitous, 
in that very little behaviour in Midwest occurred outside
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their limits, and that there were often abrupt and usually 
noticeable changes in the behaviour of a person as he left 
one behaviour setting and entered another.
The discovery of standing behaviour patterns 
was the crucial step in our identification of 
a community unit suitable to our purposes.
While important progress can be made toward 
describing general characteristics of the liv­
ing conditions and behaviour of a community by 
adding together the behaviour characteristics 
and situations of representative individuals, 
it seems clear that these patterned features 
of behaviour which can be seen directly should 
not be ignored. [ibid:8]
in considering the value of taking behaviour settings as the 
units for understanding community behaviours, we can do no 
better than to quote their own summary:
1. Visibility: behaviour settings are promi­
nent features of extra-individual behaviour 
identified with a high degree of agreement 
by independent observers. They are obvious 
empirical facts about behaviours in Midwest.
2. phenomenal character: they are features of
the phenomenal worlds of both layman and 
scientists, and a description of the community 
in terms of behaviour settings corresponds to 
common experience.
3. internal dynamics: behaviour settings involve
persons, non-psychological milieu, and 
behaviour in an interacting field of forces. 
Behaviour settings coerce behaviour and vice 
versa.
4 . comprehensiveness: behaviour settings 
blanket the community. we estimate that in 
Midwest 95 per cent of all behaviour occurs 
within the behaviour settings we have identi­
fied .
5. Variety of attributes: behaviour settings
have many discriminable behavioural and non- 
behavioural characteristics. They are rich 
material for analysis.
6. External dynamics: behaviour settings are 
not independent community units, and in fact 
the pattern of one setting is often radically
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changed by the behaviour occurring in another 
behaviour setting.
70 Theoretical position? behaviour settings are 
at present empirical facts, They can be 
demonstrated to the hardest empiricist. How­
ever, they are theoretically promising.
Their internal structure and dynamics and 
their external relations suggest that they 
can be profitably conceptualized and incor­
porated into productive theory. [ibidi9-10]
They may certainly be incorporated into the present 
conceptual scheme. The evidence is that the quality of a 
person's primary social world is very much a function of the 
availability and the quality of the behaviour settings. while 
planners and architects have talked a good deal about 'activity 
systems , most attempts to translate such notions into planning 
actions have lacked theoretical insight. in particular the 
1 non-psychological milieu' has been treated as an independent 
variable, assumed somehow to 'give rise' to the desired social 
liveliness and interaction, while Barker and wright state 
quite clearly that standing behaviour patterns are shaped 
equally by the properties of the actors and the milieu.
(3. above)
To orient planning in the community towards the 
needs of the household as the basic unit may conduce to the 
functional and efficient provision of the structures and 
amenities necessary for family life. To visualize the community 
as an overlapping net of behaviour settings, actual and poten­
tial, makes possible a new perspective on the tasks of planning, 
in which the meaning and value of the community life is not 
sought in a behaviourally random geographical area and the 
facilities it contains, but consciously located in the 
opportunities and variety provided in such supra-individual 
settings, in which people may experience the involvements and 
identity that tie them into the wider field, when the citizens 
of Canberra bemoan over again, as they have done for years,
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the city’s lack of a soul', the lacuna that they identify, 
more particularly in the outlying suburbs, is the poverty of 
behaviour settings in which Canberrans might come to know one 
another and with which they might achieve some stabilizing 
identity. Each neighbourhood has carefully calculated acreages 
of open space and playing fields, and square footage of retail 
space, and the inevitable primary school and filling station 
(budgeted for as the normal basic community requirements1). 
What most neighbourhoods lack are such behaviour settings as 
a local tavern or milk bar, through which the neighbourhood 
might become a community.
While in the conceptual series of the conventional 
framework the more basic unit, the atom from which the family, 
neighbourhood and city are compounded, is the individual, in 
the new paradigm it is the life-space« The person moves 
through a succession of behaviour settings in a continuous 
stream of behaviour that changes both himself and the settings 
in which he engages, The behaviour settings in a community 
should be such as to collectively provide each unique member 
of the community with the opportunities to learn more about 
himself and the community, opportunities for self-expression, 
and a certain level of support and recognition, There is of 
course no formula for bringing such a state of affairs into 
existence, but a start may be made by abandoning (or at least 
suppressing) the physical-territorial segmentation of the city 
as a basis for improving the quality of life and organizing 
efforts around a better understanding of the dynamics of the 
life-space and the behaviour setting.
We arrive therefore at a suggestive, if relatively 
unsystematic alternative to the conceptual grid of the 
traditional city planners» in the new framework, dynamic 
processes and behaviours move to the foreground - processes 
take precedence over spaces and structures.
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(society, social structure) 
metropolis, city 
suburb, neighbourhood 
household 
individua1
(sociosphere) 
urban field 
community 
behaviour setting 
life-space
As has been stressed earlier, the new concepts are not simply 
definitional equivalents, but belong to a new frame of refer­
ence in which the basic data are not elements or factors that 
are part of an inherently determinate cosmos, but contexts or 
complexes which continuously cohere and disperse,
Feibleman and Friend [1945] maintain that for the 
purposes of the structural analysis of wholes, three system 
levels are required - the whole from which analysis starts 
and the two levels below this. while there is an intuitive 
appeal to the idea that three levels are needed, there also 
seems to be a case for arguing that one of these be the level 
above the focal system. Thus for example the community is to 
be understood in terms of its “location1 in the urban field, 
and the behaviour settings that it comprises. if the urban 
field itself is to be taken as the unit whole, it may be that 
the sociosphere can be taken as the next higher level. The 
implication for planning is that intervention at any of these 
levels must be sensitive to and take into account the adjacent 
levels.
From Mobilization of Power to the institutionalization of values
To see the problem of city planning not as solving the 'urban 
crisis* but of finding ways in which social aggregates may 
adapt to the conditions of a turbulent urban field, suggests 
search in the direction that has already been indicated - towards 
modes of ecological adaptation and the identification and
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institutionalization of common values, in discussing the 
active and passive maladaptations to turbulence it has become 
clear that appropriate responses must take as their starting 
condition the full complexity and uncertainty of the environ­
ment, and that appropriate strategies do not include courses 
of action designed to strengthen systems of power and control. 
When the field as a whole is in motion, long run stability is 
not to be attained by segregating the field into presently 
'manageable' parts or by amplifying the power of its figural 
elements.
The answer is to be sought rather in the emergence 
and spread of shared values which embody the most important 
meanings and aspirations of all the actors and become part 
of the boundary conditions of their individual actions. This 
idea in itself has been propounded by many different authors. 
A good example is to be found in Elting Morison's study of 
coping with technological innovation, in which he addresses 
himself to the question- “How then can we find the means to 
accept with less pain to ourselves and less damage to our 
social organization the dislocations in our society that are 
produced by innovation?';
1 would suggest that in studying innovation, we 
look further into this possibility; the possi­
bility that any group that exists for any 
purpose - the family, the factory, the educa­
tional institution - might begin by defining 
for itself its grand object and see to it that 
that grand object is communicated to every 
member of the group. Thus defined and communica­
ted, it might serve as a unifying agent against 
the disruptive local allegiances of the inevi“ 
table smaller elements that compose any group.
It may also serve to increase the acceptability 
of any change that would assist in the more 
efficient achievement of the grand object.
[Morison;1966»42]
Many of the processes studied by sociologists, such as group 
formation, institutionalization, professionalization, and so
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on, are concerned with the subordination of individual 
differences to the norms, values, and shared definitions of 
the situation that constitute the sub-culture of the collec­
tivity and facilitate predictability of behaviour.
The reasons for re-emphasizing and exploring further 
the role of values as a response to the present metropolitan 
turmoil are to be found in the ominously enlarging gap between 
the transformation of the material environment through 
technological innovation and the rate at which this novelty 
is being absorbed in the cultural or appreciative systems of 
the social field, our cultural-symbolic interpretations of 
the universe have lagged behind its material transformation 
to the point that the natural distillation and change of 
meanings requires to be supplemented by the active search for 
and dissemination of new belief and value systems. The most 
fundamental difficulties seem to be the sheer scale of the 
field over which new values need to be communicated and absorbed, 
the considerable resistance of many social scientists and other 
professionals and practitioners to identifying themselves with, 
and committing themselves to particular values, and of course, 
the resistances offered by existing values.
Values have the nature not of regulators and 
sanctioners, imposing specific demands and coercing particular 
course of action, but of field forces which have the capacity 
of inducing coherence and co-ordination by providing parameters 
for the adaptive behaviours of the numerous discrete parts of 
the field. value formation does not therefore reduce the 
turbulent environment to a simple disturbed-reactive environment 
in which institutional capabilities are determinative of field 
regulation, but to a modified form of this in which scattered 
and unpredictable behaviours become organized behind commonly 
acknowledged and professed sets of beliefs and values. The 
central requirements for particular values to assume this 
organizing role seem to be firstly that the chosen values
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accurately reflect the psychic dispositions and basic cultural 
bonds operative in the given field, and that they are diffused 
by processes of exemplification, mutual explorations and 
democratic agreements rather than by authoritarian injunctions 
and covert propoganda*
in searching for the sorts of values that might serve 
to bring a degree of coherence and predictability to the 
environments of present urban communities, the choice is not 
so hopelessly open-ended as it might first appear. Emery has 
drawn attention to a basic choice of design principle“ that 
states the broad alternatives for organized social groupings 
facing changing and uncertain environments: "the choice is
between whether a population seeks to enhance its chances of 
survival by strengthening and elaborating special social 
mechanisms of control or by increasing the adaptiveness of 
its individual members" [Emery and Trist;1972:71] . To cope 
with a changing environment, any adaptive, self-regulating 
system must have a degree of redundancy built into it - it 
must have parts or functions that are not called upon all the 
time, but which can be brought into action when changes in 
the environment so demand. jn human systems, to opt for the 
redundancy of parts means treating individual members as 
substitutable and replaceable, and requires within the system 
a hierarchy of controlling parts to make decisions concerning 
the parts at lower levels that are to be active or redundant 
for the purposes of a particular response. The factories of 
the industrial revolution and the armies of the First world 
War were systems of this kind. For a social system to seek 
the necessary variety by having redundancy of functions on 
the other hand, entails having individual members who have 
multiple skills and requires some mechanism for setting and 
shifting the configurations of these functions that constitute 
appropriate responses to changing environmental demands.
This choice of basic design principle is equivalent
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to that between structuring communities as homogeneous or 
heterogeneous systems, as systems which decrease or increase 
the variety of the behaviour of parts * we have argued 
already that the former alternatives, of tightening control 
and co-ordination, are not likely to be adaptive under tur­
bulent conditions for the field as a whole, while the latter 
alternatives tend better to reflect western democratic ideals.
It would seem therefore that planning within the urban field 
ought to be premised on the acknowledgement that the constituent 
units of the field are heterogeneous systems and the recogni­
tion that large and complex social aggregates can achieve a 
higher degree of overall adaptivity by loosening up all the 
connections among their parts and fitting them as far as 
possible to cope separately with the turbulence in their 
immediate environments. The loosening of interconnections 
within the aggregate and placing the emphasis on the adapta­
bility of individual parts are of themselves preconditions 
for centrifugal movement and dis-integration. The obvious 
and most effective counter to such tendencies is the inculca­
tion and dissemination of values and ideals, self-consciously 
arrived at and agreed upon by the main actors.
The meaning of this strategy of individuation of 
parts and maintaining the adaptivity of the whole through 
shared values may be better appreciated by considering an 
extreme example - the engagement of opposing infantry forces 
in the battlefield. while the initial long-distance manoeu- 
verings and preparations are best governed by the normal 
authority apparatus of military organizations, there comes 
a point in closing with the enemy when every man for himself' 
is a far more adaptive strategy. The environment of hand-to- 
hand infighting is a radical transformation in the direction 
of greater uncertainty and unpredictability which can best 
be met by the abandonment of the normal command pyramid and 
increasing each individual's area of discretion in choosing
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his actions. when individuals are thus loosened from the 
authority structure to which they normally respond, the 
effectiveness of their joint actions becomes to some extent 
a measure of the extent to which they share common values 
and understandings and the strength with which they are 
committed to them. This combination of the physical indepen­
dence and value consonance of parts has long been appreciated 
by the strategists of underground organizations and guerilla 
warfare concerned with organizational survival in highly 
uncertain and hostile environments. it seems reasonable to 
suggest that city planners may have more to learn from them 
than from the "new Utopians'.
The suggestion is that the planning and development 
of adaptive communities within the context of a turbulent 
urban field may be furthered by defining the community itself 
as an organization with the function of serving the ends and 
needs of its members, and working towards enhancing the adaptive 
capabilities of these members rather than building up and 
consolidating the 'fire-power' of the whole. This means that 
all the resources within the community, including the resources 
available for planning, should be regarded as instruments for 
the pursuit of individual purposes and ideals to which all 
members have equal rights of access. To the extent that the 
community as a whole needs to anticipate and take decisions 
in advance of changing external circumstances, its individual 
members need to learn the meaning of planning. to the extent 
that the purposeful parts of the community are enabled to adapt 
individually and to pursue their own purposes and ideals, there 
must be contemporaneous and collaborative search for values 
and unifying ideals that will provide a skeletal structure for 
the whole field of directively correlated behaviours.
A conventional criticism and source of despair of 
the office-holders of traditional, professional planning 
commissions concerns the ignorance and indifference of the
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populations that are planned for. Elaborately prepared 
planning documents and diligently organized public hearings 
fail to generate the responses expected and lead to charges 
of public apathy, such charges may then be used to legitimate 
the resort mainly to professional standards and judgements in 
designing futures and policies of implementation. such 
criticisms are naive, ignoring as they do the fact that 
planning activity involves a special sort of interest in, 
awareness of, and concern for larger systems and broader 
future horizons than the individual usually has to concern 
himself with, and which can only be acquired by doing planning. 
Only individuals who are given responsibility for planning can 
become imaginatively involved in planning's concerns; for 
those who are denied any such responsibility their involvement 
in the planning process is likely to be restricted to some 
form of tokenism. The point has been provocatively argued by 
Churchman, who invites us to imagine a manager of the future 
reflecting upon the ’obvious' axioms of planning in the year 
19 68:
„..this manager sees what no manager of today 
even suspects, that the whole 1968 planning 
process is predicated on the false and untenable 
position of serving the public's interest by 
means of expert representation. This old- 
fashioned assumption of 1968 is false because 
in reality the public's 'interest' is_ to plan, 
to mean something in the planning process, to 
become a master, not a servant, in planning 
the system. [churchman:1968c:76]
planning must be responsive to the purposes and 
ideals espoused by individuals and to the more general field 
values that are needed to regulate actions and interactions 
across the larger system, but planners have no special 
expertise in or privileged access to community values. in 
less troubled environments of past eras when speed and 
appropriateness of responses, and accuracy and richness in 
the feedback of results may have been less critical, the
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paternalistic guaging of the public good', the fairness but 
pedantry of the ballot box, the cumbersomeness of systems of 
’representation', and the dubious scientism of surveys and 
questionnaires may have provided sufficient articulation 
between planners and planned to avoid the gross accumulation 
of lags and the creation of ecological traps. The emergence 
of turbulence requires drastically shortened reaction times, 
multi-centred sensitivity to the environment and capabilities 
for continuous learning and adaptation. such capabilities 
cannot be monopolized by experts and special institutions, 
but by their nature need to be spread out across the field.
This again has been churchman's concern, in his attempt to 
demonstrate that the wisdom required for the regulation of 
society cannot be monopolized by any of its special parts:
...we cannot assign the matter ot judging a 
society and formulating policies for it to any 
kind of elite, be it scientific or managerial.
The best answer that men have developed to 
date to the question 'who shall decide?' is 
not to be found either within political power 
or intellectual prowess« it lies in the con­
cept of a well-informed public.
There are simply no ‘experts' in the planning 
of human societies. The so-called experts know- 
less about the planning of human society than 
does the public, because in each case the 
expert brings in a thoroughly biased viewpoint; 
on account of his expertise he is forced to 
concentrate on only one aspect of the living 
system. There seems to be no successful way 
in which the expert of large-scale systems can 
become a 'generalist'. There is no such thing 
as the 'universal man' in the area of the 
ethics of large scale systems. Therefore the 
need for a well-informed public is a true need.
The underlying ethical principle here is that 
every man ought to feel that by his nature he 
can acquire knowledge about how society should 
be designed. [Churchman;1968b;65, 83-84]
The direction of the change required is from planning 
fo£ to planning with and planning by. More and more planners,
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and greater amounts of planning are going to be needed, but 
in environments in which stability is a function of value­
sharing, planners will be less able to separate themselves 
from others and make decisions for them. if, as is argued 
in the following section, the process of planning is of more 
importance than the plan produced, the value of planning is 
heavily dependent upon the number of people who are in the 
act. The degree of responsiveness that will be needed in 
future urban fields calls for the development of planning 
capabilities within communities and the capacity to co-operate 
as equal partners (co-planners) with ’outside' planning 
organizations, preoccupations in the recent planning litera­
ture with participation, choice, advocacy, and social planning 
seem to reflect a widening appreciation that some of planning's 
traditional concerns and modes of organization need to be 
sacrificed if a meaningful engagement is to be achieved with 
the clients of the planning process.
The foregoing provides the barest framework within 
which the more particular interpretations and evaluations 
needed for the coming decades may be located. Numerous 
prophets and speculators, futurologists and social scientists 
have been bolder than this in offering their insights into 
the sorts of values that are already becoming or may be 
expected to become more salient as the cultural surround of 
post-Industrial society responds to the structural transfor­
mations that have taken place and continue. Trist argues that 
whatever new values emerge they "must be values which enhance 
our ability to cope with the increased levels of complexity, 
interdependence and uncertainty that characterize the turbulent 
contemporary environment", and comments further:
Evidence is mounting that the individual by him­
self, or indeed the organization and even the 
polity by itself, cannot meet the demands of 
these more complex environments. A greater 
pooling of resources is required; more sharing,
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more trust, more co-operation. The inference 
may be drawn that appropriate emergent values 
will tend to be communal rather than individ­
ualistic. Their direction will be opposite 
to that which value-formation has taken in 
industrial societies, moulded as these have 
been by the Protestant Ethic. [Trist:1970:
12-13]
He contrasts the key cultural values, organizational philoso­
phies and government strategies persisting from industrialism 
with the emergent cultural patterns of post-industrialism:
Type From Towards
Cultural values achievement self-actualization
self-control self-expression
independence inter-dependence
endurance of capacity for joy
distress
Organizational mechanistic forms organic forms
philosophies competitive rela- collaborative relations
tions
separate objectives linked objectives
own resources own resources
regarded as owned regarded also as
absolutely society's resources
Ecological responsive to crisis anticipative of crisis
strategies specific measures comprehensive measures
requiring consent requiring participation
damping conflict confronting conflict
short planning long planning
horizon horizon
detailed central generalized central
control control
small local enlarged local
government units government units
standardized innovative
administration administration
From Trist [1970] p.13.
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planning : From product. to process
if we may caricature the ‘old' style of planning in order to 
contrast it with that which is emerging and needed, we may 
say that it tends to be reactive and remedial, that it is 
oriented to producing a plan rather than to the process of 
planning, that it venerates impartiality and rationality, 
and maintains the separation of planning and actxon. The 
need for planning becomes obvious only with the appearance 
of crises and serious malfunctionings, and responses are 
oriented to regaining the pre-existing, or finding a new- 
steady state, comparable to that which existed before the 
crisis. The main means for achieving this is to define the 
new steady state on a plan or series of plans which can be 
handed over to the decision-maker who decides if, when, and 
how they are to be implemented'. in the city the classical 
expression of this form of planning is found in the powerful, 
semi-independent planning commission, with its professional, 
qualified staff of planners, engineers, architects and so on, 
which functions as an advisory body, assisting government 
in policy-formation:
Its view is comprehensive in that no aspect of 
community development is assumed to be beyond 
its responsibility. it is also comprehensive 
in the sense that the planning commission is 
the guardian of the whole public interest rather 
than any particular special interest. From this 
it is assumed that the planning commission is 
both capable and responsible for establishing 
long-term development goals which provide a 
broad perspective and give substance to short­
term particularistic community decisions.
[Bolan:1967:234]
This sort of planning is most likely to be deferent to the 
synoptic ideal in policy-formulation and decision-making, and 
to seek its own improvement in becoming more ’rational* and 
more comprehensive.
in contrast to this, numerous emergent strands
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of planning thought are currently coalescing into an alter­
native image of the nature of planning activity which 
emphasizes its future-oriented, prospective concern, stresses 
the importance of the process itself above the plans produced, 
acknowledges the permeation of the planner's world with 
values and attempts to understand their dynamics, and which 
seeks to break down the distinction between plans and their 
implementation. This new 'dynamic' image can be traced back 
to many roots, in business and city planning, in philosophical, 
economic and political writing, and is discussed under a 
variety of names - 'innovative', 'process', 'action', and 
'adaptive' planning. its flavour may best be appreciated 
by sampling the thought of some of its proponents.
Ackoff [1965, 1970a, 1970b] develops a concept 
of adaptive planning for organizations premised on the view 
that "...planning is not an act but a process, a process that 
has no natural conclusion or end point" [1970a:3]. A 'solu­
tion' can be approached but never fully accomplished, because 
there is no necessary limit to the amount of reviewing of 
previous decisions, and because both the system planned for 
and its environment undergo change during the planning, and 
it is never possible to take all such changes into account.
Hence "A plan is not the final product of the planning process; 
it is an interim report. it is a record of a complex set of 
interacting decisions which may be partitioned in many different 
ways" [ibid:5]. planning is defined as:
a process that involves making and evaluating 
each of a set of interrelated decisions before 
action is required, in a situation in which it 
is believed that unless action is taken a 
desired future state is not likely to occur, 
and that, if appropriate action is taken, the 
likelihood of a favourable outcome can be 
increased. [ibid:4]
Adaptive planning entails taking into account the stylistic 
as well as the performance objectives of the organization,
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and the value preferences of the participants, and seeks to 
reconcile these by "motivating participants in the system 
to act in a way that is compatible with the interests of the 
system as a whole...by providing incentives that make indi­
vidual and organizational objectives more compatible" [ibid:
20]. Adaptive planning for communities rather than corpora­
tions may have to take account of the purposes of the members 
in a different way, which appreciates that the parts of such 
systems are at a higher level than the system itself, but 
the conclusion, that the benefits of planning derive more 
from participation in the planning process than from the 
consumption of its product, remains valid.
Friedmann [1959, 1966, 1967, 1969] comments that 
"until a few years ago, discussions of planning were restricted 
to consideration of an abstract model of perfect rationality 
in social decision-making" [1967:225]. He himself interprets 
planning as societal action, concerned with 'the guidance of 
change in a social system', and oversteps the disjunction 
between plan formation and plan implementation in drawing 
attention to the characteristics of 'action' and 'innovative' 
planning, and the changed environmental circumstances that 
are making these new modes obligatory. The new modes are 
dynamic and continuous:
...any plan is only a working paper of but 
momentary importance; by the time it is pub­
lished in print it may already be out-of-date.
The making of the plan, the exercise of plan­
ning thought, is infinitely more important 
than a neatly published book entitled: Six-
year plan. [1959:332]
The widespread notion that planning and implementation are 
separable activities dies hard, while the belief that 
adequately communicated plans ought to get accepted and 
implemented rests, he says "on the technocratic fallacy that 
planner's proposals are inherently superior to actions that
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result from the unaided decisions of non-planners" [1969:311].
Most forms of societal action are system-maintaining 
rather than system-transforming (revolution and counter­
planning) , and embrace two forms of planning - alloca­
tive and innovative planning. The former concerns the 
'assignment of resource increments among competing uses' and 
exhibits strains towards comprehensiveness, system-wide 
balances, synthesis, and functional rationality. innovative 
planning on the other hand, is concerned with the mobilization 
and organization of resources for new uses: "...the task of
innovative planning is the institutionalization of functions, 
roles, frameworks, and performance programs that were not 
previously part of an organization's repertory" [1969:312]. 
Elsewhere he has put forward four defining characteristics, 
innovative planning
1. seeks to legitimize new social objectives or to 
accomplish a major realignment of those already 
existing.
2. is concerned with the translation of general 
value propositions into new institutional 
arrangements and concrete action programs.
3. has greater interest in the mobilization of 
resources than in their optimal allocation 
among competing uses.
4. proposes to guide the process of innovation 
and the consequent adjustments within the 
system through information feedback of the 
actual consequences of innovation.
This description makes it abundantly clear that 
innovative planning eschews the comprehensive 
plan in favour of strategic action.... since 
our generation is living through a succession of 
continuing crises, it is not surprising to find 
that innovative is more prevalent than alloca-
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tive planning. The need for creative innova­
tion is among the imperative needs of an age 
in which structural changes are the normal 
pattern and social equilibria are always 
fragile and short-lived. [1966:196]
Very similar conceptions are evolving among the 
leading thinkers in the domain of corporate planning, many 
of whom make explicit recognition of the fact that just as 
for the metropolis, the transformation of corporate environ­
ments in the direction of greater complexity and unpredicta­
bility urgently demands new forms of planning behaviour. 
According to Branch for example, changes in the structure and 
organization of finance, sales and distribution, industrial 
relations, and research and development require of business 
operations an enhanced sensitivity to the environment and 
reduction of reaction times. The type of planning needed 
has the characteristic that 'the continuous application of 
the process is more important than any particular plan':
An understanding of the inherent open-endedness 
of planning, a coming to terms with the scien­
tifically indeterminate environment within which 
it must operate, and the establishment of an 
effective modus operandi are required for succes­
sful planning in general and corporate planning 
in particular. [Branch:1962:40]
Beer attacks the tacit assumptions of the 'old' model 
of planning in the following terms:
There is no 'day of judgement', even notionally, 
against which to measure overall performance.
This means that the pay-off for any set of 
plans admits no criterion of optimality....
The proposal is then, that managerial decisions 
implicit in any plan ought to be taken over and 
over again while the plan is unfolding; and 
that it is not enough to say (as managers do) 
that the plan 'ought to be flexible*. it 
sounds like a truism that planning must be a 
continuous process; and yet it is not in prac­
tice, and this is why plans - notoriously - 'do 
not work'. [Beer:1970:32]
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in discussing the challenges to management science of long- 
range planning, Drucker has defined business planning as:
a continuous process of making present entre­
preneurial decisions systematically and with 
best possible knowledge of their futurity, 
organizing systematically the effort needed to 
carry out these decisions, and measuring the 
results of these decisions against expectations 
through organized systematic feedback. [Drucker:
1959:240
With regard to city planning in particular, Mitchell 
concludes from his inspection of the 'new frontier in metropo­
litan planning' that the professionals will have to grow out 
of their 'static, handicraft, and largely intuitive methods':
Most planning today is static. it portrays a 
desired urban pattern at some future date. I 
believe the plans of the future will be plans 
for the nature, rate, quantity, and quality of 
urban change - for a process of development.
They will be expressed in dynamic rather than 
static terms. They will start with present con­
ditions and point the direction and rate of 
change. [Mitchell*. 1961:171]
For planners who are having to operate in environ­
ments of extended size and complexity, and rapid and uneven 
change, solutions are not to be found in attempts to improve 
upon the weaknesses of the synoptic ideal or striving harder 
for optimization in policy making, nor in the more obvious 
pathologies of artificially fragmenting the decision field.
The direction of response required is from utopian to piece­
meal social engineering [popper:1945] from synoptic idealism
to 'disjointed incrementalism' [ßraybrooke and Lindblom:1963],
/and, more generally perhaps, from optimizing to adaptivizing.
A world view compatible with such a shift has to acknowledge 
that our systems for living can never be complete and in 
balance, but will always be unfinished and experience strains 
and stresses. It requires the further appreciation that an 
extended field confronted with turbulent conditions is able
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to improve upon its total development and adaptive potential 
by loosening the connections among the parts and enabling them 
by process of 'partisan mutual adjustment1 to meet the uncer­
tainties in each of their relevant environments. of the 
strategy of '.incrementalism' for example, Lindblom argues 
that:
Through various specific types of partisan mutual 
adjustment among the large number of individuals 
and groups among which analysis and policy-making 
is fragmented, what is ignored in one point in 
policy-making becomes central at another point.
Hence, it will often be possible to find a 
tolerable level of rationality in decision making 
when the process is viewed as a whole in its 
social or political context, even if at each 
individual policy making point or centre, 
analysis remains incomplete. [Hirschman and 
Lindblom:1962;216
Of adaptive planning we may say therefore, that it 
is continuous, participative, value-laden, and future-oriented. 
Engaging constructively with the future and doing planning 
takes precedence over the creation of plans, which has as a 
natural consequence that the more people who can be involved, 
the better planning can be expected to be. it is inherently 
concerned with values as facts and seeks to understand the 
way in which they change and interact with needs and means, 
rather than trying to separate values and facts into different 
phases of planning activity.
Adaptive planning responds to the difficulties of 
constructing a comprehensive evaluative method and the limita­
tions of human problem-solving capabilities by rejecting the 
centralization of power, control and decision-making, in 
favour of the devolution of initiative and the decomposition 
of problems into separate facets and successive stages. it 
aspires to a level of rationality in the achievements of the 
whole system that is consistent with the decentralization of 
decision-making among the numerous purposeful sub-systems
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and the processes of mutual adjustment by which stable 
ecological patterns are evolved and maintained.
Adaptive planning seeks to inspire and to shape 
societal change not by the construction of complete and final 
designs of the future or by bringing into existence special 
and massive problem-solving agencies to remedy particular 
dysfunctions, but through connected series of opportunistic 
interventions in which the purposes accomplished have the 
character that they each contribute to progress towards a 
guiding ideal which supplies their rationale. The techniques 
for accomplishing change in this manner are resistant to 
categorization, because they are more likely to issue from 
expediency than from rational calculation. They include a 
special sensitivity to the use of 'leverage points' - those 
parts of the field which are susceptible to change and from 
which the greatest rates of diffusion can be expected; the 
manipulation of incentives and inducements in the reconciliation 
of competing ends; the practice of generating resources, inclu­
ding especially human and organizational resources, as a worthy 
end in itself; and the use of experimental methods in searching 
for solutions, in which the extra costs incurred and risks 
involved have to be justified in terms of the guarantee of 
some result, positive or negative that contributes to overall 
progress.
Adaptive planning aims to overcome inadequacies of 
information and to improve upon its own performance by devising 
and employing techniques of action that generate information, 
and which make the maximum amount of learning possible. when 
it is successful it is continuously self-correcting, and 
provides a continuing education for those who are involved, 
in community planning this means that some members must be 
involved from the beginning and throughout a phase of planning 
activity, so they may learn at least what the official planners 
learn, while both may learn more as a result of their inter-
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action. Attempts to involve citizens at the blueprint stage 
when a plan has been prepared and polished must be expected 
to generate more antipathy than learning. insofar as learning 
comes from self-help and practical experiences it may be 
furthered in the community by making citizens responsible for 
conducting surveys, organizing planning exhibitions and so on, 
and more importantly, for actually planning their own neigh­
bourhoods. To the extent that more can be learnt from meeting 
conflicts and trying to resolve them than from suppressing or 
avoiding them, there are benefits to be gained from working 
out such conflicts in a public forum. or to go a step further, 
some elements of conflict may be deliberately introduced by 
the creation and formal sanctioning of a counter-planning 
system to provide continuous criticism and promote alternatives. 
To the extent that learning rarely suffers from the making of 
mistakes, the community's own planners should be expected and 
allowed to make them, the benefits of the experience thus 
gained compensating for sub-optimal solutions in terms of 
professional design and implementation standards.
The long-run aim or ideal of the adaptive planner 
becomes, as Ac'koff enigmatically suggests, his own obsolescence. 
The family succeeds in its historical and cultural mission not 
by providing its dependent members with all that they need and 
want, but by liberating them from itself through providing them 
with the adaptive capabilities to survive in other environments. 
Adaptive planning succeeds when its children become planners 
themselves, and parents are able to retire.
Because ours is an age dominated by technology in 
a time of prodigious technological change, we need to become 
by one means or another an 'adaptive society', able to extract 
the fullest possible returns from the opportunities at hand 
and to build into the social field "the kind of resilience 
that will enable us to accept fully and easily the best 
promises of changing circumstances without losing our sense
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of continuity or our essential integrity" [Morison:1966:42] .
We are not yet emotionally an adaptive society, 
though we try systematically to develop forces 
that tend to make us one. we encourage the 
search for new inventions; we keep the mind 
stimulated, bright, and free to seek out fresh 
means of transport, communication, and energy; 
yet we remain, in part, appalled by the conse­
quences of our ingenuity, and, too frequently, 
try to find security through the shoring up of 
ancient and irrelevant conventions, the extension 
of purely physical safeguards, or the delivery 
of decisions we ourselves should make into the 
keeping of superior authority like the state....
...we might give some attention to the construc­
tion of a new view of ourselves as a society which 
in time of great change identified with and ob­
tained security and satisfaction from the wise 
and creative accommodation to change itself.
Such a view rests, I think, upon a relatively 
greater reverence for the mere process of living 
in a society than we possess today, and a rela­
tively smaller respect for and attachment to any 
special product of a society, a product either 
as a finite as a bathroom fixture or as concep­
tual as a fixed and final definition of our 
Constitution or our democracy. [ibid:43]
The planner's Role; From Master to Midwife
When the task of city planning is broadened from its preoccu­
pation with the physical environment to encompass the ecological 
problems of the regulation of change in extended urban fields, 
and the strategic objective for regulation is defined in terms 
of value-formation and institutionalization, some important 
changes are implied for the role of the planner. The concept 
of adaptive planning described in the preceding section invites 
one to think of the planner and organizations for planning as 
resources to be used by communities in their efforts to improve 
the quality of the community life. As the critical environmental 
processes in the action environment of the planner are the 
purposeful behaviours of people, who are capable of directively
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correlating their own behaviours with what is done by planners, 
there can be no utility in trying to define or to prescribe 
the particular sorts of relations that should exist between 
planners and planned. Their interactions should be multiple, 
varied and changing, and always open to new possibilities.
The role of midwife suggests however that the respec­
tive contributions of planners and citizens to the planning 
process ought to be more a matter for joint determination, and 
not something that is decided unilaterally by the planners. 
Reflecting the climate of the current self-examination of the 
city planning profession, Rein [1969] suggests that the advent 
of 'social' planning to respectable status makes it necessary 
for the planner to search for new sources of legitimation.
Their authority has been legitimized in the past in terms of 
expertise (planners as scientific experts independent of the 
political process), bureaucratic position (the agents of 
elected political representatives), consumer preferences (the 
translators and advocators of user-group preferences), or 
professional values. in addition to the factors already 
discussed, the accumulating, practically world-wide pressure 
towards participative democracy places an added importance on 
defining planner's roles not only in terms of formal qualifi­
cations and bureaucratic position, but in terms of leadership, 
and visible ability to assist in the pursuit of community 
objectives and ideals.
Ackoff has suggested for example, that planners 
might learn from successful ghetto leaders, who survive not 
through the operation of the 'Peter principle' but by effec­
tively serving their constituents and the larger community 
that contains them:
Without support of the larger community, ghetto 
leaders cannot get the resources and programs 
that they require to serve their constituents.
Without serving their constituents they cannot 
retain any followers. Hence only effective
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leaders survive*... The ghetto leader has 
neither rank nor authority vested in him from 
above. Therefore, he cannot use these to get 
others to do what they do not want to do. He 
must know what his followers want, what they 
can be persuaded to do, and how he can per­
suade them to do it. [1970c:18]
To retain his position the ghetto leader has to 'deliver the 
goods', and to do this he has to rely on personal qualities 
and a close and continuous sensitivity to the needs and moods 
of those whom he serves. Approaching the question from the 
other end, Rabinovitz urges that the professional planners 
needs to acquire political and inter-personal skills if they 
are to play any significant part in urban development:
...if metropolitan problems are to be dealt with, 
it is up to the planner and his professional 
cohorts to develop strategies which will include 
not only physical and social change but also the 
building of coalitions among the holders of 
influence in urban areas...the skills required 
for discovering and formulating coalitions and 
maintaining alliances are, to varying degrees, 
the skills of the politician. [1967:18-19]
Friedmann has discussed the 'behaviour traits' of 
innovative planners and the ways in which these differ from 
the received image of the professional planner's role. inno­
vative planners become committed to their ideas, and are more 
concerned with justifying proposed solutions than with predic­
ting their consequences. They become engaged but not involved 
in the political process, retaining a marginal, boundary 
position between planning and political systems that gives 
them influence in each, and treat information and co-operation 
as tactical ingredients in getting towards solutions rather 
than as ends in themselves. Finally they show strong preference 
for experimental methods and pilot schemes in tackling diffi­
cult problems - a predisposition to learn by practical results 
rather than abstract 'trial-by-simulation' which is so much 
in vogue.
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What stands out in this personality profile of 
innovative planners is their commitment to ideas, 
their single-minded pursuit of a task, their 
political engagement, and their relative indif­
ference to values other than those which bear 
specifically on their problems. This recalls 
the observation of Wolfgang Mommsen that 'only 
a spiritual state that is basically attached to 
certain values by which the individual feels 
personally compelled, can supply the measure of 
energy requisite to break out from the confines 
of the everyday world and impart a new direction 
to its sluggish flow. [Friedmann:1966:201]
in a later article he notes the appearance of a 1 new 
breed' of action planners whose concerns are 'trans-technical', 
and whose training ought now to include the development of 
those personal skills that enable technical and analytical 
competences to be put to the best use. The action planner 
needs heightened self-knowledge, greater powers of empathy, 
and an increased capacity for learning. ('...his effectiveness 
will often depend on his ability to learn from others and from 
the situation itself, and to rapidly integrate this learning 
with the knowledge he already possesses. This implies...a 
willingness to learn, a humbleness when faced with new and 
possibly disconcerting facts...') He needs to be capable of 
the skilful use of symbolic materials and to have an under­
standing of the dynamics of power and political processes. 
Finally, his word must be responsible. He is advocating points 
of view that will affect the lives and well being of others.
in action-planning then, the planner moves to the 
foreground as a person and autonomous agent. His 
success will in large measure depend on his skill 
in managing interpersonal relations.... The 
typical action environment is tense and charged 
with conflict. consequently the planner has to 
learn to live with conflict, to accept conflict 
as inevitable, and to exploit conflicting forces 
for constructive action. only rarely will the 
planner have his way; he will have to bargain, 
compromise, and learn to accept defeat without 
being crushed by it. [Friedmann:1969:317]
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Davidoff’s influential appeal for planners to become advocates, 
acting on behalf of every kind of organized interest group - 
political parties, chambers of commerce, real estate boards, 
labour organizations, ad hoc protest associations, and in 
particular neighbourhood groups, is based on some similar 
views regarding the need for the planner to become involved:
...the planner should do more than explicate 
the values underlying his prescriptions for 
courses of action; he should affirm them; he 
should be an advocate for what he deems proper.
[Davidoff:1965:331-2]
He notes as a major drawback to effective democratic planning 
'the continuation of that non-responsible vestigial institu­
tion, the planning commission', and proposes to substitute 
for its unitary planning a process of plural planning in which 
many groups create and defend plans with the help of advocate 
planners. The advocate planner is responsible to his client 
group, on behalf of whom he engages in the planning process, 
and whose views he seeks to express - he pleads for his own 
and his client's view of the good society. He therefore 
devotes much time to assisting the client organization in 
clarifying its ideas and giving expression to them, but he 
is also occupied in informing other groups of the conditions, 
problems and outlook of the group he represents, and is 
responsible for the critical appraisal of the planning carried 
out by other groups.
These are some of the facets of an emerging image 
of the kind of planner who is needed to create and galvanize 
the resources that are required to tame the metropolis. it 
goes without saying that all of the existing technical and 
theoretical skills that enter into the planning process will 
continue to be fundamental, although they have not been 
considered here. Beyond this, the horizon is one of increasing 
diversity in the roles that planners will be playing.
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The new conceptual mapping of the urban field 
proposed here suggests that the organization of planning 
itself might benefit from becoming ordered to the structural 
levels of the urban field instead of the functional and 
territorial divisions that are commonly used. The problem 
of the whole urban field is one of overall strategic planning, 
requiring co-ordination with developments in contiguous (and 
the more distant) fields. Alternative field structures and 
their implications as boundaries for the finer texture have 
to be spelt out. The involvement of the public here should 
come in the evolution of the philosophical basis of the 
structure, which could be argued out in many venues from a 
realistic (i.e. limited) number of genuine alternatives, 
inevitably, some of the major forces shaping the structural 
alternatives are the dispositions and objectives of the dominant 
institutional complexes of government, public and private 
enterprise, and planners operating at -this level need to be 
able to relate themselves effectively to the institutional 
leaders from these domains and to negotiate a degree of 
congruence between the values represented in the planning 
process and those held by other institutions.
At the community level the roles of leader and 
advocate become more salient, and more activities can be 
directed to giving expression to the preferred values. The 
community seems to be the critical level for efforts to reduce 
turbulence as it impacts upon family groups and individual 
lives. organizing community members behind vales such as 
those built into Alinsky's Peoples organizations, or conserva­
tion, or anti-poverty, gives a structure to the field against 
which other choices and actions can be measured. community 
planners should be in contact with the individuals and families, 
local organizations and interest groups, shopkeepers, lawyers, 
policemen and other functionaries in the community, and devote 
time to deliberately cultivating organization with and amongst
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them, so that the planners' success may eventually be measured 
not by the amount and quality of the planning that they do, 
but the amount that they enable others to do.
It is doubtful whether there is much value in trying 
to rationally plan and create behaviour settings, as their 
quality and viability are as much the product of the individuals 
free expressions and spontaneous interactions as of a definable 
milieu. They need to be nurtured permissively in the same 
way the intelligent planners of institutional environs do not 
'fix' and concretize footpaths until people have shown where 
they want to walk. if at the level of the whole field the
planners autonomy and responsibility are greatest, while at 
the community level he becomes a collaborator and co-planner, 
in the 'creation' and maintenance of behaviour settings he 
plays his least obtrusive role, that of facilitator.
EPILOGUE
COMMUNITY LABORATORIES FOR ADAPTIVE PLANNING
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Adaptability, at all levels of human affairs, is 
positively evaluated almost without exception. This gives 
to 'adaptive planning' and the notion of the 'adaptive society' 
a rather seductive appeal that must be guarded against. The 
point to be emphasized is that the adaptations urgently 
required are of the active and not the passive type. The 
indulgency of 'free fall' has taken us so close to the portals 
of a global trap that reacting to changed circumstances when 
they have become manifest is a luxury that cannot really by 
afforded. Active interventions are needed to overcome the 
inertia in the massive system of technologically-dominated 
machinery, energy, institutions, and ideas of post-industrial­
izing societies, and to provide a widening array of meaningful 
alternatives in ways of living.
One readily available but presently under-utilized 
means from which a start may be made is the method of experi­
mentation. ways need to be found of building into society a 
closer control over its own nature and direction by giving its 
members more responsibility for participating and greater 
powers of choice, better evidence for judging alternatives, 
and more inspiring purposes and ideals to live by. According 
to Elting Morison, we might most beneficially approach such 
tasks experimentally:
The suggestion here, at a time when we are all 
involved in technological change and are there­
fore all interested and affected members of the 
community... is to introduce a massive expansion 
of [the process of experimental demonstration] 
throughout all parts of the society, to create 
the mood and means that will enable the members 
of the society to explore new instruments and 
new procedures by designed experiments while 
pondering alternatives and reserving judgement 
until the results are in.
The conditions governing such experiments, 
whether conducted with new machinery, new build­
ing designs, new manufacturing systems, new ideas 
for community organization, are relatively simple
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and much the same in each case. Each experiment 
should be small enough in scale and sufficiently 
detached from existing practice so that the con­
tinuing state of things would not be disrupted, 
in addition, in each area of interest there should 
be not one, but a good many different experiments 
of differing design so that a suitable array of 
alternative solutions could be offered. There 
should also be enough of them in all parts of our 
life to demonstrate that the society is proceeding, 
as a whole, in the mood of experiment. [Morison: 
op cit:221, 222-3]
Another caution is needed. social experimentation 
needs to be operational rather than 'pure', requiring some 
measures of protection, but not those which would make experi­
mentation artificial and abstracted from the realities of the 
social world. The relevance and value of social experimentation 
is critically dependent upon its ability to encompass in some 
manner those real exingencies that have to be confronted in the 
post-experimental stage. it is therefore of the first importance 
that experimental sites be judiciously selected. They must be 
sites which offer the conditions for conceptual protection in 
the design stage, experimental protection during the period in 
which changes are introduced and modified, and operational 
protection during the transitional phase from experimental to 
normal operations [Trist et al:1963:225-6]. yet at the same 
time if the experiences are to be transferable they must not 
be protected to the point of unreality. From what basis then 
might experimentation in planning proceed - what would it be 
designed to accomplish?
The suggestion here is that such experimentation is 
more productively grounded on a conception of the 'solution' 
or end state to be aimed at than on the nature of the immediate 
threats, difficulties and disturbances that constitute the 
problem-solving situation. in terms of the normal thresholds 
of human and organizational adaptivity, the turbulent environ­
ment represents an 'overshoot' - a behaviour milieu characterized
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by degrees of complexity, uncertainty, connectivity, and 
dynamism that make irrelevant the experiences gained in other 
environments, and make dangerous attempts to survive passively. 
And yet the forces that operate within the manageable, dis­
turbed-reactive environment to produce turbulent conditions 
are so pervasive and so powerful that there can be no question 
of throwing them into reverse, thereby creating a path back 
from the Type iv to the Type m  environment.
Massive and powerful institutions, government 
complexes and multinational corporate systems cannot now be 
dismantled into independent firms and bureaus, and there are 
no obvious gains from now reducing the speeds and capacities of 
the global communications net, or placing a moratorium on 
scientific research. Attempts to begin reducing the inter­
dependence of the economic and other facets of society are 
at least equally infeasible. These are the forces behind the 
uneven acceleration of change, the growth in size, complexity, 
and interconnectedness of social fields, and they are forces 
that we should not deceive ourselves could be turned around, 
notwithstanding the convictions of the evangelicist, the 
authoritarian, and the synoptic idealist to the contrary.
The solution from which we might backwardly determine 
the content and design of the experiments that ought to be 
undertaken is not found therefore in the structure of the 
disturbed-reactive environment, to which there can be no 
return. we are concerned rather with a dialectical process 
in which the disturbed-reactive environment represents the 
thesis, and the turbulent environment the antithesis. The 
synthesis, and our solution, is not the disturbed-reactive 
environment again, but a modified form of it which we may 
tenatively call a disturbed-creative environment. it is a 
modulated form of the turbulent environment in which some of 
the character of the disturbed-reactive environment is repro­
duced .
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Turbulence is generated by the pounding accumulation 
of competitive energies and forces which are predominantly 
divergent - single self-seeking power centres each seeking to 
refashion the world in their own image, and deciding amongst 
competition, co-operation or coalition on the basis of power 
added, when these same forces become convergent it is often 
unpredictably so, there having been no symptoms discernable 
with the aid of any existing instruments. The consequences 
of actions lead off everywhere and anywhere, with unexpected 
and unprepared for windfalls and traumas equally possible.
What becomes necessary is to have greater potentialities for 
convergence built into the field - a rewiring of the loose 
ends of action consequences to enhance the probabilities that 
they will converge and cohere into recognizable patterns, rather 
than working themselves out through attrition or converging 
randomly to create contingencies that can neither be readily 
taken advantage of nor easily avoided.
To identify, plot and engender convergence out of 
such blooming, buzzing confusion is a task demanding creati­
vity, and it is for this reason that we are inclined to refer 
to the modulated turbulent environment as disturbed-creative.
It is still disturbed because the generating forces of 
turbulence cannot be eradicated. The creativity especially 
required, as previously suggested, is creativity in value- 
formation and, dissemination - in other words, leadership.
The potentialities for the deliberate creation of convergence 
and coherence out of the turbulently connected field are a 
function of the quality of leadership in all the regions and 
at each level in the field, of the ability of some human 
beings to relate the unconnected, unite the dissident, and 
all the time imaginatively embrace the more and more inclusive 
systems of which they are part. The necessary rewiring is not 
something that may be accomplished technically, or politically, 
or educationally, or by any other system of power. it is
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something that has to be accomplished by the fragile instru­
ments of mens minds, and their capacities to present and 
adhere to ideals to which the behaviours of multiple and 
diverse actors in the field may be directively correlated.
Having identified the disturbed-creative environment 
as the 'solution', the question arises whether in specific 
cases, it may be approached “from below5, from the simpler 
environments, through interventions in the evolutionary 
processes at the Type II and Type m  levels. The appeal of 
this strategy is that it may in some respects be easier to 
glide the developmental forces in clustered and reactive 
environments so as to produce a demonstration case of the 
disturbed-creative field than to discover the kinds of inter­
ventions appropriate in the turbulent field to reducing its 
complexity. in the case of urban planning the concrete terms 
of this possibility have to do with the kind of planning 
that is done in new communities.
New communities (estates, villages, towns, cities) 
embodying modernity in conception and design, and reflecting 
current or somewhat advanced notions of appropriate standards 
of living have become a salient feature of contemporary society 
and are much discussed in the planning literature. it is 
generally (but not always) appreciated that new communities 
in themselves can never provide an answer to the real problems 
of the large city. They syphon away minute and often privileged 
fractions of metropolitan populations and in their novelty and 
physical attractiveness distract attention from the dominant 
urban sprawls. They have however been referred to, and appealed 
to, as sites in which experiments in planning might take place.
New urban growth comes in many different forms - 
garden cities and garden suburbs, model estates and villages, 
corridor expansion and new satellites for the metropolis. in 
such contexts planning may begin from a virgin, 'green fields'
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environment, or, as in town expansion schemes, from a more 
disturbed, though still relatively simple environment. in 
cases where new towns are built on publicly owned land in 
particular, planning organizations occupy highly favourable 
positions vis a vis those in the large established cities, 
if the judgement is correct that a requirement for coming to 
terms with turbulent planning environments is new forms of 
more positive engagement between planners and other parts of 
the field, then the conclusion seems justified that the 
experience of creating new communities to date has been no­
where near as useful as it might have been.
These benign environments seem to have attracted 
some of the best planners with the promise of relatively 
early and very tangible results. characteristically however 
they have used their protected positions to perfect the 
traditional modes of planning, and to develop new techniques, 
rather than experimenting with the planning process itself, 
planners continue to differentiate among their own capabilities 
hierarchically, organizing themselves into bureaucratic 
structures when these are demonstrably less responsive than 
organic and matrix forms of organization. while there is much 
talk in new communities of 'social' planning, in fact planning 
usually continues to be organized around physical and spatial 
concepts, and reputations made on architectural achievements, 
not social. The 'Master plan' is out and 'participation' in, 
but seldom with significant consequences. The 'strategic 
outline plan' is less dogmatic and more palatable to the 
planned, while participation as it is normally conceived 
absorbs protest but fails to unleash new energies and enthusi­
asms. The community Development officer seems often to be 
the product of the same type of thinking, which produces 
'innovations' that will better maintain the status quo.
Canberra, the Australian national capital, provides 
a classic example of this 'opportunity lost'. constituted in
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1957, the National capital Development Commission has become 
in what it is and what it does a near perfect model of the 
traditional style of city planning. The organization is 
powerful, efficient, and impersonal, and its planning long- 
range, comprehensive and authoritarian. with the land it 
occupies owned by the commonwealth, and its uses controlled 
by the planners through a leasehold system, Canberra's planners 
occupy a position that is the envy of their colleagues in the 
state capitals. They have used their powers to create a 
physically superb, but socially and politically dormant habitat, 
manifested in the pervasive 'we-them' mental set of Canberrans 
towards the commission.
Of the practically total lack of citizen involvement 
in the planning process the commission has at least been quite 
frank:
Although all avenues of disseminating information 
are pursued, there is no direct involvement of the 
public in the planning process. There has been 
little evidence of a desire for such involvement 
so far but it can be anticipated that a more edu­
cated public (sici) will seek more opportunities 
for dialogue before decisions are made. The 
Commission can see much value in dialogue on 
matters of 'municipal' concern. it has already 
conducted a number of surveys of attitudes and 
behaviour of people and is proceeding with a 
programme of seminars on topics which lend them­
selves to public comment. [NCDC:1970:134]
Elsewhere in the same publication, a high quality and expensive 
book on 'Tommorrows Canberra', the planner's priorities are 
further revealed. The key to the commission's success in the 
planning and development of Canberra is attributed to five 
factors:
The public ownership of land and the leasehold 
system of tenure; the availability of reasonable 
funds for development; the absence of fragmenta­
tion in responsibilities for the planning, 
development, and construction of the city; mutual
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understanding of objectives between the leasing 
and administration authority [The commonwealth 
Department of the interior] and the planning, 
development, and construction authority; and 
effective partnership with private enterprise.
[ibid:233]
The 150,000 human beings who struggle to breathe life into 
the monumentality and vistas, the district centres and neigh­
bourhood units, are not accorded the privilege of partnership 
granted to private enterprise. They are privileged strangers 
in their own community.
in general the new communities seem to have deferred 
to the old paradigm of planning, and their planners occasion­
ally even to have struggled to retard the evolution from a 
clustered to a reactive environment. There are however, other 
possibilities for experimenting with open-ended and adaptive 
styles of planning that might eventually render the new 
community experiences relevant to the metropolitan crisis, 
by moving closer to the disturbed-creative environment. This 
would involve planners not in supplementing their physical 
planning by reacting to community organizations and protests 
as they appear and running the risk of entering a conflict 
situation, but in creating organization as an ingredient just 
as essential as roads and shops, and creating it not around 
particularized interests or territorial units, but around 
ideals that express the direction in which the community sees 
itself moving.
Community engagement with planners ought not to be 
organized around 'participation', which, as in universities, 
invariably means lower echelons participating upwards in a 
manner that reinforces status barriers and isolates the 
'participators', but around citizen control, delegated power, 
and partnership. This would mean planners foresaking the 
shelter and impersonality of the commission offices and seeking 
legitimation in terms of human qualities that can be seen to
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fit them in some respects to act on behalf of and lead the 
community.
Fundamentally, if new communities are to be regarded 
as more than beautiful set pieces, as ends in themselves, and 
used by societies to experimentally generate new forms of 
societal development and regulation that are more promising 
for the future than those existing, the conventional 'industrial' 
techniques of controlling and structuring developments compre­
hensively from the centre, avoiding or dampening conflicts, 
and visualizing growth only as a quantitative affair, have to 
be surrendered. The living medium of the coming world is 
unlikely to be 'cool' and strongly structured by its figural 
elements, and contemporary designs for creating such worlds 
are segmental and irrelevant in the broader picture. it will 
be 'hot' and fast-reactive, evincing structure only at the 
field level, phenomenal worlds at lower levels being dominated 
by diversity, transience and novelty.
To prepare for this world the captains of the new 
communities ought not to wait upon publics becoming 'more 
educated', but should vigorously go out and educate and create 
opportunities for education. planners who really believe in 
what they are doing, and want others to really believe in it 
too, might devote resources to running their own continuing 
education programmes and spread their planning knowledge as 
far as possible. They might abandon the publication of cool 
coffee-table books and reports in favour of 'turning on' 
planning awareness and interest through the local radio station, 
seeking the maximum exposure of issues and conflicts. They 
might even begin weighing the personal satisfactions of advocacy 
against the bureaucratic security of the planning authority.
Notwithstanding such possibilities in the planning 
of new communities, there are considerable forces militating 
against the development of the creative-convergent field out
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of the clustered and reactive environments of new community 
settings, and some grounds for suspecting that even if this 
could be achieved it might not be a convincing demonstration 
for those who would have to approach this new state from its 
opposite side, looking back» in particular, generally high 
levels of content with the living environments of new 
communities compared to those previously experienced dispose 
inhabitants against permanent active involvements»
It seems therefore that the experiments that have 
to be undertaken are those directed to producing a disturbed- 
creative field from states of affairs that have already in 
some senses moved beyond this, into turbulence. This means 
taking open-ended, adaptive planning principles into the 
worst communities of the big cities and demonstrating there 
that people can do their own planning, and through this con­
tinuously learn more about planning, their community, and 
each other. it. has to be demonstrated too that in this 
process the community can nurture latent creativity and leader­
ship, and discover the ideals that can focus forces of dissen­
sion and distress as well as initiative and enthusiasm»
To push, gratuitously perhaps, just one step further, 
we might suggest that any really effective transformation of 
the turbulent urban field may be more effectively brought about 
by a pincer movement in which grass-roots transformation of 
social settings in a number of scattered community laboratories 
is carried out in connection with and direct relation to the 
working out at the level of the leadership of the whole field, 
of a guiding philosophy or vision of future life in the city. 
City Hall and ghetto leaders, City councils and Ratepayers 
Associations, city planning authorities and local progress 
Associations might thus devote time and effort to negotiating 
a positive fusion of energies and collaborating in the produc­
tion of a vision and philosophy for the development of the field 
as a whole, a vision which the grass roots transformations 
might both exemplify and amplify.
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